

THE CAMPAIGN IN MANCHURIA

1904 to 1905

THE SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES

Crown 8vo, cloth, copiously supplied with Maps and
Plans. Price 5s. net each.

- I. SAARBRÜCK TO PARIS: THE FRANCO-
GERMAN WAR. By COL. SISSON C. PRATT,
late R.A.
- II. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877. By
MAJOR F. MAURICE.
- III. FREDERICKSBURG: A STUDY IN
WAR, 1862. By MAJOR G. W. REDWAY.
- IV. THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA and
SOLFERINO, 1859. By COL. H. C. WILLY, C.B.
- V. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. By COL.
SISSON C. PRATT, late R.A.
- VI. THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA, 1866.
By LT.-COL. G. J. R. GLÜNICKE.
- VII. THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN, 1813. By
COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.
- VIII. GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA,
1864 (THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN). By CAPT.
VAUGHAN SAWYER, Indian Army.
- IX. THE JENA CAMPAIGN, 1806. By COL.
F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.
- X. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. By
CAPT. F. R. SEDGWICK, R.F.A.
- XI. THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1861-1862
(BULL RUN TO MALVERN HILL). By MAJOR G. W.
REDWAY.
- XII. THE ULM CAMPAIGN. By COL. F. N.
MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.
- XIII. THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1863
(CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG). By COL.
P. H. DALBIAC.
- XIV. THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1862
(CEDAR RUN, MANASSAS, AND SHARPSBURG). By
E. W. SHEPPARD.
- XV. NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY,
1796-1797 and 1800. By LT.-COL. R. G. BURTON.

SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES.

- NO 1913

THE CAMPAIGN IN MANCHURIA

1904 to 1905

SECOND PERIOD—THE DECISIVE BATTLES

22nd AUG. TO 17th OCT. 1904

By

CAPTAIN F. R. SEDGWICK, ROYAL ARTILLERY

(Brevet-Major in the Canadian Militia), Professor of Strategy, Tactics and Artillery
at the Royal Military College of Canada

AUTHOR OF "THE INDIAN MUTINY" ETC.

WITH MAPS AND PLANS



LONDON

GEORGE ALLEN & COMPANY, LTD.

RUSKIN HOUSE, 44 AND 45 RATHBONE PLACE

NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1912

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION
OF INDIA, NEW DELHI
LIBRARY

Acc. No. M 267
Dated 24/11/84

All Rights Reserved

PREFACE

THE present volume is a continuation of a previous volume of the Special Campaign Series. It deals with the two great battles which, though exceeded in magnitude by the great battle of Mukden which took place in the spring of 1905, were the decisive phases of the campaign in Manchuria.

To English readers and authors the Japanese, Chinese and Russian names make the story of the campaign difficult to follow. In this book the spelling adopted by the British official account of the war has been adhered to. A very large mass of literature dealing with the events of the campaign has already accumulated. In this book the authority accepted has always been that of the British official account and the reports of British officers, which together form a body of military literature replete with interest and instruction.

Though very many others of the great historical campaigns form a more interesting study than the campaign in Manchuria, because complicated and interesting strategical operations enter into them, whereas the campaign in Manchuria was singularly simple in the strategy displayed by both sides—yet

few better repay study by the military student. Few campaigns have illustrated more clearly the all-importance of the moral factor. Few have proved so well the truth of Napoleon's aphorism, "L'armée ne vaut rien que par la tête."

My thanks are due to Lieut.-Col. T. B. Wood, General Staff, for kindly reading through the MS. for me and making a number of suggestions.

F. R. SEDGWICK,
MAJOR.

KINGSTON, CANADA,
18th February 1912.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTORY	1
II. THE PLANS OF CAMPAIGN	11
III. SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE OF LIAOYANG	24
IV. ORDERS FOR ADVANCE AND PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS, 22ND TO 25TH AUGUST	29
V. ACTIONS OF THE 26TH AUGUST	36
<i>Note to Chapter V.—EVENTS OF THE 26TH IN DETAIL</i>	41
VI. RETREAT TO THE "ADVANCED POSITION OF LIAOYANG"	53
VII. 30TH AUGUST—THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF LIAOYANG	67
VIII. THE SECOND DAY OF THE BATTLE OF LIAOYANG	88
<i>Note to Chapter VIII.—EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES BY THE RUSSIANS. THE FIGHTING OF THE 5TH, 3RD AND 6TH DIVISIONS</i>	99
IX. THE RUSSIANS RETREAT TO THE "MAIN POSITION OF LIAOYANG"	108

CHAPTER	PAGE
X. ADVANCE OF THE JAPANESE ARMIES. THE CAPTURE OF MANJUYAMA	116
XI. THE RUSSIAN COUNTER-ATTACK	128
XII. THE RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS TO MUKDEN	158
XIII. BOTH SIDES RECUPERATE AFTER THE STRUGGLE	162
XIV. SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE OF THE SHAHO	178
XV. 4TH TO 10TH OCTOBER	188
XVI. 11TH OCTOBER	212
XVII. NIGHT OPERATIONS, 11TH-12TH OCTOBER	239
<i>Note to Chapter XVII.—THE NIGHT AT- TACKS, 11TH-12TH OCTOBER</i>	245
XVIII. 12TH OCTOBER	250
<i>Note to Chapter XVIII.—ACTION OF THE GUARD AND 2ND DIVISIONS</i>	271
XIX. 13TH OCTOBER	279
XX. 14TH OCTOBER	289
XXI. 15TH, 16TH AND 17TH OCTOBER— THE END OF THE BATTLE	301
CONCLUSION	312

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Summary of Operations up to August 1904—Comparison of the Interior Organisations of the Two Armies—The Theatre of Operations—The dominant strategic Factors

WAR between Russia and Japan broke out in February 1904. The cause of the war and the initial operations of both sides have already been detailed in a volume of the Special Campaign Series. The first essential to ultimate success was the command of the sea. For Japan this was vital, for Russia of great importance. Japan gained command of the sea within three days of the outbreak of war, and from that time to a period beyond that of which the present volume treats, command of the waters of the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan rested with Japan. But the Russian squadron in the Far East though beaten was not destroyed. It had taken refuge at Port Arthur, a strong naval base at the end of the Liaotung Peninsula. In European waters Russia

was organising a second squadron, which (it was hoped) would, combined with the squadron at Port Arthur, wrest the command of the sea from the Japanese.

The bone of contention between Russia and Japan was the possession of Korea and the control of Southern Manchuria. The first land operations of the Japanese were therefore directed to an occupation of Korea. This was accomplished by the end of April, when an army of 40,000 men was assembled on the Yalu river which forms the northern boundary of the Korean Peninsula.

Meanwhile Russia had been making great efforts to collect her troops in the Far East. Port Arthur was strongly garrisoned and provisioned, advanced troops were pushed to the Yalu, and an advanced base was formed on the railway at Liaoyang.

On 1st May the Japanese attacked the Russian advanced troops on the Yalu. This detachment, whose rôle was essentially that of a delaying force, stood to fight against a twofold superiority of numbers and was severely defeated by the 1st Japanese Army.

Immediately after the battle a 2nd Japanese Army landed north of Port Arthur, and drove the advanced troops of the garrison back into the fortress after a severe action at Nanshan. A 3rd Japanese Army was then landed to take up the siege of Port Arthur, while the 2nd Army turned northwards for an

advance up the railway. Meanwhile a 4th Army landed at Takushan, half-way between the Yalu and Taliewan, which was the base of the 2nd Army.

General Kuropatkin, who had taken command of the Russian army in Manchuria, was urged to advance to the relief of Port Arthur. Instead of refusing to do so, or else advancing south with all his available forces, he adopted a half measure and sent one army corps with some attached troops to oppose General Oku. On 15th June this detachment suffered a severe defeat at Telissu.

Soon after this all the three Japanese armies advanced, and occupied the line of the range of mountains which forms the backbone of the Liaotung Peninsula.

It was not, however, till the end of July that a further advance was made. This movement placed the 2nd and 4th Armies in close proximity to one another near Haicheng, some thirty-five miles south of Liaoyang, and the 1st Army in the valley of the Lan river, some twenty-five miles east and south-east of Liaoyang. A further pause in the operations now took place, partly due to the heavy rains and partly because the Japanese had to get the line of communication in thorough order. This pause the Russians utilised to bring up reinforcements.

The whole period from February to August 1904 may justly be termed the period of concentration.

Both armies were now face to face and the period of decisive battles was to commence. The dominant factor in the situation was Port Arthur. The fall of the naval base would put an end to any hope the Russians might have of gaining command of the sea. It would be an advertisement to all the world of the impotence on land; further, it would set free the Japanese 3rd Army to join the field armies.

Just before the operations known as the battle of Liaoyang commenced, the 3rd Army, which was conducting the siege of Port Arthur, delivered its first general assault. It was repulsed with terrible loss.

The country over which the operations about to be described took place consists of two quite distinct areas, a plain and an area of mountains.
The Theatre of Operations The Liao river runs through a wide and level fertile plain, populous and closely dotted with villages. Two big tributaries join it on the left bank, the southern one called the Taitzu, the northern the Hun. These two streams issue from the mountains and flow generally east to west. At the point where they issue from the mountains are the two great towns of Liaoyang and Mukden. East of the line joining these two towns is the mountain area. The backbone of this area is a mountain chain which runs from the Russian province of Primorsk to the Liactung Peninsula, at the southern extremity of which stands Port Arthur. But indeed Nature

seems to have cast the mountains of Manchuria in no ordinary mould. They form a tangled, jumbled mass of hills, here rugged and bare, there forest-clad.

In the valleys run small streams; and though the population is sparse, if compared with that of the Liao river plain, yet up into all these valleys have spread farmers. Thus in every valley were to be found the mud houses of the inhabitants, and the crops of kaoliang or millet which form the staple produce of the country.

There was not a single road in the country, in our acceptance of the term. The so-called "Mandarin Road," which runs from Mukden to Liaoyang and thence to Port Arthur, is a mere track without metalling of any kind. In wet weather the traveller had often to turn off the roads on to the fields.

A single line of railway, the Southern Manchurian Railway, runs from the Siberian Transcontinental Railway southwards through Manchuria to Port Arthur. This railway constituted the sole Russian line of communication; and as their transport services were badly equipped its importance to an army of 200,000 souls can well be imagined.

The Japanese 2nd Army used the same railway as a line of communication, its base being Talienwan Bay. The 4th Army used partly the railway, partly a road from Takushan over the Fenshuiling Range to Hsimucheng. The 1st Army was based on the Yalu,

and used a tramway to Fenghuangcheng, and thence a so-called road which crosses the Fenshuijing Range by a pass called the Motienling. For road transport in the hills the Japanese disposed of a valuable tractive power in the shape of men accustomed to draw loads. In the mountains no transport animal could equal the man.

A few words must be said about the organisation of the forces. The Japanese were organised in divisions and Kobi (reserve) brigades.

A division consisted of :

- 1 cavalry regiment (3 squadrons)
- 2 infantry brigades (each 2 regiments of 3 battalions)
- 1 artillery regiment (6 batteries each of 6 guns)
- 1 engineer battalion (of 3 companies)

About half the divisional artillery were pack batteries.

A Kobi brigade consisted of :

- 3 infantry regiments (each of 2 battalions)

Some of the Kobi brigades were "mixed" brigades and consisted of :

- c 1 squadron
- 3 regiments (each of 2 battalions)
- 1 battery
- 1 company engineers

Besides these troops the Japanese had 2 cavalry

brigades of 2 regiments (of 4 squadrons), and 3 field artillery brigades each consisting of 3 regiments (of 6 batteries of 6 guns). Certain special units of heavy field artillery had also been formed during the war.

The Russian army was divided into army corps. An army corps consisted of :

Some cavalry (generally a Cossack regiment)

2 divisions

1 engineer battalion

The divisions consisted of :

2 infantry brigades (of 2 regiments of either 3 or 4 battalions)

1 artillery brigade (of either 4, 6 or 8 batteries of 8 guns)

It should be noted that a *Rifle* regiment was a three-battalion regiment, an *Infantry* regiment was a four-battalion regiment.

The rifle divisions had artillery brigades of 4 batteries each, the infantry divisions had artillery brigades of 6 or 8 batteries. Thus an army corps composed of *Rifle* regiments consisted of :

4 to 6 squadrons

64 guns

24 battalions

1 engineer battalion

An army corps composed of *Infantry* regiments consisted of :

4 to 6 squadrons

96 to 128 guns

32 battalions

1 engineer battalion

The mounted troops were organised in brigades.
The brigades were sometimes grouped in divisions.

A Cossack brigade consisted normally of:

2 regiments (of 6 sotnias each)

1 horse artillery battery (of 6 guns)

In addition to the regular formations there were a number of sotnias of frontier guards, some sections of horse pack artillery (gunners mounted), some heavy artillery, a balloon section, and so forth.

Throughout the battles one important fact must be remembered. The Japanese battalion was almost always 1000 strong.¹ The Russian battalions on the other hand were rarely more than 750 strong, and often were much less.

Thus a Siberian corps of 24 battalions might muster but few more bayonets fit for duty than a Japanese division of 12 battalions.

On the other hand a Siberian corps would be able to put 64 Q.F. guns of the latest pattern against the Japanese division's 36 B.L.'s. The disparity was to some extent redressed by the 108 guns of the field

¹ The Austrian military attachés traverse this statement, and indicate that the fighting strength of a Japanese battalion rarely equalled 800 of all ranks.

artillery brigade which was with the army, combined with the numerous batteries of mortars and captured pieces. It must be noted, too, that many Japanese batteries were pack batteries, a means of transport much more suitable for the mountain tracks and bad roads than ordinary draught.

The strategical situation was dominated by two factors. The first and principal factor was the **The Dominant Strategic Factors** existence of a Russian "fleet in being" in Port Arthur. The command of the sea was essential to Japanese success.

The Russians were making every effort to collect in European waters and send out to Japan a fleet which it was hoped would wrest the command of the sea from Japan. The fleet in Port Arthur would be a notable accession of strength to the European fleet, while Port Arthur would be invaluable to the whole navy as a base.

Every retreat northwards meant for the Russians greater difficulty in relieving Port Arthur.

The other factor is also of much importance. The Russians were rapidly bringing up very large forces to the theatre of war. Even when Port Arthur had been captured and the three Japanese divisions there set loose, and every reserve formation, in addition to the two active divisions still held in Japan, had been despatched to the front, the Russians would still be numerically superior.

Every day's delay before the decisive battle took place accentuated the numerical superiority of Russia.

There was, however, another factor to be reckoned with, and that of much importance. The sinews of war, money, were not procurable in Japan. Recourse had to be made to foreign loans. It was essential to the Japanese borrowing power that their arms should not suffer the shadow of a defeat. Success would unloosen the purse-strings of American and British financiers ; the first suspicion of failure would make borrowing well-nigh impossible.

Every consideration then urged early action on the Japanese leaders.

It should be mentioned here that no explanation of the retention in Japan of the 7th and 8th Japanese division has yet been given. Perhaps there was some idea of action in the Primorsk. At Liaoyang these two divisions might have turned barren success into a great victory.

Throughout this book strengths of a force will be described thus :
x/y/z meaning x squadrons, y guns, z battalions. Thus: 6/90/32
means 6 squadrons, 90 guns, 32 battalions.

CHAPTER II

Map I

THE PLANS OF CAMPAIGN

The Distribution of the Opposing Main Armies—Comparison of Strength—Japanese Orders to advance—Study of the Plan of Operations of both Sides

ON the 23rd August 1904 the distribution of the armies around Liaoyang was as follows :—The Distribution of Russians were divided into a Southern Russian Army Group, an Eastern Group and a Reserve.

The Southern Group under Zarubaiev, the commander of the IV. Siberian Corps, had its headquarters at Anshanchan. It consisted of the I. Siberian Corps 20/82/21, which lay south of Anshanchan, the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division 11/32/12, which was the nucleus of the II. Siberian Corps, and was placed on the left of the I. Siberians, and the IV. Siberian Corps 6/32/24 in reserve north of Anshanchan.

There was also a "Southern Group Mounted

Reserve" of 17/6/— part of which was with the covering detachments.

These covering detachments were of all arms, and were pushed out some five to ten miles south. Their strengths were 16/12/3 under Zikov and Gurko, 6/22/5 under Kondratovich, both from the I. Siberian Corps, 6/16/8 under Rebinder from the IV. Siberian Corps, 4/4/2 under Troubetzkoi and 5/—/2 under Tolmachev, both from the II. Siberian Corps.

Troubetzkoi and Tolmachev formed a link with the Eastern Group, a function which up to 19th August had been filled by the brigade of Cossacks of Mischenko.

The Eastern Group, under Bildlerling, the commander of the XVII. Corps, had its headquarters at Liaoyang. It consisted of the X., XVII. and III. Siberian Corps.

The III. Siberians 14/68/24 were posted astride the main road just north of Langtushan. The X. Corps 12/126/32 prolonged* the line northwards. The XVII. Corps 6/114/28 had a division under Yanjul north of the Taitzu and the other division with headquarters at Hsiaolingtzu was employed on the works of the so-called "advanced position" of Liaoyang. The Eastern Group had also pushed out covering detachments 11/4/1 under Grekov connected with the Southern Group and 2/—/ $\frac{1}{2}$ under

Drujinin, with one battalion in an advanced post on the main road, were found by the III. Siberians. The X. Corps had detachments guarding all the passes leading up from the Lan river valley.

In Liaoyang, under Kuropatkin's personal command, were the two cavalry divisions of Mischenko 21/12/- and Samsonov 18/6/- and a force of 15/25/16 garrisoning the town.

The V. Siberian Corps was concentrating at Mukden. Part at any rate should be available in a few days.

Special precautions had been taken to guard and watch the flanks. This was done by means of independent detachments, placed as follows :—

On the right :

Under Kossagovski in the valley of the Liao river	8/4/3
--	-------

On the left :

1. Under Grulev at Penhsihu 6/4/5
2. Under Ljubavin east of Penhsihu 12/4/-
3. Under Madritov on the passes of
the Taling Mountains 10/2/2

This gives a total of 36/14/10, or at a very moderate estimate 2500 sabres, 7500 rifles and 14 guns. Later on Kuropatkin increased these detachments, the bulk of whose strength was not employed in the battle.

To protect the town of Liaoyang, works of an

imposing character had been constructed. These Fortification works almost equalled in strength near those of a fortress. Some 130 guns of Liaoyang old pattern were mounted in the forts, and within the enceinte seven bridges had been made.

In advance of this "main position" an "advanced position" had been constructed. This position stretched from Shoushanpu on the railway to Hsiapu on the Taitzü river.

The portion of this "advanced position" guarding Liaoyang from the south was very strongly entrenched.

The position now occupied by the Russians was some fifteen miles south and east of the so-called "advanced position." But though not prepared with the care expended on the "main" and "advanced" position, yet the positions at Anshanchan, at Langtushan and on the Anpingling pass were naturally strong, and were entrenched.

The Japanese dispositions, which had altered but little since the battles of 31st July, were as follows:—

The 1st Army, under Kuroki, consisting of Umezawa's Guard Kobi Brigade, the 12th Division, Distribution of the 2nd Division and the Guard the Japanese Division stood in that order in the Army Lan river valley with Umezawa behind the right flank.

The 4th Army, under Nodzu, consisting of the 5th and 10th Divisions and the 10th Kobi Brigade, stood east of Haicheng with half the 10th Kobi Brigade pushed forward on the right to Tiehshantun.

The 2nd Army, under Oku, consisting of the 3rd, 6th and 4th Divisions, stood west of Haicheng in the order named, in the Haicheng river valley. The 1st Cavalry Brigade was in advance of the left. The 11th Kobi Brigade and a brigade of field artillery with some heavy artillery were at Haicheng.

Headquarters were at Haicheng from 22nd August.

Summary of Strengths Summarised the total of squadrons, guns and battalions were as follows :—

	Russian	Japanese
Squadrons	152	33
Guns	559	470
Battalions	193	113

But the Russian squadrons and battalions were very weak. A fairer estimate of strength is therefore by sabres, guns and bayonets. These were as follows :—

	Russian	Japanese
Sabres	12,000	4,000
Guns	559	470
Bayonets	135,000	115,000

It is clear that Kuropatkin disposed of a very considerable superiority, particularly in the cavalry arm. During the battle the Russians received

reinforcements of at least 16 battalions and 32 guns, while the Japanese were only able to bring up a battalion or two from the line of communications.

Such was the situation and strength of the armies which were about to fight out the great battle after **The Theatre of Operations** a period of concentration lasting from February to August. The battlefield of Liaoyang is divided into two sections of very marked physical differences. West of the Mandarin Road lies the perfectly level fertile open plain of the Liao valley. At this season of the year the plain was covered with crops. The principal crop is kaoliang, a variety of millet, the stalks of which grow to some ten feet in height and close together. Except where the ground had been cleared in front of the Russian prepared positions this was the milieu in which the fighting on the plain took place. East of the Mandarin Road rise the spurs of the mountains, and within a few miles the country is of really mountainous character. This area is a tangled jumble of hills, sometimes covered with bush, sometimes bare. The valleys are occupied by farmers who cultivate the lower slopes in terraces. The numerous streams are passable anywhere, but are liable to sudden floods. The Taitzu river, a tributary of the Liao river, flows from the east to Liaoyang, then after a sharp bend northwards it turns to the south and the sea. On the southern

bank are three tributaries of some importance—the Lan and Tang rivers east of Liaoyang and the Sha river south of Liaoyang. A tributary of the Tang river, called the Hsita, offers an approach to the Tang valley from the south.

The line of communication of the Russian army was the railway to Harbin, but the Japanese had two lines of communication. The 1st Army was based on the Yalu, the 2nd and 4th Armies on Talienshan Bay, with the railway as a line of communication.

The Japanese 1st Army was considerably nearer Liaoyang than were the 2nd and 4th Armies, but on

the other hand the country intervening was more difficult. As the Japanese were apparently still determined to retain the 7th and 8th Divisions in Japan, further delay, when a cessation of the rain allowed a resumption of operations, was only giving time to the Russians to collect ever stronger and stronger forces. If Oyama were to delay much longer Kuropatkin might attack and seize the initiative, that priceless asset of a general.

The courses open to the Japanese were not very numerous. The 1st Army might be weakened by transferring a division to the 4th Army, and the main attack be made against the Russian right, which would be attacked in front by the 4th and in flank by the 2nd Army. This action had the

objection that the 1st Army, which was already exposed, might be attacked on the right flank and overwhelmed, or might be cut off from the main army altogether by an advance of the Russians between the two Japanese wings.

Again, the 1st Army might be strengthened, and an endeavour made to turn the Russian left. This was dangerous, as the 2nd and 4th Armies covered the main line of communication, and the Russians might descend upon their left. It also involved placing the army astride a big river liable to heavy flood.

Thirdly, the 4th Army might be strengthened and try to penetrate between the Russian front, turning both wings at the same time. As this would be met by an advance of the Russian reserves the action would lead to no result, except that the Japanese would be strung out on a long line instead of being disposed in two compact forces.

Finally, there was the simple plan of continuing to advance in the same direction as had been employed up to this time, with the object of delivering a converging attack against the Russians' positions south of Liaoyang. This was the plan adopted.

Kuropatkin had decided to stand on the defensive for the present, and to withdraw his ^{Russian Plan} two wings towards Liaoyang. A strong reserve was to be collected with which to take the offensive when occasion offered.

That this plan gave away all the advantages of the "interior" lines on which he stood is clear, but it had the merit that his two wings ought to be able to delay the enemy for some time longer. Every moment gained would allow more troops to come up, whereas, if the offensive was taken at once, the V. Siberian Corps could not be up in time. His plan, though cautious and unenterprising, was probably sound. Had he decided to attack, it is clear that more decisive success was to be gained by the defeat of the Japanese left, but that the easier and quicker direction to achieve a success might be found in an attack on the Japanese 1st Army, which was nearer to Liaoyang and was exposed to attacks on both flanks.

It will be seen that both sides eschewed all complexity and adopted the simplest of the plans presented to them. Indeed, the Japanese
Comments were now in close proximity to the enemy, and as the roads were so bad, manoeuvre could only be slow and difficult. Thus straightforward advance offered the best chance of success. The first task was clearly to drive the Russians back to Liaoyang. This would bring the three armies into close contact, and it might then be possible to manoeuvre or to continue the advance along the convergent lines of operation in the hope

of achieving a result similar to that at Königgrätz, when the two Prussian armies converged on the Austrians.

The peculiarity of the dispositions adopted by Kuropatkin to carry out his plan of delaying the enemy to gain time, lies in the large numbers employed in the two covering detachments on the southern and eastern fronts. We know now that Kuropatkin seriously overestimated the strength of the force opposed to him.

The slowness of the Japanese advance, the want of energy during June and July, particularly on the part of the 1st Army, the fact that the Japanese had not developed turning movements in their battles in much strength, seems to have conveyed no meaning to him. It was in consequence of this exaggeration of the actual strength of the Japanese that the two holding detachments, as the eastern and southern groups really were, were made very strong. Hence no large reserve was available for offensive action to follow up a success gained on either wing.

It has been noticed that the Japanese 1st Army in the Lan valley was much nearer to Liaoyang than the 2nd and 4th Armies in the Haicheng valley. The 1st Army threatened the road to Mukden. A success by this army, whether it advanced westwards or north-westwards, would threaten the existence of troops on the Anshanchan position.

To guard against such a contingency Kuropatkin had placed two army corps in the Langtzushan-Anping position with a third corps in reserve. But up to 24th August, when the first movements had already taken place, Kuropatkin had still no intention of holding these advanced positions. He proposed to fall back on to the "advanced position of Liaoyang" and there fight the matter out. There he could keep two corps at least in reserve for an offensive movement, because by constricting his front he could economise men.

Now this plan was quite sound if unimaginative. The defect in its execution must be, however, noted. He had made his advanced troops too strong. Even timorous leaders will not tamely surrender a position. When the leaders dispose of such strength, as did the commanders of the two groups, it was inevitable that more or less severe fighting would take place. This fighting was to be followed by a retreat. A weak covering detachment, a rearguard, expects to retreat, and no demoralising influence results, but the retreat of great bodies of troops from carefully entrenched positions like those at Anshanchan and Langtzushan is inevitably accompanied with some demoralisation and much friction. Kuropatkin then was guilty of violating the excellent tactical maxim, that detachments whose rôle is merely observation and delay should be as weak as possible consistent

M8067



with enabling them to carry out their duties. The cavalry, the mounted scout detachments, and a few regiments of infantry with a strong force of artillery would have accomplished at least as much as did the $5\frac{1}{2}$ army corps allotted to the two "Groups."

It is true that on 24th August Kuropatkin changed his plan. It was then too late. It seems clear, however, that up to that date his fixed intention was to retire to the "advanced position."

The Japanese plan of campaign was, like their opponent's, simple and direct. No subtlety, no finesse, no "manceuvre" entered into it. A direct forward movement, converging on Liaoyang, was to take place. When the Russians were driven back on Liaoyang a decision was to be made whether the right or left flank was to be enveloped, or the front penetrated. The movements first ordered were calculated to reduce the front from about sixty-five miles to about twenty-five miles.

It is not clear how the Japanese could, with any safety, have "manceuvred" with either wing so long as the front covered was so very long. When the armies were in close touch then there would be some chance of manœuvring.

In fact, this is the inherent fault of the exterior, converging lines. "Manœuvre" is not feasible. Both wings must push straight to their front to get into touch with one another and to bring off the

double blow against the hostile army for which the operation is designed. When the Russians were forced into Liaoyang and the two wings were in touch, then would come the chance of using concentrated superior numbers at one point.

CHAPTER III

Map II

SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE OF LIAOYANG

As Oyama had decided to assume the offensive and to advance his armies along their present lines of operations which converged on Liaoyang, the first thing to be done was to force the Russian advanced troops back towards Liaoyang. This operation would bring the 1st Army and the 4th Army into touch with one another.

Phase I—
Russians
forced to with-
draw to their
Prepared
Position

The operations commenced on 26th August. On the eastern front there was severe fighting. The southern Russian group withdrew without fighting under cover of strong rearguards, which contested the advance of the Japanese advanced guards.

The Russian forces converged into their prepared position south of Liaoyang. This position was known as the "advanced position of Liaoyang." The position had its right on a hill about four miles south of the town and its left on the Taitzu river about six miles east of the town. Three corps were placed to hold the position. One corps was placed

on the north bank of the river. Two cavalry divisions covered the right, and a general reserve, consisting of a cavalry division and two corps, was at Liaoyang.

On 30th August the battle proper commenced. Six and a half divisions and two Kobi brigades.

Phase 2—
Main Attack
on Russian
Prepared
Position.
Turning
Movement by
Japanese
Right begun

attacked the main position south of the town, endeavouring to break straight through the defences, while one and a half divisions with a Kobi brigade commenced to pass the river about fifteen miles east of Liaoyang in order to envelop the Russian left and threaten the line of communications. At this time of year the Taitzu river is a very serious obstacle, only passable for guns at bridges. The main Japanese attack was unsuccessful on the 30th and again on the 31st, but the vigour of the attack induced Kuropatkin to dissipate most of his reserves to reinforce his defensive line. Meanwhile the one and a half divisions on the Japanese right passed the river without difficulty and formed up outside the Russian left.

The numbers of the Japanese which had passed the Taitzu were much exaggerated in the Russian reports. Though Kuropatkin had now at his disposal the majority of the 25,000 bayonets of the V. Siberian Corps he decided to abandon his "advanced" position south of Liaoyang and to

fall back on to the "main" fortified enceinte. Here he proposed to leave two corps; then with

Phase 3— the rest of his army, three to four Withdrawal to corps, to manœuvre, under cover of Liaoyang and the XVII. Corps which acted as an Concentration advanced guard, so as to fall upon against the isolated Japanese force north of Japanese Left. Capture of Manjuyama by the night 31st August to 1st September the Japanese the movement was commenced and was completed on the 1st.

On the 1st, however, the position of the XVII. Corps, which was guarding the left flank north of the river and was to form the advanced guard under cover of which the army was to manœuvre, was endangered by the successful capture of a hillock called by the Japanese Manjuyama. This hillock proved to be the "key" of the position of the XVII. Corps.

At this time a division, consisting for the most part of troops of the newly arrived V. Siberian Corps,

Phase 4— had marched from Yentai Station to the Repulse of Coal Mines. As the Japanese were convinced that the Russians were in retreat, Liaoyang. 2nd September saw them endeavouring Failure of to advance on both sides of the river. Russian Counter-stroke On the Russian side the two Russian corps left at Liaoyang held their ground, while the XVII. Corps endeavoured to retake the lost

hillock with the assistance of the division at the Coal Mines. Three corps were closing up to the XVII. Corps to take the offensive against the Japanese right wing.

The division from the Coal Mines was overwhelmed and destroyed by the right wing of the Japanese force north of the river, while the left wing of this force successfully held its ground on Manjuyama. The arrival of the I. Siberian Corps on the left of the XVII. Corps prevented the further advance of the Japanese right, but the division of the V. Siberian Corps fell back in complete disorder to Yentai.

The Liaoyang defences held out against all attacks. Kuropatkin ordered that Manjuyama be recaptured at all costs on the night 2nd-3rd September, and for that purpose placed a portion of the reserve at the disposal of the XVII. Corps. The attack failed.

During the night, moreover, Kuropatkin learnt not only that the attack on Manjuyama had again

Phase 5—
The Russians failed, but also that the veteran I. Siberian Corps under the celebrated retreat hard-fighting general, Stakelberg, had fallen back, exposing the left of the XVII. Corps, and, finally, that there was a shortage of ammunition in the Liaoyang defences.

At 4 A.M. on 3rd September he ordered a retreat towards Mukden. In Liaoyang the Russians held their ground ; elsewhere the retreat began at once.

Under cover of strong rearguards the retreat was successfully accomplished and, except for some attempt at pursuit by a portion of the forces north of the river, the Japanese were too exhausted to follow up their enemy. The Russians fell back on Mukden. The Japanese remained at Liaoyang.

From this synopsis it is clear that the battle resolves itself into five phases.

1. The advance of the Japanese and withdrawal of the Russians to their prepared position south of Liaoyang. The fighting during these operations took place chiefly on the eastern front on 25th to 28th August.

2. The main attack on the Russian prepared position on 30th and 31st August. During this time the Japanese right crossed the Taitzu.

3. The withdrawal of the Russians into Liaoyang; preparation for the counter-attack on the Japanese right; the fighting at Manjuyama; the Japanese approach against the main Liaoyang position; all on 1st September.

4. The assaults on the main positions of Liaoyang on 2nd and 3rd September, and the repulse of the Russian counter-attack on 2nd September and night 2nd-3rd September.

5. The Russian retreat to Mukden.

CHAPTER IV

Map I

ORDERS FOR ADVANCE AND PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS, 22ND TO 25TH AUGUST

Oyama's Orders for Advance—1st Army Orders—Advance of the Guard Division—Russian Covering Troops on the Right of the III. Siberian Corps driven back—Russian Movements in consequence—Ivanov calls on the XVII. Corps for Assistance—Kuropatkin decides to fight a decisive Engagement in his present Position

In Chapter II. the possible courses open to Marshal Oyama were considered. The course selected was a simple, straightforward advance by all to the his armies converging on Liaoyang. Japanese Army to advance On 22nd August Oyama issued his orders for the advance to be resumed.

The 1st Army was ordered to gain possession of the western bank of the Tang river and to extend to its left to join hands with the 4th Army. The 4th Army was to endeavour to reach the line of hills south of Mengchiafen-Sanchiatzu with its left about Yingtaoyuan. The 2nd Army was to reach the valley of the Sha river. These positions were to be reached by the 28th August.

To carry out its orders the 1st Army had to first drive the enemy across the Tang river and then cross the Tang itself and capture the hills on the western bank of that stream.

It was clear that each operation would require at least one day, so that the latest date on which operations must commence would be the 26th.

On the 22nd Kuroki issued his orders to the 1st Army.

The Guard Division was to attack the Russian right which was placed astride the main road. The 2nd and half of the 12th Division were to deliver the main attack against the position held by the X. Corps covering Anping. The main attack was to be delivered on the night 25th-26th. Half the 12th Division with a portion of the Kobi brigade was to attack the Russian left at and north of the Chipanling.

The field batteries of the 2nd Division accompanied the Guards. The 12th Division sent a mountain battery to the 2nd Division.

The Guard Kobi Brigade was to watch and guard the right against an attack from the direction of Penhsihu.

To carry out its task the Guard Division had to move at once. It was accompanied by ten batteries of field artillery, including a battery of captured

605
302
Leafplant

Q.F.'s. The Guard Division, which was on the main road, had kept touch with the enemy to its front and The Guard knew the general position of the outposts advances thrown out by the hostile advanced detachments. Its task was to turn the right of the III. Siberian Corps supposed to be about Tatientzu. Hasegawa, the commander of the division, considered that his best chance of accomplishing the operation was to seize the high ground between the valleys of the Tang river and the Hsita stream. The roads were extremely bad, even the main road required much work to put it in a state of repair sufficient to allow of the passage of the ten batteries which accompanied the division. The movement into the valley of the Hsita would be slow, and meanwhile the portion of the force executing the holding attack would be exposed to counter-attack.

At dawn on the 23rd the advanced guard,

$\frac{1}{2}$ squadron

1 battalion

1 battalion engineers

Occupies advanced without opposition to Hou-Houlangkou langkou. The engineers employed the day in making the road fit for artillery.

In the evening the division advanced and, continuing the march during the night 23rd-24th, reached a north-east and south-west line a little north of Houlangkou.

1.5 miles S.E. of Fuktaakou
on Langkou-Tatientzu road

The Guard Cavalry Regiment (less half squadron on outposts) reinforced by one company of infantry covered the left. In reserve south of Houlangkou were one battalion from each brigade, two squadrons of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2nd Division), ten batteries and the engineers.

Four batteries had been placed in a position of readiness just west of Houlangkou concealed in the *kaoliang*. The infantry had entrenched themselves in the dark.

During the 24th reconnoitring detachments of cavalry and infantry felt the Russian positions. Some of these detachments engaged with Drushinin's detachment (2/-/3), which held them at bay. The demonstration was successful, however, in inducing Ivanov, Commander of the III. Siberian Corps, to send up four mounted scouts detachments and a rifle regiment (3 battalions) which occupied a ridge east of Drushinin's line. The Guard Cavalry also engaged Grekov's detachment (11/4/1) in the valley of the Hsita.

Late in the afternoon a general advance by the Guard Division commenced and was continued into ~~Occupies~~ the night. The division bivouacked on Erhtaokou a line through Erhtaokou with the left on hill 1130. The Russian rifle regiment had been withdrawn at nightfall.

At dawn on the 25th the action was recommenced.

Three or four Japanese batteries were brought into action against Drushinin's Detachment and the Occupies the advanced post (1 battalion). The Watershed between Tang and Hsita Rivers Russian advanced troops commenced falling back about 8 A.M., giving up their positions to the Japanese, who at once occupied and entrenched them and set about preparing gun positions for the battle to take place on the 26th.

Thus the high ground between the Tang and Hsita streams was in possession of the Japanese, who could then advance down either valley. The Japanese bivouacked on a line from Langtzushan, running due west with the left turned back to Tunhsinpu.

Kuropatkin, on receipt of the news of the Japanese movement, ordered the XVII. Corps to collect at Action of the their rendezvous and advised Ivanov III. Corps to look to his right. This precaution Ivanov had already taken. He collected all his advanced detachments and strengthened them up to

Ivanov calls on the Reserve of the Eastern Front 13/20/7 $\frac{1}{2}$, placed them under Kash-talinski and ordered him to take up a position prolonging the right of the corps. At the same time he called upon the 35th Division (XVII. Corps) now collecting at Hsiaolungtzu to advance to his support. This the various units did on arrival at their rendezvous.

Three batteries of the division were sent to the IV. Corps but the remainder of the division except one regiment marched on to Kaofengtzu.

Bilderling, on hearing of the movement against his right, brought the 31st Division (XVII. Corps) to the bridge at the junction of the Tang and Taitzu rivers with one regiment to Kengchiatun.

To assist the III. Corps, the X. Corps was ordered to advance on the 26th and to make an attack eastwards from Tzukou. Orders were issued to collect at that place a force of 1/24/8 for this purpose.

The changes in the situation of the Eastern Group brought about by these movements are shown in Map I.

Meanwhile nothing had occurred on the southern front. Kuropatkin, however, reinforced it with seven battalions and three batteries. These troops arrived during the 26th. Orders were also given for cavalry to push on to and occupy hill 1500. Accordingly four squadrons under Posokhov were despatched to do this.

Movements on the Southern Front

It was on the 24th August that Kuropatkin found that he could count definitely on the whole V. Siberian Corps for the battle now imminent. His instructions had foreseen the offensive shadowed a retirement into the "advanced position" of Liaoyang. On this date he issued instructions to hold the present positions.

It seems that he hoped to make his counter-stroke shortly. Events as we shall see modified these intentions. He had lost the initiative.

One point in these three days requires particular notice. Ivanov called the reserve of the Southern

Ivanov's Action Group up to his section of the defence before he had even been attacked, and criticised long before he was in any danger.

Such an action is not only subversive of discipline but makes command an impossibility. One wonders

Comments why the commander of the division complied with Ivanov's order. We shall see how the result was double-edged, bringing one stroke of good fortune to the III. Corps but depriving the east front of reserves at a critical juncture.

The outstanding result of the operation was to give the initiative to Oyama. Kuropatkin's decision to take the offensive came one day too late. Had the III. and X. Corps advanced on 23rd August the initiative might have passed to the Russians.

CHAPTER V

Map III and Map A (in pocket)

ACTIONS OF 26TH AUGUST

General Advance of the Japanese—The 4th Army and the 2nd Army drive back the Russian Protective Detachments—The IV. Siberian Corps prepares to fall back to Shaho—The 2nd and 12th Division deliver Night Attacks which are not successful—The Guard Division is unable to make Progress—Russian Counter-attack against the Left of the Guard—The 12th Division defeats Klembovski's Detachment and captures the Hung-shaling—Kuropatkin orders the Recapture of the Position—Counter-orders issued and the whole Russian Army is ordered to withdraw—Comments on this Action
—Note on the Events of the day in detail

ON the 26th the whole Japanese army advanced. South of Anshanchan, across the line of advance of the 2nd and 4th Armies, the country is admirably adapted to the tactical requirements of rearguard actions, for a series of spurs project into the plain at right angles to the line of advance of the Japanese.

The five divisions of the 2nd and 4th Armies advanced on parallel roads. The left Action on the Southern Front was protected by the cavalry brigade. The two Kobi brigades with the artillery reserve followed the two centre divisions.

The advanced guards of the 4th Army moved out at nightfall of the 25th, and about 11 P.M. Tolmachev and Trubetskoi fell back. During the 26th these two detachments retreated to the position held by the 5th E. S. Rifle Division, the cavalry under Tolmachev taking post at Chilingtzu. About 5 A.M. on the 26th the 2nd Army felt the position of the I. Siberian Corps and in the afternoon all the detachments of this corps had fallen back upon the main body. The IV. Siberian Corps was ordered to withdraw towards Shaho and with it went the seven battalions II. Corps, and three batteries XVII. Corps which had been sent to the south front as reinforcements.

On the eastern front operations of a more important nature took place.

As we have seen, the 2nd Division had been ordered to assail the X. Corps by a night attack.

Action on the Eastern Front The 12th Division was to co-operate with the 2nd Division in the main attack, and also to deliver an attack on the Hungshaling Pass where stood the right of the Russian line. The Umezawa Brigade was to protect the right flank. The guards were to continue their movements northwards against the right of the III. Corps.

The attack of the 2nd Division and the 12th Division was delivered at night. The main attack by the 2nd and half 12th Division was completely successful in its advance and deployment, thanks

to most careful reconnaissances, but, though the Russian outposts were driven back upon the advanced detachments which held the passes in front of the main line of the X. Corps, the passes themselves were not carried. The right column of the 12th Division reached a point close to the main position on the Hungshaling but failed to carry the pass. When day broke the battle was renewed along the whole front. The guards endeavoured to press their turning movement. Kuroki sent to their aid the 29th Kobi Regiment which formed his army reserve. The turning movement, however, failed and a counter-attack by a regiment of the XVII. Corps drove in the left and placed the guards in a very critical situation. In front of the main attack the Russians were obliged to withdraw their advanced troops from the passes to their main line. This operation was successfully carried out during the afternoon. It seemed that the Japanese were completely repulsed; but late in the day the right of the 12th Division carried the Hungshaling Pass and reached Peikou. Bilderling, the commander of the eastern front, had been especially enjoined by Kuropatkin to look after his left and not to denude the north bank of the Taitzu. As half his reserve corps had been drawn most unnecessarily to the right during the night 25th-26th he was unwilling to reinforce his left at the Hungshaling. The despatch of the regiment

at Kangchiatan would probably have relieved the situation.

Kuropatkin, whose latest intention, as we have seen, had been to fight the battle out on the Anshanchan-Russian Orders Langtushan-Peikou line, ordered the to Counter- recapture of Peikou and the Hung-attack shaling. The attack was to be made during the night. However, other counsels prevailed. The south front following what they believed Russian to be the commander-in-chief's Counter-orders wish was already preparing to withdraw, so Kuropatkin cancelled his orders for the attack and ordered instead a general withdrawal to the "advanced position" of Liaoyang.

The decision was influenced to some extent by a violent storm which broke in the evening and threatened to render the Tang river impassable, thus isolating the X. Corps. Once previously all the bridges on the Tang had been carried away. The fords were already impassable. The X. Corps might then be in a very dangerous situation, especially if the night attack failed to recapture Peikou. This contingency was extremely likely to occur, for no proper reconnaissance could possibly be made.

The inner history of the events at this period are not and never will be fully known, for each actor has issued *ex parte* statements or else has maintained a dignified silence. It appears that when

Kuropatkin learnt from the Governor and Commander-in-Chief Alexiev that the V. Corps would be available before the end of August, he wished, or was pressed, to fight it out in his present position.

Comment on Russian Action

No doubt the view put forward was that the closer the Japanese armies converged the less would be the advantage of the Russian "interior lines" position. This position loses all its value if once the "exterior" line forces converging on a point succeed in gripping their enemy at that point. We shall see how the direction of the advance of the Japanese 1st Army overlapped the Russian left and was the ultimate cause of the Russian defeat.

It seems that Kuropatkin referred to St Petersburg and received the comforting assurance that if he were defeated he would incur serious responsibility.

When finally he did withdraw to his prepared position south of Liaoyang he said in a letter to Bilderling : "Unfortunately all this could have been foreseen." What was it then that numbed his nerves and crippled his arm to strike ? Was it his own character or the orders of his superiors ? This we shall never know for certain. Suffice it to say that his actions were nerveless, his orders always contained a qualifying clause, and that he evidently copied this method from his masters.

The weak point of the movement is to be found not

in its strategical aspect but in its evil influence on the moral of the troops. Why did Kuropatkin commit his troops to a fight at all if he did not want to have a decisive fight? Rearguards would have delayed the Japanese advance from the Lan to the Tang for one day, possibly for two. Why then did he make his whole Eastern Group expend their energies in a pitched battle? True, the Japanese had been checked, but what good was that if no benefit was to be reaped from the success? This *moral* advantage was to be thrown away with both hands. As Bennigsen retreated from Napoleon's beaten army at Eylau so again and again did Kuropatkin retreat before his beaten enemy, giving him the victory which he could not seize by arms. Again it was the old story of the "will to conquer." "Erst wegen dann wagen" (First ponder then *dare*). If the action on the 26th was fought after careful consideration, then Kuropatkin should have hardened his heart and dared.

EVENTS OF THE 26TH IN DETAIL

Map A (in pocket)

The operations of the 4th and 2nd Armies do not require more detailed examination. The retreat of the Russian Rearguards of advanced troops was carried out rather too rapidly. Tolmachey and Troubetskoi Southern Group retire mustered between them 9/4/4/ and should have delayed the advanced guards of the 5th and 10th Divisions longer than they did. **too rapidly**

The advanced troops of the I. Siberian Corps which

encountered the enemy mustered 6/16/8, and might also have shown a better front. The losses on either side were trifling.

The Attack of the 1st Army The 1st Army was to make two attacks, a frontal attack with two divisions and a flank attack with one division.

Hasegawa's orders for the attack of the guards were as follows :—

Right attack— $\frac{1}{2}/12/5$ to engage the enemy north of Tatientzu.

Flank Attack by the Guard Left attack— $\frac{1}{2}/—/6$ to cross the Hsita valley during the night and attack the enemy south of Kaofengssu at daybreak.

Cavalry—2 squadrons guards cavalry, 2 squadrons 2nd Regiment to reconnoitre towards the north-west.

Artillery—8 batteries to take up a position near Tunhsinpoo ready to open fire at dawn in support of the left attack.

Reserve— $\frac{1}{2}/—/1$ and 1 battalion engineers to a point east of Tunhsinpoo.

At 6.20 A.M. the two batteries of the right attack opened fire, one battery from a point a mile west of Erhtaokou, the other from a point about three-quarters of a mile north of that place. These batteries were answered by the Russian guns (2 batteries) from the high ground north of Tatientzu. At the same time the other eight batteries, placed three east of Tunhsinpoo, three north of the village, and two among trees south-west of the village, opened fire on a battery located the previous day on the hill above Peitzuwa. The Russians replied and brought three more batteries into action from a very well-chosen position near Kaofengssu. The Russian artillery put the three batteries close to Tunhsinpoo out of action. These batteries hardly fired all day. The Russian guns finally obtained fire superiority

Russian Artillery superior after a long duel lasting till 4 P.M. It does not, however, appear that the results attained were commensurate with the amount of ammunition expended. Under cover of the artillery the infantry of the right attack advanced to the hills above

Erhtaokou and Chimentzu and occupied the ridge west of Langtushan, keeping one battalion in reserve. Two battalions of the left attack advanced during the night. They formed as follows :—first a chain advance of scouts, then at a short distance the two battalions, formed in line or in line of half-company columns.

Advancing in this formation the hostile outposts were forced back and a detached post of about 40 men at Tahsikou was driven back. From this point one company from the right of the line was sent to a hill half-a-mile north, and one company from the left of the line to a point from which it could outflank the extreme right of the high ground south of Changchiaopu. This company failed to attain its object, and later came under heavy fire from the horsed pack battery with Grekov south of Sanchiakou. About 4.30 A.M. the other regiment (3 battalions) moved up on the left, but was heavily shelled from the battery above Peitzuwa. Steadily, but slowly in default of assistance from their guns, the Japanese guards pushed forward. The two advanced companies were nearly annihilated, but still it looked as if the Japanese would outflank Kashtalinski's right and occupy the position between Kaofengssu and Changchiaopu. At this juncture the 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment of the 35th Division (XVII. Corps), accompanied by a squadron, arrived on the Russian right. Colonel Martinov at the head of his regiment, accompanied by a squadron and a battery, had left Tsaofontun for Kaofengssu at midnight on the 25th-26th August. The road was bad and the infantry had to manhandle the guns.

At daybreak the column was on the Liaoling Pass, where it met an officer's patrol of Grekov's Cossacks returning from reconnaissance.

On learning the situation Martinov decided on his own responsibility to march towards the right of the position. The battery had to be left behind. Covered by a line of scouts, the regiment plunged into a deep and narrow gully, which completely hid the whole movement until Paosha-kou was reached.

*Why did not the 140th Cavalry division
join this movement? Probably they were
too weak to make an independent against
Grekov, who had 13000 soldiers?*

From a knoll near the village Martinov looked down the valley leading to Tahsikou and realised that he was on the left of the Japanese turning movement, for a long, thin firing line was extended along the valley.

He ordered his dragoons and scouts towards hill 1400, and deploying three battalions across the valley, holding the fourth in reserve, he swept down upon the Japanese left. But, though surprised, the well-handled Japanese infantry were not to be so easily destroyed. Behind the flank of the firing line local reserves in formed bodies were available, and these rapidly deployed to meet the new danger. Nevertheless the attack was not to be denied, and by 2 P.M. the Japanese left had been driven back into Tahsikou, although they still held the height north of that village.

The situation which now confronted General Hasegawa was one of much perplexity. His main attack was being defeated and driven back, and though reinforcements, the 29th Kobi Regiment, were on the way to join him, they could not be expected to arrive before evening, and then in an exhausted state. To relieve the pressure on his left he ordered the right to advance. This it commenced to do about 1.15 P.M.: One battalion advanced in line of company columns to Kotassu. A second battalion joined the first at 3 P.M., and the two again advanced, but were stopped by the Russian guns. A third battalion moved along the eastern slopes of the valley and advanced through Taihuangtun. It was covered by long-range infantry fire from the reserve, but never got within a thousand yards of the hostile trenches. About 4 P.M. a violent storm broke, which brought the Japanese efforts to a close:

The principal factors in the partial success of the Russians was their superiority in artillery; though the promptly planned and resolutely carried-out counter-attack of the Zaraisk Regiment was admirable and had a great influence on the fight;

All day the artillery fire on both sides was very heavy; At the beginning and end of the fight much of the shooting

of the Russian batteries was merely ammunition wasted. The fact that artillery in concealed positions, using indirect methods of fire, can and will stop advancing infantry was again demonstrated.

Ivanov disposed of the III. Siberian Corps reinforced by the bulk of the 35th Infantry Division, a total of approximately 15/100/36, or, in round numbers, 1200 sabres, 25,000 rifles and 100 guns. These figures allow for a very large number away, as sick, escorts, etc. The Guard Division, with added troops, amounted to a total of about 400 sabres, 15,000 rifles and 60 guns. The right of the III. Corps was secured by Grekov and the left by the X. Corps. It seems incredible that the success of Colonel Martinov was not followed up. To the end of the day twelve battalions and 50 guns at least remained idle and unused.

It is, however, necessary to say that Ivanov himself declared that he was never informed of the success of Martinov's attack or even of its inception. This is possible, for the Russian arrangements for intercommunication were singularly ineffective.

While the flank attack was obtaining no successes, the main attack of the 1st Army was expending its strength. **Main Attack** against the positions held by the X. Corps. **of the 2nd** The 2nd Division and 12th Brigade 12th **Division and** Division were to attack the centre, while the **Half 12th** 25th Brigade 12th Division was to attack the **Division** Russian left on the Hungshaling Pass. 1st Army orders had ordered the 2nd Division to make a night attack, and the 12th Division also decided to attack at night. The utmost care had been taken by the Japanese to ensure the success of their attempt. Day and night reconnaissances had pushed up close to the Russian outposts. Every leader had been over the ground and every precaution had been taken to guard against errors.

Owing to the broken character of the ground between the Lan and Tang artillery rivers support by draught artillery was difficult, and it was for this reason that one of the 12th Division pack batteries was attacked to the 2nd Division,

giving four batteries to the division. The two divisions moved out to attack the Russian positions at between 8 P.M. and 8.30 P.M. on the 25th.

The first task was to capture the passes held by detachments pushed forward from the position of the X. Corps.

The X. Corps, which was holding a line from hill 2100 to the Taitzu river, was distributed as follows :—

From height 2100 to the Anpingling Pass was held by Gerschelman with 8/54/16. His line was divided into two Distribution of sections. Hill 2100 to 2000 was held by the X. Corps Riabinkin with ten battalions. From hill 2000 to the Anpingling was held by Orbeliani with five battalions. The remaining battalion, with 16 guns, was just south of Anping.

The position held by Gerschelman was the main "battle position." From it were pushed out small detachments which held all the passes. The left section of the line was held by a detachment of 2/8/4, on the Hungshaling Pass.

The rest of the corps, twelve battalions and 50 guns, were in reserve north of Anping.


The 2nd Division moved in two columns. The right column, 4/18/4, was to attack the southern side of the Night March Knngchangling Pass, and the left column, Advance and Attack by 4/6/6, the heights due west of Hsiahsikou. The divisional reserve, two battalions, was to follow the left column and remain at Gokarei. The attack was timed to take place at 4.30 A.M. The columns were to march from the Lan river valley to the neighbourhood of Hsiahsikou, and there to deploy for the attack.

The right column moved on Houchiaputzu, the left column sent its two regiments by different roads to Shangwang-chiaputzu. Russian outposts were discovered on the heights west of this village, but they were driven in and the march continued in a single column to Hsiahsikou. The right column, having reached Houchiaputzu, despatched two companies towards the Kungchangling Pass to create


a diversion by opening fire, and with the rest of the force turned slightly south of the road and made its way to the foot of the heights guarding the south of the pass.

At 2.30 A.M. both columns were deploying for attack, the left column just west of the village of Hsiahsikou, the right column a little north-west of the village:

Both columns deployed in similar formations. The right column formation may be shown diagrammatically thus :



The left column thus :



The distances are approximate.

The deployment was completed by the right column earlier than by the left, and commenced its attack an hour earlier than ordered, so the left column moved forward as soon as it was formed.

The Russians were not unprepared and opened a heavy fire, but the lines of men pushed on without firing a shot. Bayonets were fixed when near the outpost trenches. The trenches were rushed without firing a shot. Meanwhile the Russians had been to some extent deceived by the diversion at the Kungchangling Pass, and apparently the supports had hurried there, leaving the pickets to hold on alone south of the pass.

As day broke the Japanese came under heavy fire from the Kungchangling, and though the four mountain batteries advanced to the close support of the infantry not much progress was made beyond the already captured outpost line. The Russians holding the passes were further reinforced by several battalions from the reserve.

But the Russian hold on the passes was not strong. About 10 A.M. the threatening position of the right brigade **Russians** of the 12th Division on the left was felt, and **abandon the** about the same hour a very effective oblique **Passes** fire by two Japanese guns was opened against the left of the position on the Kungchangling, from a point in the valley near Hsiahsikou. These guns were quite hidden in the kaoliang, and made some of the Russian trenches untenable. In consequence, the commander of the right section of the Russian line ordered the passes to be abandoned and the troops to fall back to the "battle position."

The 2nd Division was unable to advance beyond the abandoned Russian line.

On the right of the 2nd Division the 12th Brigade 12th Division marched in two columns towards the Hanpoling **12th Brigade** Pass. The Russian outposts fell back and of the 12th the position selected for deployment was **Division** reached at 1.30 A.M. on the 26th. The brigade then deployed, apparently in a similar formation to that adopted by the 2nd Division, and advanced towards the pass. The advance was checked and the brigade asked for and received a reinforcement of two battalions. A mountain battery was brought into action at Tahanpoling.

From Where?

Before the reinforcements had arrived the regiment on the right carried the northern side of the pass. The brigade then continued its advance, but about the same time that the 2nd Division's advance had been brought to a standstill the 12th Brigade also found itself unable to advance against the fire of the Russians from the main position.

At the same hour that the three brigades had moved **Attack on the Russian Left Flank by 23rd Brigade** against the Russian centre the 23rd Brigade, with two mountain batteries, had advanced against the Russian left section on the Hungshaling Pass.

Leaving the batteries to entrench themselves on One Tree Pass the brigade advanced south-westwards, one battalion connected with the 12th Brigade, the remainder deployed along the foot of the Suribachiyama hill. The right regiment secured the North Papanling hill and the left regiment secured Suribachiyama after some fighting. Two mountain guns were brought up to the North Papanling.

The two battalions which had secured Suribachiyama pushed on and reached a narrow causeway forty yards long and barely ten wide. This feature separated the ground in which the attackers stood from the bluff rising to the summit of the mountain to which the Russians were clinging. Charge after charge was made and driven back, until the narrow space was piled with the dead. The crash of volleys, the rolling thunder of independent fire and the roar of artillery was now incessant, though in the dim twilight the effect was slight.

As day broke the battle became more intense. The mountain batteries at One Tree Pass advanced. Assault after assault was delivered. Several times local reserves of the Russians dashed forward with the bayonet, driving back their enemies, but these gathered together again and renewed the assault. Strange missiles, rocks and stones were hurled from the crest and crashed into the Japanese, huddled together at the foot, trying to get their breath for a dash up the hill. By midday the reserves on both sides were exhausted and the battle died away.

As we have noted, Sluchevski, who commanded the X. Corps, had sent reinforcements to his right section. He also sent two battalions to the Hungshaling Pass to join the Tambov Regiment there. He also asked for the assistance of the Group Reserve to defend his threatened left. This Action of the Commander was refused. As we have seen, towards 10 A.M., realising that his position was not strong, and was liable to be turned if he lost the Hungshaling, he had ordered his advanced posts on the right and centre to withdraw to the main position on the ridge, of which hill 2100 is the centre point. The fact that this withdrawal took place without difficulty shows that the 2nd Division of the Japanese had been checked.

Sluchevski now divided his line into two sections, making an alteration in his previous distribution.

Hill 2100 to Anping he placed under Gerselman with the 9th Division, in all 8/16/21. From Anping to the Taitzu river he placed under Vassiliev, with the 31st Division, in all 2/48/10.

North of Anping was placed a reserve under Grekov, consisting of 2/42/1. At nightfall ten battalions from the right section were withdrawn to this reserve.

Meanwhile all along the line the battle had come to a standstill, though now and again outbursts of heavy firing preluded an attempt to advance or a counter-attack. About 3.30 P.M. the artillery renewed its bombardment of Hungshaling. One regiment made a holding attack against the south side of the pass, and at the same time the 46th Regiment stormed and at last captured the north side. On the col still stood the battery which had so gallantly supported the Tambovs all day. The commander and all his officers were dead or wounded, more than half the personnel were gone, but even now the gunners did not go back without taking away the breech blocks and sights. Klembovski, the gallant colonel of the Tambovs, was wounded, 500 out of the 2500 men who stood on parade that morning were dead or wounded, and

about 6 P.M. the regiment gave way and fell back through Peikou, which the Japanese occupied at last.

Bilderling was galvanised into action and ordered the recapture of Peikou, placing at Sluchevski's disposal eight Russian battalions of Yanjul's Division. It was now Measures for too late. A little more resolution on Counter-attack Sluchevski's part might have saved the situation. Two of the regiments of the 9th Division might have been moved to the left, when at 10 A.M. the passes were abandoned. The main position was never approached by the enemy.

As soon as Kuropatkin heard of the loss of Peikou he ordered that it should be retaken by a night attack, and himself detailed the force to deliver the attack.

Second thoughts, however, prevailed, and at midnight the order was issued for a general retreat into the "advanced" position of Liaoyang.

From a tactical point of view the dominant point in the day's fighting is to be found in the marked success of the Russian artillery of the III. Corps. The great difficulty in which the best infantry are placed if their artillery is out-matched is always important to notice. Yet the actual effect of the Russian guns was small. The Guard Division lost under 1000 killed and wounded, of whom many fell in the counterstroke against the left. The closest co-operation between the arms is more essential to-day than ever before.

On the other hand the artillery of the X. Corps was not well employed. Fifty guns stood idle all day, and there is no doubt that it was largely due to want of artillery support that the Hungshaling Pass was lost. We shall see again in the course of this book that guns were often badly employed by the X. Corps. There had not been time before the war to develop a proper school of artillery thought and reasoned principles of action with the new Q.F.'s. The guns had been issued just before the outbreak of war. In some corps they were brilliantly handled, in others badly.

Passing from the employment of the guns we notice that after six months of war the leaders of the Japanese 1st Army **The Night Attacks** had come to the conclusion that night operations were to be preferred on ground which could be thoroughly reconnoitred. Yet it must be admitted that though these night operations were well conceived, skilfully planned, and ably carried out, and though they carried the troops over the long and dangerous zone of approach to the close fire positions, and as such were valuable, yet they failed of complete success. Later in the campaign we find night assaults common, but such extended night operations, including a night-march, a night advance and a night attack, are uncommon.

It cannot be said that the attack of the Japanese was spirited. Neither the Guards nor the 2nd Division nor the **Causes of Want** left brigade 12th Division showed any ardour of Vigour in their attack. Probably the men were stale after a long halt.

It is noteworthy that in the battles of this war both sides began their long protracted battles rather tamely, but after a few days' fighting became more severe and more bloody. Possibly the fatigue and strain induced a moral effect of intense desire to end the business, and the fury of the fighting, which marked the latter stages of the battles was partly due to this desire to bring to an end as speedily as possible what had become an intolerable situation.

This question will be referred to again. The ease with which the Russians broke off the combat and fell back is especially interesting and must also be referred to again.

CHAPTER VI

Map IV

RETREAT TO THE "ADVANCED POSITION OF LIAO-YANG"

The Retreat of the Southern Group—Advance of the Japanese 2nd and 4th Armies—Retreat of the Eastern Group—The III. Corps—Japanese Advance slow—The X. Corps—Japanese Advance not energetic—Russian Arrangements for the 28th—Retreat continued—The Russian Rearguards—The Day's Result on the Southern Front—The 1st Army—Movement towards the North—The Day's Result in the Eastern Front—Comments

THE order to retreat from the Anshanchan and Langtushan positions was issued about midnight of the 26th-27th August, and the Russian leaders at once set to work to make the necessary arrangements. The troops of the southern front had no very difficult task in front of them. The Anshanchan position was strongly fortified and would serve a rearguard well to delay an advancing enemy and force him to deploy. The only real difficulty lay in the condition of the roads, which the rain of the last few days had converted into quagmires.

To the I. Siberian Corps were allotted the roads

west of the railway. It retired in three columns.

The Retreat of the Southern Group The IV. Siberian Corps used the Mandarin Road. The 5th E. S. Rifle Division of the II. Siberian Corps used the roads east of the Mandarin Road.

Each corps left a rearguard in the position. Colonel Gurko's Cavalry covered the western flank. Samsonov's Cavalry followed the main body of the IV. Siberian Corps. This cavalry was therefore not employed with the rearguards. The strengths of the three rearguards were : I. Siberian Corps, 9/24/7 ; IV. Siberian Corps, 6/16/8 ; II. Siberian Corps, 6/8/5. This latter rearguard was subdivided into two portions, one acting as a flank guard, but both were under the command of Tolmachev. Away to the east Colonel Posokhov with his four squadrons kept communication with the Eastern Group.

Early in the morning the 2nd and 4th Japanese Armies advanced against the position which they expected to find strongly held. The Advance of the Japanese 2nd and 4th Armies day was wet and very foggy. When news was received from the advanced troops that the Anshanchan position was only held by a rearguard, staff officers were sent forward to reconnoitre. Their reports were not received at the headquarters of the armies until between 2 P.M. and 5 P.M. It was fortunate for the Russians that this was so, for Tolmachev withdrew the

rearguard of the II. Siberian Corps prematurely, thus exposing the left of the general line of rearguards. However, no evil results followed. The Japanese bivouacked on the abandoned position. The IV. and II. Siberian Corps reached the Sha river, as did one column of the I. Siberian Corps. The other two columns were so delayed by the roads that they bivouacked about three miles south of the river near Erhtaitzu. The rearguards remained some four to five miles south of the river line.

On the eastern front the Russians were confronted by an operation of much difficulty. They ~~Retreat of the~~ were in close touch with their enemy, ~~Eastern Group~~ who might be expected to renew his attack. The X. Corps in particular was faced with the problem of withdrawing across a broad river, which, swollen by recent rain, was now only passable for vehicles at one bridge. After passing the bridge wheeled vehicles had to march north along the valley, and would only be "clear" when they had passed the defile at Shihchutzu. At this point, where the valley narrows, the road was in exceptionally bad condition. Moreover, the river had overflowed its banks and flooded the road. Lastly, as Yanjul's Brigade was now on the south bank of the Taitzu river, the north bank was uncovered except for the detachment at Penhsihu.

The III. Corps arranged its retreat as follows:—

First the Reserve, 1/16/7, under Glinski, withdrew from Kaofengssu to the heights south of Hsiaolingtzu, and took up a position.

The III. Corps This operation, though commenced at 5 A.M., was only completed by 2 P.M. In the Kao-fengssu position Grekov's detachment and seven battalions were left as a rearguard, and at daybreak the main body followed Glinski.

It was 8.30 before the mist lifted enough for the Guard Artillery to see their targets. By 9.30

Japanese Advance not energetic the advance of the infantry had brought on a sharp musketry fire, but the attack was not pressed, although the Russian columns could be seen retreating. Grekov retired about 5 P.M., the last of the rearguards, and the Guards then occupied the abandoned heights.

The X. Corps arrangements were very similar to those of the III. Siberian Corps. The right

X. Corps section was to withdraw first, using the Anping fords, and occupy a position.

Next the left section was to go back, and lastly Yanjul, who was guarding the left flank of the corps, was to fall back. The Japanese did not molest the operations, and it was fortunate for the Russians that this was so.

The infantry of the right section had cleared the Anping fords at 1.30, while two batteries posted

south of Anping swept the heights above the river with shrapnel, but only a few Japanese skirmishers were seen. The position on the west bank was occupied by 3 P.M. The left section crossed by the bridge, and as the movement was carried out under the personal supervision of the general commanding the corps it was executed with great speed and precision. Yanjul followed. At 8 P.M. the bridge was removed. The pontoons were floated away down the Tang river to the Taitzu.

The defile at Shihchutzu caused much trouble. The last waggon passed through about 5.30 A.M. on the 28th.

The fog over the positions of the 2nd and 12th Divisions lifted sufficiently to see what was happening about midday. It was not, however, till 1.30 that the columns of energetic infantry and guns slowly advanced in the wake of the scouts. By evening the 2nd Division reached the Tang river. The left brigade of the 12th Division made some little advance, but the right brigade, which should have cut the Russian retreat at the defile, never moved from Peikou. This brigade had had the only really severe fighting on the previous day.

The result was disappointing, and the fact that the roads were so bad, and the range of the mountain guns small, hardly palliates the want of dash which

lost so good an opportunity for inflicting a severe blow on the moral of one of the Russian Corps. This result must have followed if a vigorous forward movement had been made, for in that case most of the baggage, and probably many guns, would have been lost. The steadiness of the infantry would almost certainly have been shaken, even if their losses had not been severe.

So far the Russian retreat had proceeded without a hitch. It was necessary, however, to hold the present positions for sufficient time to enable the artillery and transport to get back to the "advanced position of Liaoyang." The Russian front was about thirty-five miles long and the main bodies were covered by protecting detachments as follows:—

Russian Arrangements for the 28th

On the right flank was Gurko, with about 16/14/4, near Erhtaitzu.

The rearguard of the I. Siberian Corps, under Rutkovski, 8/24/7, was at Pachiatzu.

The rearguard of the IV. Siberian Corps, under Kossovich, 6/16/8, was at Pakuakou.

The rearguard of the II. Siberian Corps, under Tolmachev, 6/8/5, was at Panchialu and Hsinpu, and Samsonov's Cavalry Brigade, 15/6/—, was north of Shaho.

Colonel Posokhor, with 4 squadrons, was between Kushonyu and Chilingtzu.

Why?

The rearguard of the III. Siberian Corps, under Danilov, 1/8/15, was distributed in three groups, south of Shihchutzu, south of, and east of Hsiaolingtzu, with a reserve at Shihchutzu.

The X. Corps was in position on the western bank of the Tang river, prepared to defend the passages. General Yanjul's Division of the XVII. Corps had recrossed the Taitzu and was guarding the northern bank.

The first necessity was to hold on to the present position long enough to allow the baggage and trains to get away to the "advanced position of Liaoyang." The Southern Group did not intend to continue its retreat on the 28th unless forced to do so to avoid becoming seriously engaged. The Eastern Group was particularly warned to hold the high ground between Chinerhtun and Hsiaolingtzu and the position at Shihchutzu. The right of the X. Corps was ordered on no account to withdraw until the III. Siberian Corps had "crossed the passes leading down to the main Liaoyang road."

While Kuropatkin was quietly, and, as it seemed, almost unmolested, withdrawing to the position in which he proposed to fight, his reserve was rapidly increasing. Twelve battalions and 24 guns of the V. Corps were already at Liaoyang, and eight battalions and 16 guns, under Orlow, had passed through Mukden. One regiment of the corps was

wasted by sending it to Hsinmintun. One regiment was sent to relieve Grulev at Penhsihu. Grulev withdrew on Yentai.

A third regiment was also wasted by sending it to join Madritov and Peterev on the Taling range. Thus were eight more battalions and 16 more guns deliberately sent away from the main battlefield to do the work which a few Cossacks could have performed. Those 6000 bayonets might have turned the scale at Liaoyang.

As we have seen, the Southern Group had not intended to retire on the 28th, except of course that the I. Siberian Corps would have completed its withdrawal to the Sha river.

During the night the commander of the II. Siberian Corps heard that Japanese troops were massing against the left of his rearguard. Thereupon he withdrew his rearguard to Panchialu. This uncovered the left of the rearguard position of the IV. Corps.

Retreat continued. The Russian Rearguards

Very early in the morning the advanced guard of the 3rd Japanese Division came in contact with the rearguard of the IV. Corps, and about the same time the II. Corps, again fearing for its left, fell back on a position at Yingtaoyuan. This exposed the left of the main body of the IV. Corps, and was the more serious as the I. Corps, obliged to keep to the roads west of the railway, was having the very

greatest difficulty in getting its baggage and trains away. The roads were girth-deep in mud, the transport drivers kept turning their trains ever wider and wider off the road into the fields, with the result that order and cohesion became increasingly difficult to maintain.

The 10th Division on the right had started about the same hour, and its advanced guard, unopposed by the rearguard of the II. Corps, pushed forward into the Huchiamiaotzu valley and penetrated to Kunhsintai, capturing two squadrons.

The main body pushed forward via Hsinpu to the valley of the Sha river. By 7 P.M. the 5th Division on the left of the 10th had reached a threatening position on the left of the IV. Corps, but by now the fighting troops of the I. Corps had begun to cross the Sha. Nevertheless Zarubaiev reinforced his rearguard and ordered Samsonov to Santuitzu. To cover the retreat of the rearguard, when that took place, he placed a force of —/24/4 in position near Tunti. The II. Corps rearguard was ordered to hold on at Panchialu. The order, however, crossed a message from Zasulich, and the A.D.C. found Panchialu already in Japanese hands. It was now about 9.30 A.M. Kossovich's rearguard, which had occupied a very extended line, was under very heavy artillery fire from Chantienpu and Taweichiatun, and very soon after was under fire from guns from Panchialu.

These guns were silenced by the batteries of the covering position at Tunti. Samsonov did not recross the river but remained on the north bank.

About 9.30 A.M. the II. Corps had again fallen back, abandoning its strong position at Yingtaoyuan, for reasons which appear utterly inadequate, indeed foolish. Zasulich reported that "None of my batteries can fire south," etc. Surely the batteries could change position. This action moved Kropatkin to hot remonstrance. Zasulich was ordered to halt and fight wherever the orderly officer might find him, and on no account to retire behind the line of the "advanced position." There the corps was to fight to the last and die. It seems, however, that Zasulich had already repented of his pusillanimity, or else had discovered the situation of the I. and IV. Corps, for his rearguard and two regiments were still in the Yingtaoyuan position at nightfall.

The rearguard of the I. Siberian Corps was engaged from early dawn with the advanced guard of the 6th Division. Rutkovski was killed, but the rearguard held on and did not fall back till 11 A.M. The flank guard kept the right flank secure. The rearguard of the IV. Corps was now exposed on both flanks. Its action throughout the day was worthy of the best tradition of any army. At 1 P.M. it retreated at last under orders from Zarubaiev, who

had now deployed a covering force of —/16/8 at Shoushanpu. Samsonov was to cover the further retreat of the rearguard of the II. Corps, and the 7th (Krasnoyarsk) Regiment was to cover the retreat of the rearguard of the IV. Corps. This regiment behaved remarkably well, retiring with extreme steadiness from position to position.

The steadiness of the rearguards of the I. and IV. Siberian Corps had brought it about that the 2nd and The Day's 4th Japanese Armies did not cross the Result on the Shaho river that day. The I. Siberian Southern Front Corps and II. Siberian Corps halted on the "advanced position." The IV. Corps continued its retreat to Liaoyang to join the Army Reserve.

The 1st Army had also prepared to press its advance on the 28th. Shortly before the advance The Orders of commenced Kuroki was told that the the 1st Army 2nd and 4th Armies were to reach the line Sha River-Tsaofantun that night. To his army was assigned two tasks. Firstly it was to send part of its strength to prolong the line of the 4th Army eastwards and to co-operate in the attack on the main position south of the Taitzu; and secondly the remainder of the army was to cross the Taitzu river to attack the Russian left. The front of attack of the 1st Army, was to be Yingshoupu-Shihchutzu-Kaolitsun.

This was a great change of the direction of movement of the army.

When the new arrangements had been set forth in army orders, the divisions were assigned to the following tasks :—

The Guard Division was to co-operate with the 4th Army by attacking the enemy's position astride the main road. The 2nd Division was to support the attack of the guards and also occupy Shihchutzu. The 12th Division was to move up to hill 1302, and to make preparations to cross the Taitzu river.

Certain readjustments had to be made in divisional orders², and about 10 A.M., when the morning mists had evaporated under a brilliant sun, the troops advanced.

The left column of the guard advanced on Weichiakou, held by Martinov with —/8/5 and covered by Grekov's Cavalry. This rearguard retired precipitately, opening the gap between the II. and III. Corps. To remedy this Kuropatkin, who had placed several detachments of various units near Tsaofantun under General Stolitza, increased these detachments up to a strength of 14/32/14 and ordered Martinov to hold on. Meanwhile, the rest of the III. Corps rearguards had fallen back slowly and skilfully, though Martinov's precipitate retreat endangered the right. Grekov and Martinov took up a position together near Mengchiafen.

The 2nd Division had brought up three of its field batteries during the night, and about 9 A.M. the mist lifted sufficiently to allow them to support the attack of the infantry. The 9th Russian Division was hard put to it to maintain its positions, but succeeded in doing so and commenced its retreat towards midday. The Japanese Infantry now crossed the Tang, but the Russian artillery, turning to bay at every suitable spot, forced them to advance cautiously. The 2nd Division halted on the hills west of Tanghoyen. During the night hill 1700 was occupied. The 12th Division reached its destination by midnight, after a long and exhausting march.

Thus the Russians had retired safely into their prepared position, while the Japanese had closed ^{The Day's} up to within striking distance. The Result on the feature of outstanding interest in the Eastern Front day's operations is the change of direction of the 12th Division to Yingshoupu.

From a tactical point of view the skilful withdrawal of the Russian rearguards is a model. The Comments general excellence of their work is shown up in relief by the fact that on both fronts the inner rearguards made mistakes. Tolmachev and Martinov both retired too soon, thus endangering the other rearguards.

It has been said that few operations of war are so

difficult as to correctly time the withdrawal of a rearguard. The fact that the Russians accomplished this operation with such success, and so frequently, shows that they were skilful soldiers.

CHAPTER VII

Map 5 and Map B (in pocket)

AUGUST 30TH—THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF
LIAOYANG

Occupation of the Prepared Position by the Russians—
Comment on retaining a large Reserve for Manoeuvre—
The Japanese Preparations—The Flank Attack—The
Main Attack—Consideration of the Plan of Attack and
the Frontages allotted—The Attack of each Division—
The Guard and 2nd Division—10th Division—A Russian
Advanced Post overwhelmed—5th Division—Note on
the Frontages—5th and 3rd Divisions attack together—
The 6th Division—Wheels to the Right—A Russian
Counter-attack—Progress of the Flank Attack—
Umezawa crosses the River at Penhsihu

THE 29th August was spent by both sides in preparing
for the struggle which was evidently about to come.

The plan for the distribution of troops for the
defence of the “advanced position of Liaoyang”

Occupation of was already generally known to the
the “Advanced army, and it only remained to give
Position” by the finishing touches to complete the
the Russian details. Three corps were to hold the
Army front south of the river, one corps was
to hold the left flank north of the river. Two

cavalry divisions were to cover the right flank. In reserve stood a cavalry division and two and a half army corps.

Behind the "advanced position" on the south bank was the fortified enceinte of Liaoyang, defended by numerous forts mounting 136 heavy guns. The Taitzu river was traversed by seven bridges. The positions were fortified with care and skill. Special pains had been taken in clearing a field of fire, thus for from 600 yards to 1000 yards in front of the trenches the kaoliang was all cut. The position was held as follows:—

From the Shoushanpu height and the railway to the Tassu valley stood the I. Siberian Corps, mustering 8/62/24.

To guard the Tassu valley, in the interval between the I. and III. Siberian Corps was placed a detachment of 6/32/6½ under General Putilov. In the valley of this brook were the corps cavalry of both the I. and III. Siberian Corps, amounting to 14 squadrons in all.

From the Tassu valley, to the hill 1080 stood the III. Siberian Corps, mustering 6/40/30.

From but not including hill 1080 to the river at Hsiapu stood the X. Corps, mustering 6/116/32.

The right flank was covered, first by Mischenko's 21 squadrons, then by Grekov's 14 squadrons.

The left flank was covered by the XVII. Corps

placed north of the Taitzu river, part in position on hill 1057, and part north of hill 920. This corps mustered 12/108/20½, while close to them stood —/24/4 of the V. Siberian Corps.

The General Reserve, Samsonov's Cavalry Division and the II. and IV. Corps, together with the garrison of Liaoyang, mustered 27/70/43. To these may be added Orlov's —/16/8, now marching south from Mukden, and Grulev's 4/6/5, which had been relieved at Penhsihu and were marching to Yentai. Thus by the 31st August there would be 4/22/13 at Yentai.

It may be as well to again enumerate the outside detachments :—

On the right was Kossagovski, with 9/18/8½, near Tawan and —/16/4 at Hsinmintun, guarding the Liao valley.

On the left were 2/8/4 of the V. Siberian Corps at Penhsihu, Ljubavin with 12/4/—, and finally Peterev and Madritov, with 10/10/6.

Of these strong detachments Ljubavin and the Penhsihu detachment opposed Umezawa's advance north. Otherwise they were wasted. Their duties could have been equally well performed by the Cossacks alone without infantry. This would have placed another eighteen battalions, about 10,000 to 11,000 bayonets, in Kuropatkin's reserve. This is a flagrant violation of a principle of the military art.

Whose was the responsibility, Kuropatkin's, Alexiev's, or the Staff, it is impossible to say.

To some extent, indeed to a great extent, the blame must be laid to the inherent disadvantages of a defensive attitude. A defensive attitude involves giving to the opponent the initiative. Consequently the side standing on the defensive does not know where the blow will fall. Instinctively it tries to guard all approaches. Rumour always exaggerates the numbers of the attacker. His advanced troops appearing at many points are magnified into advanced guards of strong columns. These disadvantages accompany the "offensive-defensive" attitude as surely as they accompany the pure defensive. With the possible exception of the Duke of Wellington, no great general has ever adopted the "offensive-defensive" attitude from choice. As in the great Duke's earlier campaigns the defensive was forced upon him on account of his numerical weakness, and as he always took the offensive when he could, it is not right to assume that he adopted the defensive attitude from choice. It is more probable that he adopted it from necessity. As soon as he was strong enough he took the offensive in every campaign and every battle. Nor will the "offensive-defensive" tactics accompany an offensive strategy. An army operating offensively must attack the

Comment on
the Offensive-
defensive
Attitude

enemy wherever it meets him or else lose the initiative.

The base of the arguments of the modern exponents of the theory that the offensive-defensive is the strongest form of war is founded on the retaining power of the modern firearm. The theory is based on the assumption that comparatively few men well entrenched can hold out for a long time and force the enemy to expend his reserves. Then the reserves of the defence will take the offensive in their turn. Moltke and Balck add their great authority to this theory. Moltke, for example, in the solution to his 50th Problem (Von Donat's translation), says: "According to my opinion, owing to improvements in firearms, the tactical defensive has gained a great advantage over the tactical offensive. . . . It appears to me more favourable if the offensive is only assumed after repulsing several attacks of the enemy." Balck, in the opening words of his chapter, "Attack and Defence," quotes the great authority of Clausewitz to show that the defensive is the stronger form of war, and again under the sub-heading, "Strategic Offensive, tactical Defensive," he asserts that theoretically the strategic offensive and tactical defensive is the goal to attain. Unfortunately it is but seldom that the theatre of war permits of this combination. The great objection to the tactical defensive is that the enemy may manœuvre, and it should be noticed

it off at the 2nd battle of Maanado

that modern weapons give to him the power to manœuvre behind a screen of comparatively few troops. Unless, then, the theatre of operations is peculiar, the combination suggested as theoretically best is impracticable. As a matter of fact the theatre of operations in Manchuria was exactly suited to the offensive-defensive tactics of the Russians, for the line of advance of the Japanese was constricted. There was only one railway, and roads were not existent. Manœuvre therefore would have been slow and could not be extended very far from the narrow belt of ground on each side of the railway. Even though the theatre of war exactly suited offensive-defensive strategy the Russians never succeeded in winning a battle. Is it not possible that some of the blame for the failure may be laid to the door of the attitude itself and not only to the execution? Is it really true that the power of the modern weapon has weakened the attack? Certainly it has made the attack more slow, but surely the modern Q.F. gun has redressed the balance. The range, accuracy and rapidity of fire of the gun is such that, *provided intimate co-operation between the infantry and gunners can be attained*, the defence will be crumbled under an avalanche of shell "switched" from one spot to another as here or there the infantry find difficulties in advancing. And, when the main attack is launched from a direction unexpected by the enemy,

it can to-day be covered by the fire of hundreds of concealed guns, for the range of the modern gun will allow far more guns to be in action against one point in the enemy's line than ever before.

Even if this theory is discarded, and it is still maintained that progress in armament is all to the advantage of the defence, there is yet the moral argument in favour of attack. If the attack is energetic ~~some~~ weak points in the defender's armour will be found, and to these points are almost sure to be directed some portions of the General Reserve of the defence. For the defence will always be uncertain that there are no more concealed forces waiting to dash upon any point in the defensive line which might be denuded to support a weak point somewhere else in the line. Thus troops are and always will be wasted in the endeavour to be strong everywhere. Every detachment commander, every section commander, will be sure that his area is the scene of the hardest fighting and be urgent for reinforcements, till finally the offensive reserve will probably be too weak for its task. In most of the victories gained by the reserve of the defence striking in at the critical moment and assuming the offensive, the reserve has been a new force which has come up during the battle, another army, or the army of an ally.

Bound up with the question of the offensive-defensive is the question of the General Reserve.

18 Bull Run
Waterloo

The modern weapons are said to afford such strength to weak forces that it will be best to keep the main

The General Reserve used for Offensive Action body well back from the advanced troops, and under the screen afforded by the advanced troops to manœuvre to gain the enemy's weaker flank. Following out this theory we may assume two armies of approximately equal strength, both advancing, both covered by a screen of troops of all arms, advanced troops, strategic advanced guard, call it what you will. Suppose now one side deploys its whole strength at once to attack and crush the enemy's advanced troops, may it not succeed, and may not its flank guards be able to hold off the other main body for sufficiently long to give time to carry out this operation ?

If this thesis is correct then the side which first throws its whole strength into the scale will probably be successful. "In war it matters not so much what is done as that the course adopted be carried through with vigour and determination."

Our Field Service Regulations lay down as a principle that the most suitable tactical method for

The General Reserve in Field Service Regulations the British Army is to manœuvre behind a screen of advanced troops. The contention in this comment is that, in spite of the retaining power of the modern rifle, weak screens of advanced troops can and

will be crushed by an enemy resolutely determined to seize and hold the initiative and determined to win. A screen of advanced troops opposed to an army deployed is forced on the defensive in the nature of things.

While the Russians were taking up their positions the Japanese were reconnoitring. Oyama had already determined to use the bulk of his preparations force, six and a half divisions, two Kobi Brigades and the Cavalry Brigade, south of the Taitzu, and to turn the Russian left north of the Taitzu with one and a half divisions. Meanwhile one Kobi Brigade was to advance north through Penhsihu along the Mukden road.

On the evening of the 29th Oyama issued his orders distributing his forces as follows :—

For the flank attack, the 12th Division, with one brigade and all the artillery of the 2nd Division, were to cross the Taitzu and advance westwards. The Umezawa Brigade was to force a passage at Penhsihu and advance northwards.

The frontal attack was divided as follows :—

The Guard Division plus one infantry brigade, 2nd Division, were to attack hill 1080 to the front. Frontal river. But no clear orders as to the action of the brigade, 2nd Division, were given.

The 4th Army, which was to "set the pace" for the guard, was to attack up the Tassu valley. Its

task^o then was to break the centre of the Russian line.

The 2nd Army was to leave one division as an Army Reserve and attack the Russian front from Hsinlitun to hill 693.

Considering the dispositions in detail we find that
Comments about one-fifth of the army was assigned
to the turning movement to threaten
the Russian line of retreat.

It was obliged to pass the Taitzu. The Taitzu river is a very formidable obstacle. Having in view the large numbers of the Russian cavalry and mounted scouts, it seemed certain that the Russians must receive early and accurate information of the numbers employed in this movement. These factors must have all been clear to the Japanese.

South of the Taitzu it is clear that the attack of the guard and 3rd Brigade (2nd Division) could only be intended as a holding attack.

The front assigned for attack was that held by the left section, III. Corps, and the X. Corps, and was about eight miles long, about 14,000 yards. It was known of course to be strongly held and entrenched. To this front Oyama allotted approximately 15,000 bayonets and 42 guns.

The front allotted to the 4th Army, from Tsao-fantun to Hsinlitun, is about 7000 yards. It was held by the extreme left of the I. Siberian Corps,

Gurko's Cavalry, Putilov's detachment, and the right section, III. Siberian Corps. The valley of the Tassu brook breaks the line held by the Russians in two just at this point. The troops allotted to the attack numbered some 27,000 bayonets and 72 guns.

From the fact that the guard was ordered to act in conjunction with this attack, and that the 3rd Division was specially directed to cover its left, it seems that Oyama intended that this attack would break in—in fact, be decisive.

The front of attack allotted to the 2nd Army was only some 5200 yards long. It was the right flank of the Russian army. But that right flank was covered by 35 squadrons of cavalry with 28 guns, against which the Japanese could only oppose 8 squadrons and 6 guns, with 6 machine guns.

The 2nd Army, which had been deprived of a division to form the Army Reserve, had at its disposal some 36,000 bayonets, or nearly 6 rifles per yard of front allotted.

The reserve consisted of one Kobi Brigade and the 4th Division, which was on the left of the 2nd Army. To this division was assigned the rôle of protecting the left. The relations of its commander to the commander of the 2nd Army and to the commander-in-chief were nebulous.

The 2nd Army appears to have disposed of the

whole of the Field Artillery Brigade and to have at any rate given march orders for the whole of the heavy artillery.

It is necessary to consider the attacks of each division separately. We will do so in order from The Attack of the right. The attack of the Guard the Guard Division was to be timed by that of the 10th Division on their left, and supported by the brigade of the 2nd Division on the right.

About 6 A.M. the 10th Division advanced, and immediately the guard artillery opened fire and the left wing of the Guard Division deployed for attack. The Russian guns, however, dominated the field, and the infantry were not able to advance against their fire. It must be admitted that the Japanese effort was weak. The brigade engaged in this attack only lost 450 all day.

The threat nevertheless sufficed to induce the commander of the III. Corps to place his whole reserves in the firing line and to call upon the X. Corps for aid. Towards 11.30 the right wing of the division, although ordered to time its advance by the left, decided to make an effort. Its artillery was conducting an aimless duel with the Russians at a range of 6000 yards, but the infantry, favoured by the ground, pushed on towards hill 1080. Towards 4 P.M. the right regiment assaulted and captured the

trenches on the lower spurs of the mountain, but there was no support.

Four battalions from the Russian reserve came up at the critical moment. One of these battalions and some of the defenders of the lost trenches advanced with the bayonet, while a battery limbering up and advancing to the crest poured a heavy fire into the enemy at a range of 400 yards. The Japanese were unable to advance farther, and lost one or two lengths of trench. In the evening their situation was considered dangerous, and the regiment was withdrawn to the hollow from which it had made its spring.

The 10th Division had been checked and the guard cavalry reported strong hostile forces concentrating on the left. Hasegawa could not know that these strong forces were only one or two regiments moving up to reinforce the threatened Russian centre. The brigade of the 2nd Division, too, on his right, had not co-operated. Though within sound, almost within hailing distance of the desperate struggle among the rocks and ravines of hill 1080, yet the commander of the 3rd Brigade had done nothing. Towards midday he had received orders to march east to join his own division, but on the representations of a General Staff Officer of Kuroki's personal staff he consented to attack. It was too late. The reserves which might have been held fast by a strong attack against the Shuiyu

*Failure of the
Brigade, 2nd
Division, to
co-operate*

position had moved off south to replace Ivanov's reserves, sent up to strengthen the sections of defence. One of these battalions had been among those which drove the 3rd Guards back and recaptured the lost trenches.

It was about 5 A.M. that the 10th Division, supported by the 10th Kobi Brigade, advanced in Advance of the three columns and a reserve. The 10th Division right column consisted of five battalions and 24 guns, the centre column of three battalions, the left column of four battalions and 12 guns, and the reserve of four battalions.

The Russian outposts fell back and six batteries were brought into action against an advanced post held by the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd E. S. Rifle Regiment.

The infantry deployed for attack about 5.30 A.M. The gallant Russian battalion refused to retire. As

A Russian Advance Post overwhelmed the Japanese firing lines approached the trenches the battalion advanced to the counter-attack with bayonets fixed.

The fight was soon over ; 302 out of its 504 privates and every single officer and sergeant lay upon the blood-soaked ground, a grim testimony to the Japanese soldiers of the manner of the resistance they were about to meet before they could plant the flag of the Rising Sun on the hills in front of them.

To cover the retreat of the survivors a battery advanced into the open and took up a position barely

600 yards from the victorious enemy. Though the losses suffered were severe, this gallant action checked the Japanese, and even to the end of the day the battery kept one gun at least in action.

While the right of the 10th Division contented itself with its success against the advanced post, the left advanced. Its attack was taken in flank by the batteries west of Tsaofantun, and in front by a battery that advanced south of Tsaofantun. Two battalions from the divisional reserve were sent up in support. Wuchiakou and Minchialantz were captured, but north of these villages the Russians had had time to cut the kaoliang, and beyond the edge of the clearing the Japanese infantry could not be induced to advance.

By Kuropatkin's personal orders a battery in the I. Siberian Corps' section of defence fired on the left of the firing line of the 10th Division.

The Russian centre at the Tassu brook was in fact very strong, for on each side of the valley the defences were echeloned back so that troops penetrating were fired into by a murderous cross fire from the I. Siberian Corps on the east and Putilov's batteries on the west.

Finally the divisional artillery of the 10th Division received a severe shaking by the fire of two batteries of the X. Corps, which enfiladed them and inflicted serious losses. From 9 A.M. onwards these two batteries were engaged by the guard, but the 10th

divisional artillery had been much weakened by this action.

About midday there was a lull in the action, which was resumed with increased fury about 2 P.M. Under The Russians' cover of the newly arrived batteries Counter-attack the reserves of Putilov's section advanced and recaptured the lost villages. South of Putilov, in the right section of the III. Corps, the reserves, aided by the 18th Siberian Rifle Regiment of the II. Siberian Corps, assumed the offensive and about 4 P.M. forced the whole of the 10th Division to withdraw. The centre and right of the Japanese attack lost heavily. The advanced post, in which

The 10th
Division falls
back to its
Original
Position

the 3rd Battalion 23rd Rifles had been practically annihilated in the morning, was recaptured. About 8 P.M. the firing had ceased. The Japanese bivouacked in the position they had held the previous night. East of the Tassu brook they had failed utterly.

West of the Tassu brook lay the position of General Stakelberg. Against the left of this position the The Attack of whole of the 5th Division was employed, the 5th Division for the area allotted to it was west of the brook. It is therefore necessary to modify our ideas of the frontages which we get from Oyama's orders for the attack. As it turned out, against the 7000 yards of front held

Note on the
Frontages

by the I. Siberian Corps, 45,000 bayonets, supported by the fire of 332 guns and mortars, were employed.

The 5th Division, whose attack was to be supported by the right of the 2nd Army, marched in two columns and a reserve. The right column, one regiment, reached Tawa, driving in the Russian outposts. The left column, one regiment and the artillery, reached Hsiaoyangssu, crossing the front of the 3rd Division.

The 2nd Army had left its bivouacs early. The 3rd Division, with one regiment of the Artillery Advance of the Brigade, was assigned to the area between the railway and Heiniuchuang. The 6th Division was to keep west of the railway and then to swing up to attack the Shoushanpu hill from the west. The 11th Kobi Brigade was ordered to Shaho, the 4th Division to Hsinglungtai.

The 3rd Division marched in two columns at 6.20 A.M. The advanced guards had occupied Tutaitzu and Heiniuchuang. Here they were fired on, and the nine batteries of the left column came into action in the kaoliang. After a reconnaissance the commander of the 3rd Division decided to move to his right and deploy for attack against the western flank of the position east of the Tassu. To cover the movement the three other batteries of the division came into action near Heiniuchuang.

There followed the intermingling of the units of the 3rd and 5th Divisions. So when the two divisions formed for attack units of the 5th Division were with the 3rd. Five regiments, two of the 5th and three of the 3rd Division, formed the firing line, the remaining three regiments being in reserve.

The attack was commenced as soon as the deployment was completed, and fell upon the positions held by the 33rd and 34th E. S. R. Regiments. Two battalions from the I. Siberian Corps Reserve were sent to the threatened point, and a battery from the right section took the Japanese firing line in flank. One more regiment was brought up into the firing line, and a battalion of mortars with a Kobi regiment was sent up, but the two remaining regiments of the 5th Division and the Kōbi regiment attached to that division were not put in. By midday the firing line was about 900 yards from the hostile trenches, extended from Tawa to Tatzuying. Although the firing line was strengthened by the supports and most of the local reserve of the attack, and although it was supported by the fire of 108 guns and 18 old-fashioned mortars, no further advance was made.

The 6th Division had marched early, also in two columns. The left column, one Division regiment, reached Tachiaochiatai at 9.30 A.M., and deployed but did not advance until

afternoon. The right column only reached the southern end of the same village about 11 A.M.

It was 1 P.M. before the guns were able to get into action. Their march had been very slow, owing to the ground. When they arrived they went into action about Tahungchi at a range of nearly 6000 yards. Their fire was of course ineffective. The remainder of the Artillery Brigade (72 guns) remained in reserve at Shaho.

About the same time Kuropatkin had ordered two regiments of the General Reserve to march to join the I. Siberian Corps.

Before their arrival the infantry of the 6th Division had advanced to the attack. The firing line of one regiment reached the brook west of Mayehtun, and by 3 P.M. the firing line of the left attack was engaged in a fire fight with Russian infantry from Mayehtun northwards at a range of about 1000 yards. The left of the attack was taken in flank by fire from a village about 900 yards west of Kuchiatzu. The village was captured by the local reserve on the left flank of the attack, which then advanced towards Kuchiatzu.

By this time the divisional artillery of the 4th Division was in action, and in the afternoon it was advanced to Hsinglungtai, whence it was able to afford some support to the 6th Division.

About 5 P.M. a regiment of the IV. Siberian

Corps, which with one and a half batteries was marching along the railway to report to the I. Corps, arrived on the right of the position of that corps. The village west of Kuchiatzu had just been captured by the Japanese. Bringing his battery into action, General Dobrotin, deploying three battalions in a dense firing line and keeping one battalion in reserve, bore down upon the Japanese left.

The attack was totally unexpected, and immediately successful. The village was reoccupied and placed in a state of defence.

Thus the sum total of the fight of the 5th, 3rd and 6th Divisions was that some 30,000 men had been

**Result of
the Frontal
Attack** employed out of the available 54,000, and that nowhere had the firing lines been able to maintain positions closer than 1000 yards from the Russian position. The 10th Division had suffered a reverse. The guards had been obliged, through the failure of the 10th Division, and of their own left attack, to relinquish their dearly bought success.

During the day the 12th Division had been hard at work at Chiangkuantun. At 11.30 P.M. on the **The Flank
Attack** 30th the division commenced to cross by the ford. The Japanese soon found themselves hip-deep in the swirling waters. Linking arms, the little soldiers plunged in, and despite

the treacherous foothold the crossing continued all through the night. By 6 A.M. on the 31st the division was all across, only two companies remaining at Shuangmiaotzu, where a flank guard had been posted during the passage.

Farther eastwards, owing to some unexplained reason, the regiment of the V. Siberian Corps, which had relieved Grulev at Penhsihu, had retired, leaving the defence of the crossing there to Ljubavin's Cossacks. Umezawa, with the Guard Kobi Brigade, moved up to Penhsihu on the 30th. At 4 A.M. on the 31st he attacked Penhsihu, while detachments passed the river at Tahoyan, which was watched by four squadrons, and at Unjinin, which was watched by one squadron. Ljubavin withdrew northwards, rallying to himself the regiment of the V. Corps.

The outstanding feature of the day's action was the want of simultaneity in the various Japanese attacks, and the lack of effective artillery support to the attack. The best of infantry can do but little without effective artillery support. The principle of assigning a task to each body of troops, and leaving them to carry it out as they think best, can be over-pressed when the consequence is lack of intimate co-operation.

Comments

CHAPTER VIII

Map B (in pocket)

THE SECOND DAY OF THE BATTLE OF LIAOYANG

Action of Russians during the Night—The Japanese—The Holding Attack by the Guard and 10th Division is not pressed—Proposals for a Counter-attack by the X. Corps—Issue of Provisional Instructions for a Retreat—The Main Attack—The 4th Division not employed—The Flank Attack—Comments—Note on the Employment of their Reserves by the Russians—Note on Fighting of the 5th, 3rd and 6th Divisions, and the Movements of the Reserves of the I. Siberian Corps

THE night which descended over the field of battle on the 30th August brought but a short respite to the combatants. The infantry, which had gained but little ground nearer than 1000 yards from the enemy's trenches, were to endeavour to cover the deadly zone during the hours of darkness and make a lodgment in the Russian lines. The artillery fire of the attack had been ineffective because of the long fanges. The hours of dark were therefore to be utilised to bring the guns up to closer range. During the day infantry and artillery officers had reconnoitred the ground, and arrangements for these night operations had been thought out. The troops

were allowed to cook, get some rest, and replenish ammunition before the night attacks commenced. As the attacks were carried on throughout the 31st, and formed a connected series lasting from the small hours of the 31st to dark on that day, the night operations will not be considered in a separate chapter.

The night of the 30th-31st was spent by the Russians in preparing for the battle next day and in re-collecting the reserves.

Action of the
Russians dur-
ing the night,
30th-31st

Kuropatkin had sent eight battalions of the II. Siberian Corps and ten battalions of the IV. Siberian Corps to join the I. Siberian Corps. These troops Stakelberg declined to return to their own units. Finally he was allowed to keep the eight battalions of the II. Corps and one regiment of the IV. Corps, which was placed at Yuchiachuangtzu to guard the right flank. As Corps Reserve ten battalions (three of IV. Corps, five of II. Corps, two of I. Corps) stood north of Fangchiatun.

The III. Siberian Corps returned the troops on loan except three battalions, X. Corps, three battalions, V. Corps, and three battalions, II. Corps. These nine battalions, together with three battalions of the III. Corps, formed a Corps Reserve. Two other battalions of the X. Corps remained with the III. Siberian, and were placed on hill

1030; attached to the left section of the line of the III. Corps.

The X. Corps had in reserve eight battalions east of Shihchangyu, two battalions south of Yehmitsuan. One regiment of the III. Corps stood at Hsingfangtzuying.

The XVII. Corps was holding hill 1057 with outposts towards Hsikuantun and detachments farther advanced.

Orlov, with two regiments, V. Corps, was at Yentai, near which place also was Grulev's detachment, consisting of the 11th Regiment and one battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment. The total about Yentai was thirteen battalions and 28 guns.

With Ljubavin, besides his cavalry, were four battalions and a battery, V. Corps. In General Reserve near Liaoyang there were available, Samsonov's Cavalry, the IV. Corps (less eleven battalions), and about twelve battalions of the I., II. and V. Corps belonging to the garrison of Liaoyang.

On the Japanese side, the 4th Division had now been moved up on the left of the 2nd Army. Three regiments of the 4th Division, the 11th Kobi Brigade, and two regiments of the 5th Division had not been engaged on the 30th. There was now no Army Reserve proper, though two Kobi battalions appear to have arrived by rail during the 31st.

To press the attack on the 31st was Oyama's intention, but the arrangements made for the attack

The Holding
Attack by the
Guard and
10th Division
on the 31st

by the Japanese Guard and 10th Division were faulty in the extreme. Each received orders to conform to the other. Human nature asserted its sway, and neither did anything.

The total loss of the Guard Division on this day was 7 killed and 9 wounded, which attests the fact that no serious advance can have been made by the infantry.

In front of the X. Corps the movement of the Japanese 2nd Division towards the east was clearly

Proposals
for a Counter-
attack on the
Russian Left

visible. It was proposed to make a counter-attack, but the proposal was vetoed and this section of the defence

was ordered to withdraw "any troops it could spare" to be in readiness for the offensive.

Russian accounts from the III. Siberian Corps speak of several severe attacks on the night 30th-31st August having been made and repulsed. As the total losses of the 10th Division were 81, and of the guard 16, it is manifest that this serious fighting was only bickering at the outposts and needless alarms.

The artillery of the guard and 10th Division was dominated by the Russian guns, but the material effect of the latter was very slight. The ranges

were long and the targets doubtful. Many rounds were expended in sweeping ground supposed to be occupied by the Japanese.

The proposed counter-attack on the Russian left is of interest to show the Russian ideas on attack.

At about 7 A.M. Vassiliev wrote to the commander of the X. Corps asking him to place at his disposal two battalions then at Yehmitsuan. At 8.30 A.M. he sent a report, giving his proposed action in detail. The report said :

" Hsiaotuntzu and the adjoining villages have been shelled by our artillery. The village of Tatuntzu and one farther south have been occupied by a battalion. I am sending a battery to east of Kuchengtzu to shell the Shuiyu valley. To Hsiaotuntzu I am sending a strong cavalry detachment with a support of infantry. After shelling the Shuiyu valley I propose to occupy the hills west of the valley. After that I shall send forward a battery to enfilade the Japanese advance against the 9th Division. There is no danger in occupying the ridge west of Shuiyu as it is within range from our present position. I am expecting that you will consent to this and place at my disposal the two battalions already asked for."

Although Army Orders left general officers

commanding free to assume the offensive at their own discretion, Sluchevski did not care to permit this very modest little forward movement without reference to Headquarters. Kuropatkin promptly vetoed it. The Chief of the Staff of the X. Corps in forwarding this refusal was weak enough to commit the reasons for the refusal to writing. Here they are :

" To advance the left to occupy the heights west of Shuiyu is undesirable, because it would increase your front and therefore weaken you. . . . The Commander - in - Chief wishes you to withdraw as many troops as possible from the fighting line to the General Reserve if you are not opposed by any considerable force, so as to have ready as strong a force as possible for the impending offensive. . . ."

Vassiliev thereupon withdrew to his original positions.

To refuse to place part of the Corps Reserves at the disposal of Vassiliev for this movement was very possibly justifiable. It would, however, have been even more justifiable to use the whole of the Corps Reserves for the movement, and to have acted boldly against the Japanese right.

Comment
What effect such action might have had on the fortunes of the battle it is impossible to say. The X. Corps had available eleven battalions in reserve,

which with Vassiliev's eight battalions would have formed a force of 12,000 rifles. A strong flank guard placed in the direction of Shichutzu could have secured the left, and with the remaining 10,000 bayonets bearing down upon the gap which separated the two portions of the 1st Army the situation of the Japanese would have been one of much danger. At the same time it is apparent that such an attack would have had only a temporary success unless it had been sustained by a vigorous offensive by the III. Corps, which had not been seriously attacked.

But Kuropatkin had by now issued "Disposition No. 3," which contained instructions as to a possible retreat. The issue of such a document must have affected the commanders.

All day the 2nd Army was making a heroic effort to break into the positions held by the I. Corps.

A night attack by the 3rd Division and one regiment, 5th Division, was delivered with the utmost gallantry. Several advanced trenches were reached, but in general the attack was repulsed. The left regiment of the 3rd Division was so severely handled that two Kobi regiments were placed to connect with the 6th Division.

This attack is considered in more detail in a note at the end of this chapter.

Issue of In-
structions as
to Method of
Retreat

The artillery was moved forward to closer range, until 300 guns and howitzers were prepared to open fire at dawn upon the devoted regiments of the I. Corps.

About 11.30 A.M. a storm of shell bursting over the trenches on the Hsinlitun heights preluded a fierce assault by the 3rd Division. This time the assault was successful in reaching the advanced line of trenches, the defenders retiring to the second line. Beyond this the Japanese, swept by fire from the right and left, as well as from the front, could not advance.

The night had also seen an advance of the 6th Division. About the same time that the 3rd Division attacked Hsinlitun, the 6th Division attacked hill 693. The attack here failed also, nor was a forward move by daylight successful.

Movements on the Russian right had led to the idea that a Russian counter-stroke was brewing on this flank. It was not till 4 p.m., therefore, that the 4th Division was finally placed at the disposal of the 2nd Army. The 4th Division not employed till late

Even then further reports of movements on the Russian right were received from the cavalry, and the 4th Division was withheld. By the time these reports were found exaggerated night had fallen.

The Japanese main attack had failed, but across the Taitzu half the Japanese 1st Army was rapidly concentrating, without a shot being fired to hinder them. Though the passage of the river by the Japanese was fully reported, it was 11.30 A.M. before steps were taken by the XVII. Corps to occupy Hsikuantun, but at that hour Dobrjinski occupied hill 920, placing eight battalions and 48 guns on the position and keeping eight battalions with 56 guns and 6 squadrons in reserve.

A detachment of 12/6/2 under Orbeliani was ordered to watch the left towards the Coal Mines. Farther east Ljubavin, now joined by the regiment, V. Corps, which had been near Penhsihu, was watching Umezawa.

The delay in placing the 4th Division at the disposal of General Oku has been a matter of surprise to many.

About midday the regiment, IV. Corps, on the left of the I. Siberian Corps, occupied Yuchiachuangtzu and, reinforced by a battalion, made some show of advancing. Two battalions of infantry attached to Mischenko's Cavalry drove some Japanese cavalry from Shuichiuan. The Japanese cavalry was foiled in an effort to take Wulantai, and the Cossack masses were clearly

visible. It was a possibility that behind these masses of cavalry Kuropatkin was deploying a strong counter-attack. It was the duty of the Japanese staff to assume that their enemy was acting on sound principles. The Japanese staff well knew that the only hope of a Russian victory lay in their taking up the rôle of attacker. In front of the Japanese army lay seven army corps. It was probably known that a portion of these troops had been dissipated in useless detachments, but even so the Japanese had to reckon on at least six and a half army corps opposed to them. They were well aware that the troops holding the line opposed to them consisted of four corps. There remained then available for a counter-stroke some sixty battalions, say 40,000 infantry at a moderate estimate. It was impossible for the Japanese to know that Kuropatkin had dissipated the bulk of his reserves in reinforcing his defensive line. More probably the troops seen to be reinforcing the firing lines were the reserves of the sections of defence.

In the nature of things, Oyama continued anxious for his left. Strategically this flank was dangerous because the line of communication ran back behind it. Again, the Russians had placed the bulk of their cavalry on this flank, where open country afforded some possibility of cavalry action. Just as the line of communication ran up to the

Japanese left, so did the Russian line to their right. The troops of the V. Corps as they arrived might be expected to detrain behind the Russian right. Lastly, Oyama was aware that the Russian generals had one and all agreed to attribute their previous defeats to the assumed superiority of the Japanese in the mountains. "Once we get these little yellow men into the plains you shall see how we will eat them up." This was their constant cry. For all these reasons, therefore, Oyama had to look for a counter-stroke against the left.

About 4 P.M., when the attack of the 3rd Division was obviously a failure, the 4th Division had been placed again at Oku's disposal for a final effort against the Russian right. Hardly had the order been given than a message came from the cavalry that a strong Russian column was marching southwards from Peitai. The 4th Division was thereupon ordered to meet this advance. When the report was at last found to be incorrect the time had passed by and it was dark.

It does not appear that any other action on Oyama's part would have been safe, unless it had been possible indeed to place a portion of the division in a strong defensive position on the left, and thus, by utilising field entrenchments to economise men, have left some available for continued pressure on the Russian right. But for such action the terrain was unsuited.

The two armies had now been engaged continuously for thirty-six hours, for the period from 8 P.M. on the 30th to 3 A.M. on the 31st was no period of rest anywhere along the line. The losses of the 3rd and 6th Divisions were very heavy. These losses had been sustained gradually during the whole thirty-six hours. During all that time the nerves of the men had been kept at full tension. How far more tiring is a pain which endures for a long period than a wound the pain of which is short and sharp. Everyone has experienced this. It is the same in war. In the old days a loss of 20 per cent. or more might be inflicted in a few moments' clash at close quarters. To-day the strain must be endured for hours, nay, for days. A loss of 20 per cent. nowadays implies a far more exhausting effort than a loss of 20 per cent. in old days, before the advent of the long-range weapon.

This is a fact which must be constantly borne in mind in comparing war of the present and earlier days. The human factor is of all importance, and undoubtedly strategy as well as tactics have been affected by the exhaustion consequent on the strain of long battles.

EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES BY THE RUSSIANS

The use to which the various Russian commanders put their reserves on 30th and 31st August is of interest, and it

is thought that a tabular statement may make this clearer. In the morning of 30th August the reserves stood as follows :—

	Squadron	Guns	Battalions	Engineer Battalions
Army Reserve—				
Cavalry	19	6	—	—
IV. Corps	6	32	22	1
II. Corps	2	32	12	1
Garrison Liaoyang	2	32	9	—
Marching to Yentai—				
From North	1	16	8	—
From South-East	4	6	5	—
I. Siberian Corps—				
Corps Reserve	—	14	9	1
Section Reserves—				
Right Section	—	—	3	—
Left Section	—	—	nil	—
Putilov's Reserve	?	—	nil	—
III. Siberian Corps—				
Corps Reserve	—	8	19	?
X. Corps—				
Corps Reserve placed in two groups—				
At Kaolitsun	?	24	8	?
Shichangyu	—	—	8	—

The Reserves were used as follows :—

- I. Siberian Corps—3 battalions to left section
2 battalions to right section
6 guns to right section
- III. Siberian Corps—12 battalions to firing line
4 battalions to Section Reserves
- Later—2 battalions to left section
3 battalions to right section

- X. Corps— 3 battalions to III. Corps
 1 battalion to right section
 3 battalions to left section
- Army Reserve— 3 battalions from II. Corps to III. Corps.
 2 batteries from II. Corps to Putilov
 8 squadrons, 2 battalions, from IV. Corps to Mischenko
 2 battalions, II. Corps
 { 12 guns and 4 battalions, IV. Corps } to I. Corps
 12 guns and 4 battalions from IV. Corps to left of I. Corps. at Hsipalichuang
 6 battalions, II. Corps, to Hsipalichuang
 2 battalions, IV. Corps, to I. Corps

In this way the Army Reserve was gradually reduced by 23 battalions. The Reserve had included 43 battalions and now only mustered 20 battalions. Four more arrived during the night from the north.

During the night 30th-31st August the Reserves were re-formed, and on the morning of 31st August stood as follows:

	Squadrons	Guns	Battalions	Sapper Battalions
Army Reserve—				
Samsonov	II	6	—	—
IV. Corps	6	20	14	I
II. Corps	2	16	1	—
V. Corps	—	—	4	—
I. Siberian Corps Reserve	—	24	10	I
III. Siberian Corps Reserve	?	—	13	?
X. Corps Reserve in three groups	?	24	14	?

The commanders had orders to use their reserves for offensive action on 31st August, but the issue of Disposition No. 3, which though it did not enjoin yet forecasted a possible retreat, paralysed any offensive movement.

The III. and X. Corps had no serious fighting. The I. Corps used all its reserves, except eleven companies, to feed the firing line.

The Army Reserve was not called upon to assist the fighting line, and though it mustered 19/42/19 yet it was not employed. At Yentai there were during the day a further 6/22/13.

THE FIGHTING OF THE 5TH, 3RD AND 6TH DIVISIONS

During the night the artillery was moved into positions very much closer to the enemy. Three batteries of the 15th Artillery Regiment, the 5th Artillery Regiment, and the 2nd Regiment Foot Artillery (4 batteries of 3·5-inch mortars), in all 54 guns and 24 mortars, were brought into action on and behind hill 525. A heavy battery of 4 4·2-inch guns was brought up on railway trucks and put in action near Houchiatung, while three more mortar batteries were in action just east of Heiniuchuang.

Just west of Heiniuchuang was placed the 3rd Artillery Regiment in two groups, with the 13th Artillery Regiment close to them and slightly in rear.

The 14th Artillery Regiment, a battery of 5-inch howitzers, and three mortar batteries were in action east and west of Hsiwanchuang.

The 6th Field Artillery Regiment moved up to Poputz. The 4th Artillery Regiment was at a point north of Fuchia-chuang.

When fighting ceased on the 30th the 41st Regiment, 5th Division, was occupying a line from Tawa to a hillock half-a-mile west of that village, there coming in Night Attack by 3rd Division touch with the 3rd Division. Two regiments of the 5th Division were in reserve, and one regiment was in the line of the 3rd Division,

which was formed as follows :—18th, 6th, 21st (of 5th Division) 33rd, 34th. All the regiments of the division were detailed for a night attack. The only available battalions in reserve were the 23rd Kobi Regiment of two battalions. The five regiments advanced between 3 A.M. and 4 A.M., but as their attacks, though evidently intended to be simultaneous, were not so, it will be best to consider each regiment separately.

On the right a battalion of the 18th took up a position on a knoll at A to cover the movement of the regiment.

18th Regiment The other two battalions advanced along the ridge held by the 35th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. One battalion was discovered, but the battalion on the north-eastern slope was not seen at first. A section with a section of engineers led, followed by two companies in first line and two companies in reserve. The leading section reached the obstacles, but a storm of bullets showed them that they were discovered. The front line then fell back to the reserve in a shallow ravine about 500 yards from the trenches. Here they were exposed to a heavy fire from Rocky Ridge, from Hsinlitun and from the battery at Fangchiatun.

On the left of the 18th Regiment, two battalions, the 6th Regiment advanced, one battalion leading with two companies in first line, two in second ; one **6th Regiment** battalion was in reserve. One battalion of the regiment did not advance.

The first line reached the obstacles. Eight fougasses which exploded unnerved the attackers, and the men fell back to a hollow road running east from Hsiaoyangssu, where they were able to get some cover, with the aid of their light entrenching tool. Here they lay all day.

It was not till after these two regiments had been repulsed that the 21st and 33rd Regiments advanced. They **21st and 33rd Regiments** too moved, it seems, in a similar formation to the 6th Regiment—that is to say, about one-third in a first line extended with a pace or two between files and accompanied by a party of engineers ; then a second line,

also of about a third, in somewhat closer formation, and finally a third line in a similar formation to the second line. The attack failed.

On the left of the 33rd Regiment the 34th advanced rather earlier than the 21st and 33rd Regiments, with two battalions **34th Regiment** forming the first two lines, and the third in third line echeloned on the right. The attack was directed on Middle Hill.

The leading lines captured a Russian fire trench and also the trench for supports in rear. As the light got brighter they began to lose very heavily. Two counter-attacks were repulsed, but gradually the men slipped away down the hill, and with the reserves took shelter in the pits and obstacles at the bottom of the hill. An attempt to capture Low Spur failed.

To fill the gap in the line between the 3rd and 6th Divisions, which was now a danger point because of serious losses **11th Kobi Bri-** sustained by the 34th, the 12th and 45th **gade ordered** Kobi Regiments were ordered up.

to fill Gap be- The 3rd Division had by no means ex-
tween 3rd and hausted its strength, however. The night
6th Divisions attack had been, as night attacks following a long and exhausting day of fighting may often be, disconnected. A simultaneous advance all along the front might possibly have succeeded. To cover the infantry as soon as day broke the long line of nearly 200 guns behind the 3rd and 5th Divisions opened as hot a fire as possible on the Russian trenches. Unfortunately difficulties of ammunition supply over the muddy roads led to the possible expenditure of ammunition being limited. About 11.30 A.M. the bombardment increased in severity. This proceeding was timed to synchronise as far as possible with a forward move of the infantry of the 6th Division. The 18th Regiment observed men leaving the trenches. The firing line, covered by the fire of the local reserve on the hillock in the same situation as during the night attack, succeeded in entering the lower trenches. Two companies, however, had been obliged to face towards

Hsinlitun to meet the heavy enfilade fire from that direction.

At the same time the survivors of the 6th Regiment saw their 3rd battalion advancing, heard the shouts of "Banzai" away to their right, heard bugles sounding the advance and, animated by the daring spirit which was so characteristic of the Japanese, and also, no doubt, desirous of ending the intolerable situation in which they found themselves crouching in the sunken road, dashed forward, headed by a party of some twenty men and a lieutenant. The lower trenches were gained. Immediately a counter-attack, covered by the fire of every gun near Hsinlitun, and Fangchiatun, was launched against them. The Japanese gunners, however, were on the look-out for this likely move. The counter-attack reeled under a storm of shell and the gallant Japanese were able to hold on to the ground they had bought so dearly.

In the early hours of the 31st, at about the same time as the 3rd Division was advancing to the attack, the 6th **6th Division** Division also advanced. On the left the 48th Regiment attacked Kuchiatsu and the 13th Regiment attacked Mayehtun. The houses on the railway near the latter village were taken and retaken several times. About 4 A.M., in a further advance by the 28th Regiment, a few men got across the railway line, but they were again obliged to retreat across the embankment, where they dug themselves in.

Again and again attempts were made to bring more troops up to the embankment, and to bring up the left of the 48th Regiment. All these were frustrated. A battery of machine guns in Kuchiatsu was specially useful. However, the Japanese were so menacing that Stakelberg moved the bulk of his corps reserve to Shoushanpu from Fanchiatun. From 11.30 P.M. onwards the attack of the 3rd Division was the principal attack of the 2nd Army; the infantry of the 6th Division was unable to make any further forward movement. The loss of the division on this day amounted to 1800 killed and wounded. On the 30th the loss had been

1400 killed and wounded. In the two days' fighting the division lost, therefore, about 3200 killed and wounded.

This loss approximates to 20 per cent. The infantry, therefore, must have lost over 20 per cent. of its strength in the two days' battle. When the duration of time is considered over which the losses took place it will be seen at once what a much higher strain in endurance and moral the modern battle entails. In Napoleonic times the combatants approached to within a few hundred yards before they began to suffer loss. They did not become subjected to a really serious fire until not more than two or three minutes' rush separated them from the enemy. No doubt in the terrific volleys at close quarters the storm of grape and canister and the occasional bayonet mêlées, the proportions of losses sometimes far exceeded 25 per cent., but the whole affair was over in a few moments. It was not a long-drawn-out agony.

The battle had, as we have seen, commenced with a fierce attack just before dawn by the 3rd and 6th Divisions. The Move-
ments of the Reserves of the I. Siberian Corps on the positions held by the I. Corps. When this was beaten back Kuropatkin had ex-
pected the next effort to be made against his right, especially as the artillery fire in front of the III. Corps was increasing in violence. Two regiments were therefore ordered up behind the right of this corps, and a regiment of the V. Siberian Corps, which was at Hsiawakontzu, was ordered to Muchang.

About 5.30 A.M., when the fury of the assault of the 6th Division was at its height, seven of the ten battalions in the I. Corps Reserve were moved to Shoushanpu, and one battalion from the section reserve of the left section which had just beaten off the 3rd Division was also brought to Shoushanpu.

When the 6th Division was beaten off about 11.30, and the assault of the 3rd Division renewed, Stakelberg returned the battalion borrowed from the left section and reinforced the section with two battalions. A little before this he had reported that he hoped to replace the 7th Regiment (IV.

Corps) at Yuchiachuangtzu by a regiment from his reserve; the renewed assault of the 3rd Division prevented this, however. At 4 P.M. the Corps Reserve of the I. Corps was still four battalions. The bombardment preluding the proposed attack of the 4th Division, however, induced him to reinforce his firing line, leaving three battalions only in reserve.

CHAPTER IX

Map C (in pocket)

THE RUSSIANS RETREAT TO THE " MAIN POSITION OF LIAOYANG "

Issue and Contents of Disposition No. 3—Reasons for Adoption of this Course—Orders to carry out the Retreat issued—The Retreat

DURING the course of the battle of the 31st the corps commanders of the troops holding the Disposition "advanced" position had received No. 3 a document known as Disposition No. 3. This remarkable document is dated Liaoyang, 31st August 1904, 1.15 A.M. Summarised, its contents were as follows :—

Should it prove correct that considerable hostile forces have crossed to the right bank of the Taitzu with the object of turning our left, I shall order a retirement to the "main" position with the object of contracting the front held and attacking the enemy on the right bank of the Taitzu after concentrating a reserve. The line defence will be occupied as follows :—

The IV. Siberian Corps, from Chingerhtum to but not including the railway line.

The II. Siberian Corps from the railway inclusive to Erhfa. (This corps consisted only of the 5th E. Siberian Rifle Division and was to be reinforced by one brigade and two batteries, III. Corps, and one brigade and three batteries X. Corps.)

The XVII. Corps "will secure the left flank by defending the position on the right bank from Muchang to Hsikuantun, will watch the Taitzu river, and maintain touch with the Penhsihu detachment."

The General Reserve will form up as follows :—

I. Siberian Corps will pass Liaoyang on the west, cross by the railway bridge and the bridge below it and form up at Liuchiachuang.

The III. Siberian Corps, leaving one brigade and two batteries, will withdraw through the town and form up north of the city walls.

The X. Corps, leaving one Infantry Brigade and one Artillery Regiment in the town, will retire east of Liaoyang, cross the bridge at Erhfa, and form up at Hsincheng.

Of the V. Siberian Corps, the 71st Division is to form up near the III. Corps; the 54th Division, under Orlov, is to go to Yentai station.

The cavalry will move as follows :—

The division under Samsonov to Shahotun.

The division under Mischenko to Saichiatur.

It seems that this disposition was in reality issued before 1.15 P.M., for General Stakelberg is said to have received it just as the Japanese 3rd Division made their second attack—that is to say, about mid-day. It is stated that the disposition was drawn up on the night 30th-31st August.

However that may be, it must have taken the sting out of the defence. The positions held so gallantly were not to be the pivot on which Kuropatkin's counter-strokes were to manoeuvre. Again there was to be retreat and reforming; again were the troops to fall back over the muddy roads a morally beaten force.

According to Kuropatkin's statements, made, it is true, long after the event, the reports from the

Strength of
the Japanese
North of the
Taitzu
exaggerated

XVII. Corps made Kuroki's force north of the Taitzu to be 65,000 to 70,000 men. No doubt it was during the afternoon of the 31st that reports

of the passage of the river at Penhsihu by Umezawa's Guard Kobi Brigade arrived. We may be sure that the strength of this brigade was not underestimated in the reports.

Reasons for
Retreat

The actual reason for the action taken is probably best put in the words of a telegram sent to the Czar :

" My General Reserve was no longer strong enough

to ensure a counter-stroke in a south-westerly direction being successful. A withdrawal to the main position shortened the length of the line to be defended, making it possible to concentrate a considerable portion of the army north of the Taitzu river. There was undoubtedly a danger of Kuroki cutting our communications and *the most pressing duty of the army seemed to be to guard them.*"

Orders were given about 7.30 P.M. to carry out the movements detailed in Disposition No. 3.

A little before this Samsonov had received orders to go to the Coal Mines and Orlov had been ordered to move as early as possible on the 1st towards Hsiaotalienkou.

The retreat of the I. Corps commenced about 9 P.M., the III. Corps and X. Corps moved as soon as the I. Corps was reported to have got into column of march.

No sound of the movement reached the Japanese. The noise of a bombardment drowned all sounds of life. No idea that their enemy had left the dark hills in front crossed the minds of the tired soldiers as they slept on the rain-sodden ground where they had lain fighting.

Marshal Oyama, however, had determined on one more effort. Kuroki's passage of the Taitzu had left a gap in the line. The situation was very full

of danger. Long after dark the bombardment was kept up and a storm of shell rained upon the hills. The Japanese in front held only by a few companies. **Night Attack** At midnight the infantry of the 3rd Division and the 11th Kobi Brigade moved forward in the order they then stood. The engineers leading the advance reached and destroyed the obstacles, and by 1 A.M. a few men had reached the deserted trenches.

The news spread like wildfire. It is not difficult to picture the feelings of the men. For thirty-six hours and more they had lain prone among the kaoliang and crops, sheltering behind a rock or old piece of wall, or in a sunken road or some ravine. Now and again their officers had called upon them to try to get forward. The storm of shell would redouble in intensity. The local reserves would open magazine fire, a rush forward would be made and then they would drop again to wait and shoot. Some of the men had reached the foot of the low hills in front, barely 500 to 1000 yards away, only to be driven back by bayonet, bullet and shell, leaving their dead and wounded on the ground at the foot. All their efforts were in vain. Even Oriental passivity and Japanese gallantry and contempt of death were not able to bear up against the feeling of hopelessness besetting all ranks. And now it was all over; they

were victorious. Their enemy had fled before them. What did it matter that he had withdrawn, taking his wounded and his guns ? He had withdrawn, that was the thing. There lay his dead. There were his empty trenches, there were places where his guns had stood and checked the assaulting lines again and again. With wild shouts of "Banzai!" the men rushed forward, the rearguards falling back from the position. What a revulsion of feeling ! Kuropatkin had trebled his opponent's strength by the moral victory which his withdrawal gave him. War is not a game of chess; it is no game at all. It is a fierce strife of man against man, of will against will, conducted in circumstances when the moral powers are reduced by the severe drain on the physical strength consequent on long marches, exposure to weather, bad food, over-excitement, over-tension of every nerve, muscle and sinew. The general who fails to understand and reckon on these factors, the general who applies text-book strategy and manœuvre conditions to war, is leaving out of his calculations the most important factor, the factor of human nature. This was the factor that Kuropatkin seems to have ignored. Or if he did consider it he only looked to his own men, and forgot "the men on the other side of the hill." If the Russian troops were overstrained by fighting, must not their opponents be equally

exhausted? They had had the more difficult task, the approach over the muddy roads, ahead of, probably quite away from, their train transport. They had lain for days and nights in the rain. They were having difficulties in transporting ammunition. All these disadvantages the troops holding a position suffer from in a less degree. If the Russians had suffered heavily, ensconced in their trenches, must not the Japanese have suffered far more severely? Nor had the commanders of sections of defence been in any way despondent. All of them still had intact reserves. Even the I. Siberian Corps had some 1600 or 1700 bayonets in the Corps Reserve. In the Army Reserve still stood four and a half regiments. Within reach were three regiments more of the V. Corps, two at Yentai, one at Muchang. The Pskov Regiment was at Yentai. Two cavalry divisions were available. It is absurd to say that thirty-five squadrons and thirty-four battalions could not have achieved something, and these were available without calling on the X. Corps or the III. Corps for a man of theirs. However, it was not to be. One of the critical battles of world history, the battle which in all probability will have a greater influence on the situation of world power in the Pacific and Far East than any of the many that will doubtless be fought in those regions in this twentieth century, was

decided by the action of Kuropatkin on 31st August.

Once again the advantage of the offensive over the defensive was demonstrated, once again the inherent vice of the plausible offensive-defensive attitude was demonstrated.

The simple action is what is always best in war. Simplicity and determination to win are to be found in the operations of almost all great leaders when dealing with the main operations. Complexity sometimes enters into the conduct of the operations of detachments, rarely into those of main armies. The larger the armies the simpler must be the scheme and the more strenuous the determination to carry the scheme through, cost what it may.

CHAPTER X

Map V and Map C (in pocket)

ADVANCE OF THE JAPANESE ARMIES. THE CAPTURE OF MANJUYAMA

Movements South of the Taitzu—Distribution of XVII. Corps—Action of 1st Army—Kuroki decides to attack—Capture of Manjuyama—Orlov reaches the Coal Mines—Ljubavin falls back slowly—Kuropatkin's Plans—Distribution for the Great Attack—Comments—Complex Movements more difficult To-day

By early morning of the 1st the Russian troops had retired within the lines of the "main position."

Movements South of the Taitzu All morning train-loads of wounded and stores were being despatched northward and the staff was busily engaged in collecting the scattered units of the II. and IV. Corps. It was late in the afternoon before the troops had been reassembled in their own units and the line of defence had been occupied.

The Japanese 2nd Army was far too exhausted to pursue. The 3rd, 5th and 6th Divisions and the 11th Kobi Brigade had to be re-collected. Rations and ammunition had to be distributed, wounded collected, dead buried, and the multifarious details

of organisation, which had of course been much deranged by the advance and battle, had to be straightened out. The cavalry and 4th Japanese Division were ordered at 9 A.M. to reconnoitre the western portion of the Liaoyang enceinte. Although the infantry of the 4th Division had hardly been engaged on the 30th and 31st, yet rations had to be issued, gun ammunition replenished and other details attended to. It was 2 P.M. before the division moved. The heavy battery for which transport was provided on railway trucks was brought forward, and about 4 P.M. opened fire from Kuchiatzu.

Towards 5 P.M. the 4th Artillery Regiment came into action, and infantry of the 4th Division deployed between Yuchiachuangtzu and Wangpaoshan. The cavalry reconnoitred northwards as far as Tan-chuangtzu.

The 10th Division on the right of the 4th Army had not been seriously engaged on the 31st, and by 7 A.M. was able to press forward in pursuit. Although the division was checked by heavy artillery fire from Muchang and the Liaoyang forts, the advanced guard established itself between Tata-peihu and Hsitachiawatzu. From this point of vantage the enceinte could be overlooked and carefully reconnoitred.

The 5th Division was able to push on soon after the 10th. Its advanced guard prolonged the line

of that of the 10th Division. The main bodies of these two divisions halted at Tsaofantun and Wanpalichuang, with the Kobi Brigade at Wuchia-kou. The Guard Division advanced as far as the line Shihchangyu-Chalutzu. Four batteries came into action against the Russian guns at Muchang.

North of the Taitzu river the Russians were distributed on the morning of the XVII. Corps 1st as follows :—

On both sides of Hsikuantun, General Dembovski's Division placed :

2 battalions on Manjuyama

1½ battalions in Hsikuantun village

3 battalions on hill 920

3 batteries between Shahotun and Hsikuantun

1 battery between Hsikuantun and Manjuyama

An advanced post of 1½ battalions was near Kungkufen

On hill 1057 was placed General Yanjul's Division, consisting of eight battalions and five batteries.

In reserve at Shahotun were 4½/64/11, under General Glasko.

Mischenko's Cavalry stood at Saichiatur.

Prince Orbeliani's detachment, 12/6/2, was guarding the left,

At the Coal Mines were Samsonov's Cavalry Brigade, 18/6/—.

Orlov's Infantry Brigade was approaching from Yentai.

Away to the east Ljubavin's detachment was in touch with the Guard Kobi Brigade.

General Kuroki had been convinced since 30th Kuroki's Action August that the Russians were re-treating, and that the rôle of his army was to cut off their retreat.

At 11 A.M. on the 31st the advanced guard had occupied the hills west of Kuantun. Behind the screen thus afforded the three Japanese brigades had deployed, the 12th Brigade on the right, then the 23rd Brigade, and then the 15th Brigade, 2nd Division.

At 11 P.M. on the 31st orders for the advance of these three brigades were issued. The 15th Brigade was to attack Hsikuantun and a knoll called by the Japanese, Manjuyama—that is, "Rice Cake Hill." The 12th Division was to advance on the right and to push on to the railway.

Five miles west of the position occupied by the Japanese was the hill "920." At its eastern end, about three miles away from the Japanese, stood the village of Hsikuantun. The village is situated on a low col between hill 920 and an underfeature of no remarkable size which extends north-east

from the main hill. This is the underfeature which was called by the Japanese, Manjuyama. The possession of this feature would render movements of the Russian troops from Liaoyang towards the north and east almost impossible.

Very early in the morning Kuroki arrived at the station selected for army headquarters on a considerable hill east of Kuantun.

Here he received news of the Russian retreat from the "advanced" position. This confirmed him in his belief that the Russians were retiring, and, in spite of a warning from Oyama not to commit himself, he issued orders for the attack to commence.

A feature of the fighting on the north bank of the Taitzu was that the whole country was a rolling mass of kaoliang nearly ten feet high. Only the tops of the big hills showed above this sea of waving corn. Small hills like Manjuyama were covered almost to the top. In this curious battlefield the troops groped their way slowly, steering by the compass. Many must have been the opportunities for the sluggards and cowards who compose so numerous a section of every army to fall out and disappear. Many must have been the strange happenings when opposing patrols met face to face in this strange *milieu*.

At 7 A.M. the detached post at Kungkufen was driven in and the Wutingshan occupied by the 12th

Division. The Divisional Reserve, two and a quarter battalions, was in rear of the right. Three companies formed a right flank guard.

The 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, was already on its way to the Taitzu. One battalion arrived at 6 A.M. At 8 A.M. the 2nd Division Artillery relieved that of the 12th Division at Yingshoupu, and during the afternoon two more battalions, 3rd Brigade, arrived.

At 8.30 A.M. the guns of the 2nd Division opened fire, and were answered by the concealed batteries behind Hsikuantun. The range was too great for the Japanese guns, which turned their fire on Heiyingtai and Manjuyama. The Russian Artillery were evidently "false crested," for they shelled the ridge behind that on which the Japanese guns were placed.

At 11.30 A.M. the 15th Brigade advanced to attack Manjuyama. At this time the 12th Division received reports of Russian columns on the right. The cavalry and one regiment went out to investigate. At 1 P.M., the reports being confirmed, the 12th Division suspended its advance and informed the 15th Brigade of its action. The brigade, however, continued to advance, supported by the fire of both the 2nd and 12th Divisional Artillery.

Meanwhile Kuroki had summoned the rest of the 2nd Division, ordered the Guard Division to send him the 29th Kobi Regiment, and directed Umezawa

to push on towards the Mines. He now ordered the left brigade of the 12th Division to support the 15th Brigade in their attack on Manjuyama.

The Japanese Infantry succeeded in occupying Heiyingtai and a ridge north of that village. A cross fire could thus be brought to bear on the summit of Manjuyama.

Meanwhile Bilderling, seeing the direction of the Japanese advance, sent up a regiment and three batteries from the Corps Reserve. These troops occupied a position in echelon behind the left of the two battalions holding the hill. A very heavy fire fight at ranges of 500 to 1500 yards then commenced, and lasted till sunset. About 7.20 P.M. a fierce artillery bombardment was commenced. This lasted till about 8 P.M., when the infantry of the 15th Brigade and one regiment, 12th Division, assaulted.

The regiment on the left, which was directed on Hsikuantun, found the ground very difficult. The two regiments on the right, on the other hand, found the ground easy. The two Russian battalions, although reinforced by two companies, were unable to hold their own, and the Japanese occupied the northern end of the hill. Meanwhile the regiment on the left found Hsikuantun abandoned. For some inexplicable reason the troops there had withdrawn without fighting. The regiment then prepared to sweep the hill, but were suddenly heavily counter-

attacked by the very troops who had left the position.

The Japanese beat this attack off and began to entrench themselves in the village. But the Russians Capture of were not disposed to leave them in Manjuyama undisturbed possession. An attack was delivered about 1.30 A.M., but it was repulsed. For some equally inexplicable cause one Russian battalion on the left also withdrew. During the early hours of the 2nd the other troops withdrew in perfect order. The Japanese then occupied the hill and entrenched it.

During the 1st September Orlov, who had left Yentai at 5 A.M. and picked up the 11th (Pskov) Russian Force Regiment on the way, joined Samsonov at the Coal near the Mines towards 2 P.M. One Mines regiment and 12 guns were placed in a position, and the rest of the force bivouacked at the Mines.

Farther east Ljubavin had retired, maintaining Ljubavin touch with Umezawa. Ljubavin was falls back joined by Madritov with six squadrons. slowly Meanwhile Kuropatkin, in full assurance that the Hsikuantun position was secure, was Kuropatkin's maturing his plans for the great Plans counter-stroke, fixed to take place on 3rd September.

These plans were detailed to his corps commanders in a document known as Disposition No. 4.

Suñmarised, this disposition distributed the army as follows :—

To hold Liaoyang, Zarubaiev, with 10/142/64

To hold hill 1057, Yanjul, with 3/ 68/16

Right Flank Guard west of Liaoyang,

Grekov, with 14/ 12/1½

To form the force for the counter-stroke under the personal command of Kuropatkin :

Advanced Guard, XVII. Corps, Bilderling,

with 18/116/23

Right Column, X. Corps, Sluchevski, with 6/ 85/21

Left Column, I. Corps, Stakelberg, with . 8/ 62/18

Reserve, III. Corps, Ivanov, with 4/ 48/18

Left Flank Guard, Orlov, with 3/ 22/13

Cavalry, Samsonov, with 19/ 6/—

And Mischenko, with 21/ 12/—

Rearguard to be stationed at Liuchia-chuang, Kondratovich, with 2/ 8/ 6

The duties of the several portions were as follows :—

The Advanced Guard was to act as a screen behind which the army could manœuvre. For this purpose it was to hold on to Hsikuantun and hill 920.

The Right Column was to march to Shahotun.

The Left Column was to march to Lotatai, and thence on Fankuantun.

The Reserve was to go to Chanhositun.

The Left Flank Guard was to regulate its advance by that of the Left Column.

Samsonov was to reconnoitre towards Penhsihu and get into communication with Ljubavin.

Mischenko was to await orders at Saichiatun.

No orders were issued as to Ljubavin's action.

Grekov's Right Flank Guard was to remain out on the west as during the battle of the 30th and 31st.

These dispositions merit a close study.

Utilising the high ground 1057, 920, Manjuyama as a screen, to be held by the advanced guard,

Comments Kuropatkin proposed to mass a force of about sixty-two battalions and 200 guns on a front from Shahotun to "a point 3 or 4 versts north of that village." Behind the Infantry Corps Mischenko's Cavalry, 21 squadrons, stood ready to follow up the victory. The disposition was made by a man who, whatever his faults, had studied war, and was a good soldier. The whole movement was perfectly possible, and was in fact carried out. The plan was marred by the loss of Manjuyama.

This loss probably resulted directly from the retirement without any orders of the Novoingermanland Regiment from Hsikuantun and the battalion of the Bolkhov Regiment from its post on the left of Manjuyama. Had Bilderling made sure of Manjuyama on the night 1st-2nd the scheme ought to have

been successful. Whether Kuropatkin would then have had the firmness necessary to carry through the attack and envelop the Japanese right with his reserves and Orlov's flank guard is another question.

It is interesting to note how badly informed the Russian leaders were throughout the battle. The same failure is noticeable at the battle of the Shaho. Nothing is more conspicuously important in the modern army than the service of intercommunication. In these days of smokeless powder, wide extensions, and empty battlefields, it is quite impossible for leaders to *see* what is going on. Even battalion commanders are dependent on reports. Of all the difficulties of war nothing is so well known but so seldom appreciated as the difficulty of appraising the value of reports from troops actually engaged. Every skirmisher is convinced that he is the centre of the heart of the fray. Individual temperament colours reports. One man will report coldly, another warmly. Even in everyday life the difficulty of getting reliable evidence of an event is well known. Two people will see things quite differently. This is still more the case in war.

In action too not only do reports become coloured by local events, by the idiosyncrasies of the reporters, and by mistakes, but men taking reports back get killed or lose their way, or add information of their own; excited officers forget to send reports;

the officers whose duty it is to send reports are perhaps killed. A thousand small circumstances enhance the difficulties. *Yet the general is absolutely dependent on reports.* He cannot see with his own eyes what is happening.

It would seem then that one of the most important parts of a soldier's training must be the sending of accurate reports, and one of the most important parts of the organisation of an army must be the system of transmission of reports.

The Japanese seem to have been on the whole fairly successful in this respect. To some extent this was due to the simple nature of their strategy and tactics. Attack is simpler than defence. Utilisation of a reserve at the critical spot is difficult. The Japanese kept but a small reserve, and it was soon used up. The larger armies are, and the more complex their arms and organisation, the simpler and more direct ought to be their action.

CHAPTER XI

Map C (in pocket)

THE RUSSIAN COUNTER-ATTACK

Advance of the Russian Main Body—Orlov's Position—Orlov attacks—Kuroki decides to remain on the Defensive—Hears of the Russian Retreat—Determines to press forward in Pursuit—The 2nd Division is attacked—Attack fails—12th Division advances—Encounters Orlov—Orlov routed—Arrival of the I. Siberian Corps—Further Advance stopped—Exhaustion of the I. Corps—Kuropatkin's Plans—Kuropatkin receives Bad News—Retreat ordered—The Situation—Action in Front of Lioayang—Results

At 5 A.M. the I. Siberian Corps advanced in two columns. The left column, under Gerngros, consisting of —/36/12, was joined by Gurko's Main Bodies Cavalry (8 squadrons), and marched advance via Kolisai towards Liulinkou. The right column, under Krause, —/16/6, marched via Lotatai towards Fankuantun. The remainder of the corps, 2/8/6, which formed the rearguard of the army, remained at Linchiachuang. The corps halted about 8 A.M. on orders from army headquarters.

At the same time the III. Corps commenced to pass the Taitzu to Chanhositun, and the X. Corps, covered

by an advanced guard of 3/24/8, marched to Fan-chiatun and halted.

While the main body was moving up the advanced guard at Hsikuantun and the flank guard at the Coal

Mines had been heavily engaged.
Action of the Russian Flank General Orlov's command now Guard under Orlov amounted to 4/28/13, and his left was covered by Samsonov's 16/6/—. His position was one of much complexity. He had not received Disposition No 4, and cannot therefore have known Kuropatkin's intention to counter-attack. He received the following messages and orders :—

1. At 7 P.M. on the 1st, from Bilderling, telling him to co-operate with the XVII. Corps.

He acknowledged this, and said that if the Japanese attacked the XVII. Corps he would attack their right, and asked that if the Japanese attacked him the XVII. Corps would attack their left.

2. At 2 A.M. on the 2nd, from Bilderling, dated 5.45 P.M. on the 1st, saying that the XVII. Corps would attack at dawn and ordering the detachment at the Mines to co-operate.

On receipt of this order Orlov issued orders for the advance of his detachment.

3. At 4 A.M., from the quartermaster-general of the army, saying: "Your principal task is to keep in touch with Bilderling, and if he is not attacked to act in the manner which has been indicated to

you" (*i.e.* in Disposition No 4, which as a fact Orlov had not received). "If however he is attacked at Hsikuantun you will move to his support by the shortest route."

On receipt of this message Orlov counter-ordered the advance, and despatched a copy of the order to Bilderling asking for instructions. No reply was received. Orlov then placed his troops in position on the Fangshen mountains south of the Mines, with nine battalions and 28 guns on the position and four battalions in reserve. The left was covered by Samsonov, and the right by Orbeliani with 12 squadrons.

At 6 A.M. Orlov's guns opened fire on the Wuting-shan. The Japanese guns replied, and a lively artillery duel took place.

4. At 7 A.M. a message arrived from General Dobrijinski, commanding the troops of the XVII. Corps near Hsikuantun, saying that there had been fighting during the night at Manjuyama but the result was not known.

To this Orlov replied, asking how he could best assist.

Soon after the despatch of this message Orlov was able to see that the Japanese were in possession of Manjuyama and that the left of Bilderling's Corps was engaged. He therefore decided to advance south against Manjuyama.

Kuroki had, as we have seen, intended to remain on the defensive on the 2nd September, and to draw the Japanese to himself the Guard Division, if that 1st Army were allowed by army headquarters. The 2nd Division had now all arrived, and five of its battalions were in reserve at Kungkufen. During the night the remainder of the division had entrenched itself on the captured hill, and early in the morning, finding the spur just south-west of Hsikuantun unoccupied, a battalion had seized it and entrenched themselves there and in the village.

Early in the morning, however, Kuroki heard of the Russian retreat from Shoushanpu, and that the 2nd and 4th Armies had closed up to Liaoyang and hoped to reach the line of the Taitzu that day. It now seemed clear to Kuroki that the Russians were in

Kuroki decides to "pursue" and issues Orders to advance full retreat, and that to complete the Japanese victory he must press forward in pursuit. However, it was also evident that the rearguards, as he took them to be, were very strong. Three or four batteries were in action near the Coal Mines and heavy masses of cavalry and infantry were visible in that direction. The troops opposite the 2nd and 12th Division were holding their ground. Under these circumstances he decided to make a simultaneous attack by the Guard and 2nd Division on the positions held by the XVII. Corps, while the 12th

Division advanced north-west. He then issued the following orders:—At 8 A.M., to the Guard Division to force the passage at Kuchengtzu and capture hill 1057; at 10 A.M., to the 2nd and 12th Divisions, saying “the enemy are retreating on Mukden. The Umezawa Brigade is advancing on the Coal Mines, and the Guard is attacking hill 1057. The 2nd Division will capture hill 920 and advance on Lotatai. The 12th Division will advance on Lannipu.”

The situation which naturally developed was exceedingly interesting. The advancing 12th Division met Orlov's troops, which had assumed the offensive.

The 2nd Division was itself furiously assailed, and quite unable to advance. The guards remained inactive.

These actions must be considered separately.

Bilderling, who had been disappointed not to hear that Manjuyama had been recaptured during ~~Attack on the~~ the night, had ordered Dobrjinski to 2nd Division recapture the hillock. The advanced guard of the X. Corps, under Vassiliev, was also ordered to attack. Further, Ekk's Brigade was ordered to support the advance. However, Dobrjinski does not seem to have attempted to issue orders to Ekk or Vassiliev. The attack was not well arranged; the different portions attacked piecemeal. About 8 A.M. more than 100 guns concentrated their

fire on the captured spur west of Hsikuantun, on the village itself, and on Manjuyama. But though the bombardment was severe it was not timed to support the infantry attack. The Japanese soldiers quietly slept through it all, lying quite safe in the reverse slope of the hill.

The firing line advanced about 10.30, but apparently only six and a half battalions of the twenty-five¹ available at first took part in the attack. The spur west of Hsikuantun was recaptured, but not much further progress was made.

Kuropatkin, who with his staff was now on a hill east of Fanchiatun, then intervened. He advised Ekk to vigorously support the right. At the same time he sent a message to Vassiliev, the commander of the advanced guard, X. Corps, telling him to be careful. This intervention does not seem to have effected anything.

At any rate the attack failed. The spur west of Hsikuantun was abandoned by the Japanese in the afternoon, but they still held on to Hsikuantun. The attack on Manjuyama failed completely.

Bilderling then decided to abandon further efforts till dark, but an artillery bombardment by 150 guns lasted all day.

¹ Dobrjinski's 137th, 138th, 139th, 140th Regiments; one battalion, 10th Regiment; Vassiliev's 121st, 123rd Regiments; Ekk's 85th and 284th Regiments.

We have seen that Kuroki's orders to the 2nd Division could not be carried out, and that in fact the division was itself assailed. The 12th Division was distributed as follows:—
The Japanese 12th Division advances the 12th Brigade held the Wuting-shan hill; the 23rd Brigade held a position covering the right of the 2nd Division on Manjuyama. In divisional reserve were a Kobi regiment and two other battalions. The cavalry was at Tayaopu. The Commander of the Division ordered the 23rd Brigade to hold its ground and the 12th Brigade to advance north against the Fangshen heights. The brigade formed, with the 47th Regiment in the centre. All three battalions were in one line. One battalion, 14th Regiment, covered the right; two battalions, 14th Regiment, the left.

When Orlov had decided to attack he ordered Orbeliani's 12 squadrons to cover the advance.
Orlov's Attack and Defeat This was done. At Tayaopu the Japanese cavalry was met and driven back. The cavalry dismounted and machine guns were brought into action. Orlov's troops deployed as follows:—on the right, the 11th Regiment; on the left, the 216th Regiment, less one battalion; in reserve, the 215th Regiment. Eight guns and two battalions remained in the position. Twenty guns with 3 sotnias as escort accompanied the advance. The movement was very slow, on account of the

crops. Orlov's troops advancing south and the 12th Brigade advancing north met in the kaoliang. The Japanese general had wisely left his guns at the Wutingshan. Twenty of Orlov's guns were wandering in the kaoliang. As in wood fighting so in the kaoliang, the side which attacked most resolutely was bound to win. The side whose subordinate leaders were trained to accept responsibility and act at once obtained local successes. The fighting, swaying backwards and forwards, inclined to the Japanese. At 1 P.M. Orlov put in his reserve in a close mass. This was probably a wise arrangement, but it failed. The whole line broke and streamed back towards Yentai. Long before this, however, at 11.25, Orlov had reported his troubles to Stakelberg, who was with the left column of the I. Corps. Stakelberg had also received a note about midday from headquarters telling him that "as soon as the I. Corps comes into line it will attack between the XVII. Corps and 54th Brigade."

It is now necessary to turn to the position of the Russian main bodies.

The X. Corps was formed up at Fanchiatun at 10 A.M. Its advanced guard had taken part in the ~~The Russian~~ attack on Hsikuantun.

Main Bodies The III. Siberian Corps reached the same neighbourhood by 1 P.M. Mischenko's cavalry was also at that point.

The I. Siberian Corps was marching north-east in two columns. Its march was to some extent impeded by Mischenko's Cavalry, which crossed its front. However, no idea of haste was in Stakelberg's mind, and his columns moved slowly and with many halts through the baking heat, which was intensified by the airlessness of the kaoliang covered plain.

A Bavarian officer, Major Freiherr von Tettau, was among the military attachés, standing on the little hill just west of Fanchiatun. He has described in graphic language the general feeling of the head-quarter staff and entourage at this time. News had come in of the successful repulse of the Japanese Infantry from the Liaoyang forts. On the right the troops on hill 1057 were having no difficulty in keeping off the guards. A storm of shell was sweeping the kopje in front, known to us by the Japanese name of Manjuyama, and called by the Russians the "ssopka." To this the Japanese artillery could hardly make any reply. Hill 920 had been cleared of the enemy, and the bloody repulse now being inflicted on the left attack was not visible because of the kaoliang. The I. Corps was approaching the field and the roar of Orlov's battle had worked south.

Everything was satisfactory, yet the mind of the thoughtful German soldier saw uncertainties in the situation. Why was the "ssopka" left in Japanese hands while two and a half army corps watched and

waited? Where was the use of this hesitation? Why did not Kuropatkin launch the great attack so well prepared?

There was no doubt whatever that the enemy was outnumbered, his artillery was outmatched; even if Orlov made no headway the veteran I. Corps would soon support him. Why hesitate?

When Stakelberg received the messages from Orlov and from headquarters referred to above, his column was halted. About midday the left column advanced, and about 1 P.M. reached Liulinkou. Between 2 P.M. and 3 P.M. the advanced guard reached Hsiaotalienkou, where a crowd of fugitives were met. Stakelberg in person was with the advanced guard. He ordered a battery into action at once, despatched officers to rally the fugitives, and tell them that the I. Corps had come up. To relieve Orlov he pushed the advanced guard on at once. Gurko's troopers led the way, followed by the 2nd E. S. Rifle Regiment. Still no enemy was visible, though the fighting was within a few yards. Orlov reported personally to Stakelberg, who had lost his temper and, having rated that unfortunate and very gallant soldier as if he were a native boy, ordered him to lead his troops in person. One battalion remained and Orlov placed himself at its head and marched toward Tayaopu. Soon they came on the enemy. Orlov was wounded in five places and

the battalion broke and fled. Grulev, commanding the 11th Regiment, had one battalion in hand and joined the 2nd E. S. Rifles. Their attack also came to a stop, and the regiment fell back on Hsiaotalienkou. Stakelberg, who had gained his immediate object, to stop any Japanese pursuit, deployed his advanced guard at Hsiaotalienkou and awaited the arrival of his main body before attacking. A full report was then sent to Kuropatkin. As soon as the rest of the 1st Division arrived it was deployed, but the right column, delayed by Mischenko's Cavalry, only came up at 4 P.M. Stakelberg now had some 60 guns in action and sixteen and a half battalions under his hand. One and a half battalions and 6 guns were sent to Samsonov to help him to hold the Coal Mines. At this time, 4 P.M., a message was received from Samsonov, dated 1.15, saying that he was being turned by a force of four battalions. This force was the Umezawa Brigade, which, having driven Ljubavin towards the north, had turned west to attack hill 1290. However, Ljubavin came on again and Umezawa was forced to retrace his steps and fight him. Thus Samsonov was not pressed, but a detachment of infantry was sent to join him.

Meantime Mischenko's Cavalry had moved up to connect the I. and XVII. Corps. Including Mischenko's and Samsonov's guns, 80 guns in all were

now in action against the 12th Division. This force of artillery checked any further forward move of the Japanese.

Stakelberg at this time received orders not to advance farther that day. The directive in which

Further
Advance
stopped

this order was contained continued as follows:—"I leave to you the choice of the direction of attack with this consideration. Our task to-morrow is to capture the enemy's position from Kungkufen to the river. Our former position of Hsikuantun forms as it were the pivot on which the left wing is to move forward.

. . . The enemy is perhaps only occupying this position as an 'advanced position.' It may be desirable to capture the line Wutingshan to Kuantun, which is a likely 'main' position. The height near Kuantun is probably forming the main pivot of the Japanese manoeuvre."

What an extraordinary assumption all this seems, with a full knowledge of the Japanese movements! Kuropatkin seems to have been quite oblivious of the possibility that the Japanese were not bothering about "positions" to defend, that their only thought was the capture of his "positions."

Stakelberg determined to remain where he was for the present and to advance during the night. He found, however, that the losses of the advanced guard regiment, which had saved Orlov's Brigade

from further loss by its prompt and resolute advance, had been very severe. The men were utterly done up. They had fought for thirty-six hours consecutively in the position at Shoushanpu,

**Exhaustion
of the
I. Corps** and then retired by a night march of some difficulty. During 1st September

they had nominally had a day of rest. Anyone, however, with any experience even of manœuvre conditions will realise how very little rest there could have been at such a time. After such a rough forty-eight hours, which as a matter of fact followed a retreat in the face of the enemy, everything was in need of furbishing up. Arms and accoutrements had to be cleaned, underclothes washed, cooking utensils scrubbed. First line and train transport vehicles must be cleaned, ammunition fetched, and pouches filled. Shoes wanted mending, trousers patching, socks darning. Fresh supplies of haversacks, water-bottles, equipment straps and so forth must be obtained from the depots. The regimental quartermasters would not know their way about in the town; all the stores were being evacuated, everybody was busy, everybody in a state of nervous tension. There would have been very little rest indeed for the men, none for the officers and non-commissioned officers. Then very early on the morning of the 2nd the corps was *en route* again.

The day was grilling hot, the road enclosed by

kaoliang. Everyone must know how trying is heat in such a terrain. Never a breath of wind gets through the close stalks of the tall grass or corn, only the sun beats pitilessly down upon the dusty columns. It is no wonder that the men were worn out.

At 6.30 P.M. the firing line was withdrawn to the supports at Hsiaotalienkou.

It is clear from the directive issued to Stakelberg after hearing, at about 3.30 P.M., of Orlov's defeat, that Kuropatkin was still determined to capture the Hsikuantun position on the evening of the 2nd, preparatory to the attack on 3rd September.

The main body of the X. Corps had not been engaged, except a few of the guns; the eighteen battalions of the III. Corps were unused.

Plans Thus three army corps were available to drive one Japanese division from the knoll which it had captured and which was held by a mere handful of men. It was necessary to place the conduct of affairs in the hands of one man. The XVII. Corps had had much fighting. A portion of it was held by the demonstration of the Guard Division opposite Kuchengtzu, north of which the corps held hill 1057. The X. Corps had not been engaged, so at 5.30 P.M. General Sluchevski was ordered to take direction of the attack. Unfortunately he did not know the ground.

The rest of the X. Corps was ordered up to

Shahotun, with this peculiar reservation, that it was to support "*in case of need* the attack of the XVII. Corps on Hsikuantun fixed for 5 P.M." The reason for stating the actual time was that Bilderling, commanding XVII. Corps, had reported: "We are going to attack Hsikuantun at 5 P.M." It is most noteworthy that Bilderling commenced his attack at 5 P.M. At 5.30 P.M. Kuropatkin ordered Sluchevski to take command, and placed under his orders the very troops actually engaged in the attack. Sluchevski, however, was equal to the occasion. His first action was to write to Bilderling, saying that he had been ordered to capture the hill, and that "I place myself under your Excellency's orders." Sluchevski's only action as a matter of fact was to stop the nine fresh battalions of his corps from going beyond Shahotun in the dark.

Bilderling had already confided the conduct of the attack to Dobrjinski, but although the intention of attacking in the evening had been declared after the repulse at midday yet no proper orders for attack had been made out. No proper arrangements for control of the artillery fire were arranged, and again there was no attempt at unity of action between the troops of the three generals—Dobrjinski, with a division, XVII. Corps; Ekk, who with the above-mentioned brigade, made up of one regiment, I. European Corps, and one regiment, V. Siberian Corps,

was attached to the XVII. Corps; and Vassiliev, with the division of the X. Corps which had gone up in the morning, and assisted in clearing hill 920.

Briefly, the attack fell out in this way. Ekk's Brigade attacked on the right, with portions of Vassiliev's Division intermingled with his left regiment. The firing line advanced at 6 p.m. from the spur which had been recaptured in the morning direct on Hsikuantun. The village was held by the remnants of 6 companies, 4th Regiment. These companies were driven back out of the village.

One company, apparently of some regiment, X. Corps, then made an effort to establish itself on the southern slope of Manjuyama. It appears to have been promptly attacked by local reserves of the Japanese troops holding Manjuyama and driven back. No further effort was made by Ekk to assist the main attack on Manjuyama.

On the left of Ekk's attack portions of Vassiliev's and Dobrijinski's Divisions advanced in a straggling line against Manjuyama. One hundred and fifty guns had been brought into action against the hill, but no proper provision had been made for artillery support. It is impossible to refrain from expressing astonishment at the stubborn gallantry of the fighting which now took place. The Russian Infantry made assault after assault. The men lay for a long time within 200 yards of the Japanese trenches. The

trenches were entered several times, and apparently one line of trenches was held for some time, which led to a report that the hill was captured. This report was passed to Kuropatkin by Bilderling at about 11 P.M.

So fierce was the firing that General Okasaki, the gallant leader of the Japanese troops, was unable to distinguish friend from foe, and ordered the "Cease fire" to be sounded. Instantly fire ceased along the Japanese line, making it possible to distinguish the Russian firing line.

Okasaki received reinforcements of one battalion, but only utilised it to place behind his right for a counter-attack if required. Towards 9 P.M. the energy of the assaults of Vassiliev's troops died away, and no further attack was made. In fact the crowd of shirkers streaming to the rear showed that the men's hearts were not in the work, and that discipline was failing. Dobrjinski's troops, on the other hand, led by a very gallant man and good soldier, Colonel Istomin, continued to maintain the fight, holding as they did one side of the plateau which formed the top of the hill. About 11 P.M. Istomin asked for reinforcements with which to sweep the hill. The nine battalions, X. Corps, still at Shahotun were not, however, sent in. Soon after this Istomin was killed. The Japanese had now brought their firing line up to a maximum density, yet they still had in second line

three more battalions, including the fresh battalion sent up and placed on the right.

About 2 A.M., no reinforcements having arrived, one more desperate assault was made by the Russians. From the fact that though the night was dark and without a moon the advance of the long grey firing line was distinctly visible to the Japanese, we are able to be sure that the line was "skylined." The Russian firing line must therefore have been up on the crest. This time Okasaki was determined to end the matter. Two battalions, 30th Regiment, with the battalion, 29th Regiment, which was in reserve, advanced with the bayonet against the Russian left. The blow was sharp and sudden, and the loss heavy. The whole charge failed and the men gave back. The Japanese pursuit was promptly stopped. The fight was won.

In those two days of fighting on Manjuyama Okasaki's Brigade lost 1039 men out of their total of under 6000. When it is remembered that the hill was small, and the whole brigade was on or behind it; that it was continuously shelled by from 50 to 150 guns for twenty-four hours; that it was won after a hard night fight and was twice attacked, part of the summit being recaptured; and that several million rounds of small-arm ammunition were fired at the Japanese, many from very close range, it will be conceded that though strain was

terribly severe the actual loss sustained was small. Still one man in every six is a heavy loss. The losses in the battalion, 29th Regiment, which took part in the last counter-attack were very heavy—225, or over 25 per cent. The Russians must have fought hard before they were driven back.

At 10 P.M. Kuropatkin wrote to Stakelberg impressing on him the necessity of keeping in touch with the left of the XVII. Corps.

Kuropatkin receives Bad News Stakelberg's reply was to retire at 1 A.M. to Liulinkou. His report of his action continued : " My situation is serious. Considering the great losses of my troops I have to report not only that I cannot attack without reinforcements but that I cannot fight at all."

This terribly serious report reached Kuropatkin at about the same time that he heard, first of the disorganisation of Vassiliev's troops of the X. Corps, then of the failure of the 35th Division, XVII. Corps, and their final repulse from Manjuyama. Nor was the cup of bitterness drained even then, for at the same time he heard from Zarubaiev, in Liaoyang, that his reserves of men and ammunition were exhausted.

As we have seen, Kuropatkin had, up to midnight, maintained his intention to attack on the 3rd. These reports, however, were too much for him. As

a matter of fact he still had Samsonov and Mischenko's Cossacks, the III. Corps intact, and Gerschelmann's Division of the X. Corps. Ekk's Retreat Brigade had hardly been engaged, and ordered could be relied upon. The report of Stakelberg was as likely as not written in a fit of irritation. The 3rd Division of the XVII. Corps was fresh. Zarubaiev had beaten off all attacks. However, Kuropatkin decided to give it up. The I. European Corps was rapidly coming to hand at Mukden, as were some reinforcements for the corps at the front.

If Zarubaiev really were beaten then a victory over Kuroki was of little avail. Besides, Kuropatkin still overestimated the strength opposed to him. He still thought four divisions, not two and a half, were north of the Taitzu. The Umezawa Brigade was magnified to a division. Many of his troops were hopelessly disorganised, and it sounded as if the veteran I. Corps was in the same state.

This influenced him terribly. "I am very sorry," he is said to have said, "but even Stakelberg has gone back. I must go back to Mukden. There we will reorganise and resume the offensive."

The question is, Could anything else have been done? Could Kuropatkin have gone among the troops and seen more of them? If he had gone and seen Stakelberg—he was only a few miles away—

would Stakelberg have been heartened up? If he had gone and seen Zarubaiev, would things have been better? It is impossible to say.

Much of the trouble was of his own making. His orders and counter-orders were difficult to keep pace with. The exhaustion of the troops was largely the result of the complexity of his operations.

However, the decision was taken. At 6 A.M. orders were issued for the retreat.

The situation on either side was, briefly, as follows:—The Russians held the Liaoyang enceinte, Situation on either Side hill 1057, hill 920. They had nine battalions of the X. Corps placed, prolonging the line to the north-east of Shahotun.

Mischenko was on the hill south of Liulinkou. The I. Corps was at Liulinkou. Orbeliani was on the hills north of that place, with a small detachment of the I. Corps, and Samsonov to the north. The remnants of Orlov were gathering at Yentai, and of Vassiliev at Shichotzu. The III. Corps was intact at Fanchiatun. Grekov's Cavalry was intact west of Liaoyang.

The Japanese had the 4th and 2nd Armies face to face with Liaoyang, and in spite of their enormous artillery superiority had had no success. Their 4th Division was still intact behind the left. The Guard Division of the 1st Army was doing nothing opposite hill 1057. Eight battalions, 2nd Division,

and three battalions, 12th Division, held Manjuyama. The right of this position was covered by the remainder of the 23rd Brigade, 12th Division, placed on the western slopes of the Wutingshan. The 12th Brigade, 12th Division, was halted on the line Tayaspu to the Coal Pits, with the cavalry regiment on the right keeping touch with Umezawa, who away to the north-west had driven Ljubavin off the field towards Pienniulupu.

Reference has been made to the events round
Attack on Liaoyang the fortified enceinte of Liaoyang and
opposite hill 1057 which form a quite separate episode in the battle of 2nd September.

General Oku's orders for the 2nd Army for 2nd September were that the 3rd Division, with one Kobi regiment, was to leave Shoushanpu at 7 A.M. and advance on the Mandarin Road to Hsikuan. The 6th Division, with two artillery regiments, was to keep in touch on the left, marching along the railway. The 4th Division, with one artillery regiment, was to await in its present position (Yangchialintzu) the advance of the 6th, and then co-operate in an attack at Hsuiwantzu. The Foot Artillery followed the 6th Division. The Kobi Brigade was to march to Kuchiatzu. The 4th Army moved up on the right of the 2nd apparently about the same time.

By 8 A.M. the guns of the 4th Division were in

action; about 9.30 the guns of the 3rd Division came into action, and the guns of the 6th Division followed those of its advanced guard into action. At 10 A.M. the guns of the 5th, and soon afterwards those of the 10th, Divisions were in action.

At 11 A.M. the heavy guns were in action. The 2nd Army now had 180 field and 32 heavy guns pouring shell into the east front, while the 4th Army had 108 field and 16 heavy guns in action against the south front. The 4th Army directed its principal fire against Fort III. and westwards. Meanwhile the infantry commenced their approach. This was more closely pressed near Fort III. than elsewhere, and here the firing lines had reached decisive ranges by 10 A.M. Everywhere the leading lines of Japanese entrenched themselves.

The Russians, however, though they did not reply very heavily to the bombardment, were not inactive. Very early in the morning the "rear-guard," six battalions of the I. Corps which had been left at Liuchiachuang, were turned over to Zarubaiev, with orders to employ them to move along the right bank to a hillock near Fort VIII. He was also charged to send some of his reserve to Fort VIII. and make a demonstration between Forts V. and VIII.

At 9 A.M. Rebinder, with 6/8/8, moved out from between Forts V. and VI., and Shileiko, with 2/-/3, was ordered to co-operate on the north towards

Yanguchi. Four battalions were kept in reserve at Fort VI.

Rebinder captured Chiangshihchiaotzu, which was occupied by a weak Japanese detachment, and moved south. The 4th Division reinforced the troops on the left. About 3 P.M. the two Russian forces withdrew.

The result of the action was to cause Oku to reinforce the 4th Division. The fighting, of which little is known, was very severe. Rebinder lost 1200 killed and wounded, though he only took out between 4000 and 5000 men with him.

The action of the Guard Division opposite the Taitzu fords on this day must be a page which the men of that gallant division would wish to turn over quickly. The guard stood between and within sound and sight of the fierce bombardment of Liaoyang and the fierce battle round Manjuyama and the kaoliang fields to the north. It did nothing except shell hill 1057. The losses of the guards on 1st and 2nd September were nil, a fact which speaks for itself. The Guard Division apparently had not yet recovered from the battles of the 26th and 30th. Its losses during the whole series of engagements called the battle of Liaoyang were the most severe of any of the divisions of the 1st Army. Perhaps the Commander of the Division felt some doubt as to

what his rôle was, and the result was that nothing was done.

The result of the battle of 2nd September and the night following was on the whole distinctly favourable to the Japanese. A Russian brigade had been wiped out. The severe repulse of the Results troops which had attacked Manjuyama had led to the disintegration of a division of the X. Corps and one of the XVII. Corps.

Nevertheless Oyama's situation was critical, for it was clear that his force north of the river was heavily outnumbered, and it was also clear that twenty-four hours must elapse before it could be reinforced in view of the failure of the guard to force the passage opposite hill 1057. His main attack on the Liaoyang defences had failed, and here also the Russians had counter-attacked. Though repulsed, the mere fact that they had taken the offensive everywhere showed that their fighting power was still high.

There was nothing to be done but to order the guard to join Kuroki via the bridge, and to press the attack on the fortified enceinte.

This action was ordered, and the Japanese spent the night moving their artillery to closer range. The Guard Division, as it proved, was not able to join Kuroki until the 4th September.

CHAPTER XII

Map V

THE RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS TO MUKDEN

Orders for Retreat—Kuroki inactive—Battle round Liaoyang—Retreat continued on the 4th—Pursuit by the 12th Division—Pursuit relaxed

THE orders to retreat were issued at 6 A.M. The confusion of units had become very considerable.

Orders for Retreat For example, the XVII. and X. Corps, with Ekk's Brigade, were all intermingled on the area, hills 920, 1057 and the village of Shahotun.

The first thing to do was to form a rearguard. The most severe pressure would be from the southwest by Kuroki and from the south by the 2nd and 4th Armies. Therefore Zarubaiev was ordered to hold on to Liaoyang till nightfall, and Stakelberg, with the veteran I. Siberian Corps, to "Stand fast. The army will retire on Yentai. You will form the rearguard." The III. Corps was to deploy to assist the withdrawal of the X. and XVIII.

The final dispositions were that the I. Siberian Corps was to take up a position near Tatamenkou and

Post No. 8, and the III. Siberian Corps was to prolong the line westwards from Liulinkou. The XVII. Corps was to go back on Chansitun and the X. Corps on Changtaitzu. Mischenko was to cover the right of the III. Siberian Corps, and Samsonov the left of the I. Siberian Corps.

The withdrawal of the XVII. Corps was effected with the usual skill shown by the Russians in retirement. Under cover of the fire of the line of guns near Shahotun the advanced regiment of Ekk on the right fell back quietly behind hill 920. Two battalions and 16 guns were left on hill 1057, and then the whole XVII. Corps fell back when Vassiliev's Division of the X. Corps had cleared the roads.

Kondratovich's regiments of the I. Siberian Corps fell back on Yentai, and thence, on 4th September, rejoined their corps, which still stood near Post No. 8.

We have seen that Kuroki had been obliged to arrange to maintain a defensive attitude on 3rd Kuroki in September until the guard either forced Action a passage or joined him on the north bank. The guard decided to move to the right, but it was not till 4th September that any of their regiments rejoined 1st Army Headquarters. Except for the artillery engagement between the guns of the XVII. Corps and the 2nd Division, there was no fighting on the main battlefield. Away

to the north Umezawa pressed on towards Pienniu-lupu, driving Ljubavin back from position to position.

South of the Taitzu, however, a furious engagement **Battle round** was fought.

Liaoyang Attacks had been made during the night on the redoubt at D, and very serious efforts were made by the 4th Army to enter the lines at Fort III.

During the 3rd Fort IV. was heavily attacked, and very heavy fighting was kept up all along the line. At 6 P.M. a final attack was delivered but repulsed. How severe the fighting was may be judged from the losses. The 4th Division lost 857, the 3rd Division, which during the battle had already lost 3300 men—over 20 per cent. of their total strength—lost on 3rd September a further 873, bringing the total for the battle up to the prodigious number 4280, or fully 25 per cent. of their combatant strength. The losses of the infantry must have been fully 30 per cent. of their fighting strength.

During the night the garrison of the front line quietly withdrew through the second line of forts, which had been occupied during the day by the reserves.

Then, leaving eight battalions under Putilov as a rearguard, with three battalions and three batteries placed as a flank guard at Muchang, and three battalions as a flank guard at bridge No. 7, the main bodies retired to Changtaitzu. The

bridges were burnt and stores destroyed by the rearguard.

The Russian losses in the Liaoyang defences amounted to some 1000 men, but in addition 1300 fell in the fierce sortie under Rebinder on the 2nd.

On the 4th the retreat of the main bodies was quietly continued.

It was not till 11 A.M. on the 4th that the Japanese Retreat
continued
on the 4th realised that hill 920 was abandoned. It was at once occupied. Mischenko's artillery then opened fire on the hill.

Kuroki at once issued orders for a pursuit, but the 2nd Division was unable to advance. The 12th Division, however, moved and got into communication with the Umezawa Brigade. Pressing the pursuit during the night, the 12th Division marched into the rearguard of the I. Siberian Corps which was at Tatalienkou.

The leading regiment was checked and the regiment following was counter-attacked from the south. Pursuit by
12th Division A fierce and sanguinary bayonet fight took place, such an encounter as there are few examples of in history.

The staunch Japanese infantry and the equally staunch East Siberians furiously assailed one another in a succession of bayonet mélées, in which neither side gained any advantage.

The pursuit, however, was rudely checked, and the Russians retired quietly in the morning.

Umezawa's Brigade also had a night engagement near Tumentzu. Here again there was no result, but the pursuit was checked.

On the 5th the retreat was continued. Yentai station was successfully evacuated. All sick, stores and rolling stock were got away north. The only interruption was by the advanced guard of the 2nd Division near Lannipu.

Beyond this point no pursuit was attempted, Pursuit for the 2nd and 4th Armies had not abandoned crossed the Taitzu and the 1st Army could not advance alone.

Thus once again the Russians had successfully escaped, or rather withdrawn, and abandoned the fight. But though the result was in one sense successful yet it was without doubt a tacit admission of defeat. "*Retirer pour mieux sauter*" was of course the excuse given, but no one failed to see through that. The troops were not beaten, but their leaders.

The following description of the retreat gives some idea of the demoralisation which is bound to follow in the wake of such an operation:—

"The Mandarin Road, broad as it is and further widened by driving over the fields on each side, was

almost blocked. Gradually the baggage and trains of all those army corps to which the roads east of the railway had been allotted had converged upon this one route. Frequently vehicles could be seen standing side by side in five or six ranks waiting with a patience *peculiar to the Russians* for their turn to move on. Batteries of various types, engineer, telegraph and pontoon waggons, field artillery parks, and trains of all sorts, medical and commissariat, were collected in a mass. Between them infantry singly or in parties, horsemen sometimes with led horses, mules, donkeys, cattle were trying to get through to the north. Dead and dying animals, lying or near the road, did not add to the picturesqueness of the scene. It is true that no effort was spared to keep the traffic moving. Signposts had been put up; military police had been posted at necessary points. Yet at every bridge and every village there were hours of delay and incredible confusion.

"A heavy thunderstorm in the night had made the road, which the day before was hard as rock, a morass in which wagons were sunk to their axles and frequently had to be abandoned. Numbers of horses broke down. But the strange feature pervading the whole scene was the quiet. Russian arms, equipment, harness and wagons make very little noise even on hard ground. But the principal

cause of the quietness is that the *Russian is at all times quiet and patient, used to unordered methods, and accustomed to find his way about amidst confusion.*"

The words in italics are of special interest.

All soldiers at any rate will have read accounts of the disastrous retreat from Burgos in 1812, of the horrors of the retreat to Corunna in January 1809. Yet these were small forces with comparatively little equipment, and in the case of the retreat from Burgos they were retiring after a repulse, it is true, but without pursuit, and after a successful campaign.

It is more than probable that no other army than the Russians could have carried out these retreats successfully.

During the 6th to the 8th the retreat was continued, and on 10th September a final distribution around Mukden was made.

South of the Hun river stood the X. Corps, with the XVII. Corps just north of the river on the main road.

At Hsifanpu was the V. Siberian Corps.

At Fuling was the I. Siberian Corps.

At Fushun was the III. Siberian Corps.

At Shihfuchang was the II. Siberian Corps.

In reserve, north of Mukden, was the I. European Corps; and north-west of the town, the IV. Siberian Corps.

The three cavalry divisions covered the front, and flanking detachments were placed on the right under Kossagovski, and on the left under Ekk, Peterev and Ljubavin.

The Japanese 2nd and 4th Armies remained near Liaoyang. The 1st Army stood on the north of the river, with Umezawa's Brigade pushed out, rather dangerously advanced, to Pienniulupu.

The losses in the battle were as follows :—

Japanese, 23,782

Russians, 19,112, including missing

Of the Russians 1194 were taken prisoners and they lost or burnt a few wagons and some stores. A few guns were abandoned on the march or in the works of Liaoyang.

But, to quote the words of the British official account : "Although the trophies of victory were very few, the battle of Liaoyang had ended in a splendid tactical triumph for the Japanese. With forces numerically inferior to those by which he had been opposed Marshal Oyama had driven the Russians from carefully prepared positions and from a battlefield of their own choosing." And again : "The importance of this battle can hardly be exaggerated. By their victory the Japanese triumphantly vindicated their strategy, and extricated themselves from a position which at one time threatened to prove extremely dangerous. Moreover

the knowledge that they had emerged victorious from a bitter trial of strength gave them that supreme confidence in their own invincibility which is the greatest asset of a soldier. Lastly a reverse, following as it would have immediately upon the failure of the first general assault upon Port Arthur, must have been disastrous for Japan. It is not therefore without reason that the twelve days from 23rd August to 3rd September have been called the most critical in the history of the war."

CHAPTER XIII

Map VII

BOTH SIDES RECUPERATE AFTER THE STRUGGLE

Japanese Arrangements—The Isolated Position of the Umezawa Detachment—The Russian Army—Dispositions and Condition—The Battleground of the "Battle of the Shaho"—The Russian Plan of Attack

WHILE the troops rested the administrative services and departments of both armies were hard at work.

An alteration in the military law of Japan placed another 46,000 men at the disposal of the War Ministry to reinforce the field armies. But indeed it was no small task that confronted the Japanese. The losses at Port Arthur and before Liaoyang during August and the first days of September amounted to no less than 42,000 men. Of these no less than 11,000 were killed, and probably another 10,000 disabled from active service. To these must be added the constant loss by disease.

In spite of difficulties, by the end of September the ranks were full again. The 2nd Reinforcements Cavalry Brigade, which had not yet been sent to the front, reached Liaoyang and was attached to the 1st Army, and the 3rd Kobi

Brigade, six battalions, reached Liaoyang and joined the Army Reserve.

On 8th September the railway had been so far repaired that trucks, pushed by coolies, began to reach Liaoyang, and on the same day the first junk reached Hsiaopeiho, having sailed up the Liao river from Niuchuang. By the last day of the month the gauge of the railway had been altered to suit Japanese rolling stock, as had that of the branch Niuchuang-Tashihchiao line, and henceforth the railway was available for the supply of the whole army.

The 1st Army, however, continued to use the line from Korea through Fenghuangcheng-Chiaotou and Penhsihu for the bulk of its supplies.

On 17th September the 2nd and 4th Armies, except the 10th Division, crossed the Taitzu. The Japanese Dispositions 1st Army then extended to its right to include the mountainous area east of the Mines. Early in the month the Guard Kobi Brigade had been pushed forward to Pienniulupu on the Sha river. The German General Staff history of the war states that the very advanced situation selected for the brigade was the result of bad maps. The Headquarters Staff of the Japanese Army did not realise, it is said, the distance from Pienniulupu to the right of the 1st Army. If that is so it seems extraordinary that they did not become

enlightened when the reconnaissances and road reports, which the Umezawa detachment no doubt sent in, reached the Intelligence Branch of the Staff.

Pienniulupu was a most important point on the road from Penhsihu to Mukden. The situation of the Kobi Brigade there was no doubt dangerous, but at that time no cavalry was available to cover the right flank, and it seems probable that the position for the brigade, isolated though it was, was deliberately chosen. It barred the road which the Russians must use to turn the Japanese right and to attack the communications of the 1st Army. As it proved, the situation in which the brigade stood was the means of delaying the whole Russian advance, though it is true that Umezawa was for some time in very great danger.

On the day that the 2nd and 4th Armies crossed the river and the 1st Army extended to the right, the Umezawa Brigade was attacked by a reconnoitring force under the celebrated and active leader, Rennenkampf, who had recovered from his

Russian Reconnaissance in Force wounds and returned to lead his Cossacks. At 11.30 A.M. two battalions and some squadrons advanced from the east under cover of the fire of a battery. The attack was not pressed, and about 3 P.M. the Russians withdrew without serious loss. Next day Umezawa

had to again report the activity of the Russians east of his position.

The Japanese, who by this time must have known the distance from Pienniulupu to the Coal Mines, and have had some knowledge of the country, did not withdraw the brigade but sent forward reinforcements consisting of a regiment and two batteries of the 12th Division. The post at Penhsihu was strengthened by line of communication troops. Marshal Oyama now ordered the 10th Division of the 4th Army to occupy the ground at present held by the left division of the 1st Army, and the 1st Army then concentrated the 12th Division at Tayaopu. On the 31st September the whole of the newly arrived 2nd Cavalry Brigade was also concentrated at that point.

During the periods of halt it is noteworthy that the Japanese prepared strong defensive positions.

Japanese Dispositions for Defence The Umezawa Brigade prepared a strong position at Pienniulupu; the heights east of Liaoyang were fortified.

A position was entrenched extending along the upper waters of the Shili river, through the hills north of the Coal Mines, along the branch line, through Lannipu, and across the road and railway.

At first, after the battle of Liaoyang, Kuropatkin had intended to lead his troops back to defend the "position" of Tiehling. It seems that there was

a good "position" at Tiehling—hills, a defile, a good field of fire, and so forth. What a conception **The Russian** of war! The one thing needful being **Proceedings** to find a suitable "position"! Any idea that the Japanese might manœuvre seems to have been unthought of.

A "position" had, it is true, been prepared at Mukden, but this was only designed as a bridge-head. In this "position" the X. Corps, with the II. and III. Siberian Corps, were to act as a rearguard.

But the Japanese were not pressing on. Only patrols were beyond the branch line.

Kuropatkin began to breathe again. At last he realised that the enemy must have been severely strained by the fierce onslaughts against the gallant troops he led. The very announcement that the retreat would be discontinued raised the moral of the Russian troops. Reinforcements were on the way, the bitterness of defeat was soon forgotten.

The Russian commanders now set to work to consider the possibilities of the "Mukden position."

On 7th and 8th September general orders were issued to concentrate the army near Mukden. The X. and II. Siberian Corps were placed in the "position," strong detachments were pushed out to the flanks. On the right the V. Corps, consisting, however, only of 10/24/10, was sent along the Hun river towards Waichinpu. On the left General Ivanov,

with the III. Siberian Corps, was placed at Fushun, and had command of three detachments; Rennenkampf, 12/14/6, at Fangshen and the Kaotailing pass; Peterev, 6/4/3, at the Taling pass, and Ekk, 4/20/9, at Yingpan. The I. Siberian Corps at Fuling connected with the III. Siberian. All round the army were placed cavalry reinforced by infantry. In the Liao river valley was Kossagovski, 9/16/6; near Kuanlinpu, Grekov, 12/6/—; at Tungshankou, Mischenko, 24/10/—; south of the Wangfuling pass, Samsonov, 18/6/—.

On these dispositions the German General Staff account comments as follows:—"The front covered was very extended. From Kossagovski's detachment on the Liao to Ekk's advanced posts at Hsing-cheng is over 100 miles. Remarkable strength was detailed to protect the flanks. The total of these protective detachments amounts to no less than 48/78/34½. The protection of the flanks might have been left entirely to the cavalry had only the use of that arm been clearly understood."

General Sluchevski, who commanded the troops occupying the position, proceeded to make line after line of works of most elaborate description, including such devices as false mines, bonfires to be lighted by electricity, *et hoc genus omne*. As a matter of fact the country was thoroughly unsuited for such works. Completely flat, there was no extended

view to the front. What view there was was obstructed by villages surrounded with trees. The Hun river at this period of the year is fordable in many places. There was then no reason whatever for supposing that the Japanese would attack the defences at all and not march round them.

Further elaborate works arose east of and also west of Mukden along a line of low sandhills which runs north and south parallel with the Mandarin Road.

On 10th September the II. Siberian Corps was moved towards the south-east to Tienchiaia.

Reinforcements were pouring in. By 15th September the I. Corps from Europe had been concentrated near Mukden. By the end of the month the VI. Siberian Corps, less one infantry brigade, had reached the theatre of operations. Three mountain batteries, a balloon detachment and a bridging battalion arrived. Not many reinforcements for the veteran corps came in. Barely 4500 men for these corps were received during September. Still, sick and wounded were returning from hospital to the ranks. Part of the V. Siberian Corps was handed over to the I. and III. Siberian Corps to make good losses, but the average strength of a battalion was only about 600; in some regiments much less.

Supplies were plentiful. Transport was much improved. Roads, roughly graded, were made,

radiating in all directions from Mukden as a centre. Clothing, arms and ammunition were replenished.

Russian Discipline The moral of the troops had recovered.

Discipline The talk was all of an advance, of driving the "yellow monkeys" into the sea, of relieving Port Arthur, of peace following victory.

But in contrast to the strict discipline, the quiet orderliness, the cleanliness and general air of solid military worth of the Japanese camps and the town of Liaoyang, the Russian camps and the city of Mukden presented a very different spectacle. Discipline in many units was very lax. Drunkenness in the streets of Mukden was common. Idle boasting and braggadocio, not by the rank and file but by officers, and those too in important positions, were common everyday occurrences. Among the higher leaders and the staff the spirit of cavilling at the actions of the Headquarters Staff and the actions of equals was growing. The regimental officers were full of abuse of the leaders and their staffs. All ranks were heartily tired of the war.

Reconnaissances on both sides led to constant clashes all along the front. Russian accounts do

Clashes on the Outpost Line not anywhere make mention of the attack upon Umezawa at Pienniulupu

on 17th September; nor is it quite clear what induced the Japanese reports from that direction of considerable increases in the Russian numbers.

On the 21st a reconnoitring detachment drove Peterev from the Taling Pass, arousing a momentary excitement in Mukden, but next day the pass was reoccupied. In sum total the 50 squadrons covering the front of the Russians gained but very little information. The Japanese, whose system of espionage was very good, were more successful in obtaining information.

The obvious course for the Russians now to pursue was to take the offensive and drive back the Japanese Army, which, weakened by losses, was still resting by the Taitzu river. With this decision no one could quarrel. It was clearly the correct action to take.

The numbers of the opposing forces were estimated by Kuropatkin to be something over ten divisions.

Kuropatkin's Decision to advance South said to have estimated the Japanese strength at 6360 sabres, 144,000 bayonets and 648 guns. The Russian force would by the end of the month amount to 12,000 sabres, 194,000 rifles and 760 guns. It is, however, right to say that this estimate, which is made by the British General Staff, was not that made by Kuropatkin himself, who early in October reported that the strength of his infantry was 147,000 bayonets. It would seem that in this he did not reckon the strong VI. Siberian Corps, 30,000 bayonets, which

nominally belonged to the so-called "2nd Manchurian Army" to be formed under General Gripenberg at Harbin. Probably 180,000 is a reasonable estimate of the actual number of bayonets at the disposal of the Russian commander. Evidently he had a preponderance even on his own estimate.

The country south and east of Mukden is, broadly speaking, similar to that of the battlefield south and east of Liaoyang. The country between the Hun river and the Taitzu river is traversed from north to south by the railway and Mandarin Road. West of this line the country is a dead level plain, dotted with villages in great numbers. These villages are of single-storey sun-dried brick houses, which generally stand in yards with mud walls two feet thick. The villages are surrounded with trees and form "localities" of some defensive strength. Graveyards and tombs increased the cover available on this open plain. The kaoliang was now almost all cut, but the stalks projecting a few inches above the ground were an obstacle to the movement of horses. A tributary of the Taitzu river, the Sha river, which gives its name to the battle about to take place, crosses the railway some ten miles south of the Hun river. Some seven miles south of that again, the Shili river, a tributary of the Sha river, also crosses the railway. These two streams take their rise in the mountains to the east of the rail and road.

The streams form no really serious obstacle to movement.

At this time of year they were fordable in many places, though the drifts were bad for the passage of guns. The bed of the rivers, some eighty to one hundred yards wide, is some twelve feet below the surface of the plain. As the water only covered a small portion of the bed, the remainder of the river-bed was available either for concealment of troops or for their lateral movement completely defiladed from view. Just east of the Mandarin Road the plain is broken by a range of low sandhills running parallel with the road. This little range is too narrow to afford positions for guns, but gave some command for observation. In a mile or two east of this slight feature the foot-hills of the mountains begin, and east of a line joining the Coal Mines to the Putilov hill the country is mountainous.

As the month of September wore away and the armies recovered from the exhaustion consequent on the battle of Liaoyang, the Headquarters of both armies began to consider arrangements for prosecuting offensive movements.

Both armies were standing across their lines of communication, and the topographical features, which affected the situation equally for both armies, were, on the east, the mountains; and on the west, the great Hun river. The Russian left, extended far

to the east of the railway, overlapped the Japanese right, for the Japanese army was far more closely concentrated than the Russians. Factors which affected the Situation Finally, the Russians disposed of a considerable superiority of strength, particularly in cavalry and artillery. These factors were all fairly clear to both sides.

Four possible courses presented themselves to Oyama. He could push forward covering troops northwards, and then pass his main body across the Hun river to attack the Russian right. This course laid open the lines of communication of the 1st Army, but by basing that army on Liaoyang and fortifying a bridge-head at that place Oyama might hope to protect his communications until his main body had made its presence felt. He could advance directly to his front either in echelon from the centre or in echelon from the left. The latter course, with the 2nd Army, which was on the left, leading the advance, would appear the more suitable, for he might hope to draw the Russian reserves up against his left while the 1st Army penetrated to Fushun. He could advance the 2nd and 4th Armies direct on Mukden, while Kuroki, advancing through Pienniulupu, endeavoured to outflank the Russian left. This course would seem at first less dangerous than an attempt to outflank the Russian right, but in view of the situation of the II.

and III. Siberian Corps Kuroki would be in danger of being himself enveloped. Lastly, he could simply advance in line northwards and, when he had engaged all along the line, decide whether to attempt to envelop a flank or to break the Russian centre. This plan, which had the merit of simplicity, was in fact hazardous, for it gave to the Russians full liberty to employ their superior numbers to envelop one or both of the Japanese flanks, and it discarded all attempt at surprise or at concentrating superior numbers at a decisive point by manœuvre and mobility. Yet it was in this last factor that the Japanese superiority lay.

Courses open to Kuropatkin, though not so well informed of the enemy's dispositions as was Oyama, yet knew fairly well their general positions and numbers. The courses open to him were similar to those open to the Japanese.

The Japanese main line of communication ran back behind their left centre, and by the configuration of the country was more easily reached from the west than from the east. The first course then which must have presented itself was to use his cavalry, reinforced by detachments of all arms, to cover his front, and to pass his main body down the west bank of the Hun to turn the Japanese left. This course offered by far the best chance of

decisive success. It had the disadvantage that it involved the passage of the Hun close to the Japanese army. But such an operation as the passage of a river in face of the enemy offers no superhuman difficulty, and has been frequently carried out.

If he feared to adopt so bold a course he might move south astride the Hun river. This course, however, involved the possibility of defeat in detail, and did not offer such hopes of decisive result; on the other hand, it covered Mukden effectually. He might advance in echelon from the left, or the right, or the centre, trusting to engage the enemy's attention with his leading echelon and envelop him with the echelon in rear. Or he might advance in two or three converging masses, seeking to envelop both Japanese on both flanks. This operation was obviously hazardous against nearly equal numbers.

Finally, he might advance in two masses, the right wing acting as a holding attack, while the left wing, which already overlapped the Japanese right, brought up their left shoulders and enveloped the Japanese 1st Army. This latter course was not so promising of decisive success as an effort to envelop the Japanese left.

The country west of the railway, the open plain, afforded ground on which all arms could co-operate and would allow the Russians to utilise their immense preponderance in guns and cavalry. The

country east of the railway was very bad for cavalry, difficult for guns, and quite unsuited to the easy working of the three arms combined. Factors which affected the Decision Moreover, the Russians had always been outmatched in the hills. On the other hand, the Japanese left rested on the Hun river, and the right was in the air. The Japanese right was already overlapped, and on the Russian left stood the three veteran Siberian Corps, the pick of the army, with General Stakelberg, the senior officer, on the wing. Here too was the dashing leader, Rennen-kampf, just recovered from his wound, to lead his Cossacks. Whatever may have been Plan the actual deciding factor, Kuropatkin did finally decide to deliver his main attack against the exposed Japanese right.

It is easy to be wise after the event. The Russian effort failed, but it came near success, and might have achieved it with a little more energy on the part of the leaders.

One precaution, however, Kuropatkin did not take. He made no effort to conceal his plans. He made no attempt to "mystify, mislead and thereby surprise" his enemy. He made no attempt to concentrate superior numbers at the decisive point either by holding his enemy to his ground by means of holding attacks or by feints. All the ruses of strategy, all the principles which

inculcate not losing time in the attack, all the precepts of great leaders as to secrecy, were neglected. The fact that at the Council of War some of the leaders were against attack at that moment was openly admitted. Seldom has an army gone forth to decisive battle less prepared by skilful leadership.

CHAPTER XIV

Map VII

SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE OF THE SHAHO

Kuropatkin's Orders for the Advance—Advance commences—Japanese Detachment escapes—The Japanese Army moves into Position—The Russian Attack is not pressed—The Japanese take the Offensive—The Attack against the Japanese Left—Russian Left and Centre withdraws—The Russian Right is defeated—Russian Counter-attacks—End of the Battle—The Four Phases of the Battle

ON 28th September Kuropatkin issued the orders for the advance southwards, which was to commence on the 4th.

He divided his army into two wings and a reserve. He also detailed a special right flank guard. Outside Kuropatkin's the army on the right and left were Orders further flank protective detachments.

The right wing consisted of the X. and XVII. Corps and Grekov's Cavalry. The left wing, which was to deliver the decisive attack, consisted of Samsonov's Cavalry Division, the I. II. and III. Siberian Corps, and Rennenkampf's detachment, which amounted to about a division of cavalry and a division of infantry.

The two wings were linked by Mischenko's Cavalry Division.

The reserve consisted of the I. European, the IV. and the VI. Siberian Corps. The right flank guard consisted of the ten battalions of the V. Siberian Corps.

The objective assigned to the army was to drive the enemy across the Taitzu and clear the right bank.

Very careful instructions were issued for the exact locality to be reached by each army unit on each day of the advance. The first task assigned to the left (Eastern) Group was to capture Pienniulupu, occupied by the Umezawa Brigade belonging to the Japanese 1st Army.

The Western Group was to advance cautiously, fortifying the ground reached each day.

The flank guard was to advance down the Hun river and make bridges.

On 4th October the Eastern Group and Mischenko advanced. The Western Group moved on the 5th.

By the night of the 6th the Western Group was on the line of the Sha river.

The three corps of the Eastern Group were within striking distance of Pienniulupu, with the advanced guards of the I. and II. Siberian Corps within five miles of that place. Rennenkampf had reached Sanchiatzu, and Samsonov connected him with the III. Siberian Corps. The situation looked dangerous

for the Japanese. However, Kuropatkin ordered the Western Group to spend the day entrenching their present position, and the Eastern Group did not attack. The Umezawa Brigade escaped on the night, 7th-8th, and the delay saved the Japanese.

The Japanese were holding a general line east and west from the Coal Mines to Santaitzu across the Japanese Actions Sha river. The 12th Division was in reserve at Tayaopu. In general reserve, at Liaoyang, stood three Kobi brigades, a field artillery brigade and the Foot Artillery.

When it was clear that the Russian attack was directed against the right, the 12th Division was ordered to a position a little in advance of the right of the army, while the guard was brought from the left to the right of the 2nd Division. The 10th Kobi Brigade was sent to the 4th Army, and a field artillery regiment to each of the 2nd and 4th Armies. The Umezawa Brigade was ordered to retire. This it did on the night, 7th-8th, and, throwing two battalions into Penhsihu to reinforce the Kobi battalion there, took up a position from the Taling to the Shihshan mountain.

On the 7th Oyama issued his orders to the effect that he intended to assume the offensive as soon as possible. The 2nd Army withdrew the 6th Division and extended the lines of the 3rd and 4th Divisions.

Marshal
Oyama's
Orders

As no news was forthcoming from Stakelberg, Kuropatkin ordered the main bodies of the Western Actions of the Group to close up to their advanced Russians on guards on the 8th and entrench themselves there. The advanced guard of the XVII. Corps advanced to the line of the Shili river and entrenched itself.

A Centre Group, consisting of Mischenko's Cossacks, Mau's Brigade of the X. Corps and the IV. Siberian Centre Group Corps, under command of Zarubaiev, formed was formed. Mau, who formed its advanced guard, was at Mengchiafen.

The I. European Corps came up behind the centre, The the VI. Siberian Corps behind the Reserves right.

The Eastern Group also spent the 8th closing its main bodies up to the advanced guards. These latter did not advance far. Rennenkampf's advanced guard occupied Weiningying after some fighting. His Cossacks crossed the river and threatened the line of communication to Chiaotou. Samsonov reconnoitred the Taling pass.

On receipt of news from Umezawa, the 12th Japanese Movements Division on the right of the line was on the 8th ordered to move the bulk of the division towards the Taling, and about 2 p.m. the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was ordered to march to Chiatou.

The Russians advanced all along the line. The Western Group advanced a few miles and entrenched the line of the Shili river. The Centre Group advanced its main body to Yensansai, its advanced guards occupying the Sanchengtzushan and Nanshan hills. The advanced troops of the I. Siberian Corps attacked the Taling pass.

Rennenkampf, assisted by the advanced guard of the III. Siberian Corps, attacked the Shihshan and Mingshan mountains. The summits of both mountains were captured, but the Shihshan was later recaptured by a counter-attack of the Japanese. The main body of the 12th Division reinforced the Umezawa Brigade.

On the evening of the 9th Oyama found the situation sufficiently clear to issue orders for the Japanese Army advances the assumption of the offensive. The to attack whole army was to advance. Even the Umezawa Brigade was ordered to attack.

His plan was that the 4th Army should break the weak Russian centre and then wheel to its right, pivoting on the left of the 1st Army. The 2nd Army was to deal with the Russian Western Group.

On 10th October the 2nd and 4th Armies advanced and drove back the advanced guards of the Western Group. The 4th Army commenced its wheel to the right. The 2nd and Guard Division stood their

ground awaiting the advance into line of the 4th Army. The 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade withstood all the attacks of the I. and III. Siberian Corps and Rennenkampf's Infantry. The Cossacks under Samsonov and Ljubavin were inactive. The 2nd Japanese Cavalry Brigade reached Chiaotou.

During the 11th and 12th October the 12th Division and Umezawa Brigade were again assailed by the I. The 11th and III. Siberian Corps and Rennen-12th October kampf's Infantry. The II. Siberian Corps was not employed by Stakelberg.

On the 12th the 2nd Japanese Cavalry Brigade advanced from Chiaotou and surprised the Cossacks on the south bank of the Taitzu. These fell back, exposing Rennenkampf's left. The latter withdrew, and by evening the attack of the Russian Eastern Group had been finally repulsed. The II. Siberian Corps was still held back.

The whole of the remainder of the Japanese army advanced, and though the Russians held out on the 11th, on the night, 11th-12th, and during the 12th, the Western and Centre Groups were driven from their advanced line. The XVII. Corps suffered a serious defeat. But Oyama's plan had not entirely succeeded, for the 4th Army did not execute its wheel to the right. The IV. Siberian Corps had indeed been obliged to fall back, but Mau's Brigade, X. Corps, attached to the Centre Group, still held out on the

Lotashan, a bastion of the Nanshan mountain. The 1st Army ordered a brigade to move to the right to attack the right of the Russian Eastern Group. Kuroki's idea was to cut off the retreat of the Eastern Group. The main body, 5th Division, was brought back as Army Reserve, replacing the three Kobi brigades now with the 4th Army.

The morning of 13th October found the whole Russian army in retreat. The I. European Corps had formed up on the left of the X. ^{13th October} Corps, a little in echelon to the front. Mischenko was covering the retreat of the Centre Group, and rearguards covered the retreat of the Eastern Group. The Western Group was in position a little south of the bend in and astride the Sha river.

Oyama had issued a new directive to his army. He ordered the army to clear the south bank of the Sha river. He approved Kuroki's action in trying to cut off the Russian Eastern Group and despatched the 5th Division to assist in the attempt.

The effort of the 1st Army to cut off the Eastern Group was met by a vigorous and successful counter-
^{14th October} attack by the II. Siberian Corps. The corps then withdrew across the Sha. The Eastern Group despatched a composite corps of twenty-two battalions towards Huangshan to form an Army Reserve.

The 1st Army, much delayed by Mischenko, reached the line of the Sha by evening.

The 4th Army, reinforced by a brigade of the 2nd Army, inflicted a severe defeat on the I. European Corps and reached the line of the Sha river.

The 2nd Army attacked the lines of the X. and XVII. Corps. The 3rd Division penetrated the line at Shahopu, but suffered severely in holding the ground gained. The 6th Division (less the brigade assisting the 4th Army) captured a village called Lingshenpu on the left of the XVII. Corps. The 4th Division on the left was forced to meet a vigorous but ill-conducted counter-stroke of the VI. Corps. The attack was repulsed with great loss.

The 15th October saw the 1st and 4th Armies engaged in straightening out their line.

15th and 16th October Kuropatkin, by the evening, had collected a central reserve of some forty-six battalions, about 22,000 bayonets, and proposed with them and Dembovski's fresh troops to initiate a counter-attack on the 16th.

The 15th passed, however, without the recapture of the lost points in the positions of the X. and XVII. Corps. In the evening another village, Lamutun, was lost, and also the Putilov hill. The Novgorod hill was captured by the Japanese on the 16th. On the night, 16th-17th, by a very brilliant attack, the Putilov and Novgorod hills were recaptured,

but as all efforts to recapture Shahopu, Lamutun and Lingshenpu failed, Kuropatkin abandoned his attempt to counter-attack and the battle ended by mutual consent. The armies remained in close touch along the Sha river.

The Russians had been completely repulsed and had definitely failed to relieve Port Arthur. The Japanese plans had not completely succeeded, principally because the weight of numbers was against them.

Like the battle of Liaoyang, the battle of the Shaho shows five marked phases. The first phase may be said to be from the 4th to the 9th of October, when the two armies came into close contact.

The 10th October forms the second phase, during which the Russian Eastern Group attacked and the Japanese took the offensive and advanced.

The 11th and 12th October inclusive form the third phase. During this period the Japanese beat off the attacks of the Eastern Group and drove the Western Group and Centre Group back.

The 13th and 14th form the fourth phase. During this period the Japanese followed up the retreating Russians and drove them across the Sha river.

The 15th, 16th and 17th form the fifth and final phase, when the 2nd Army withstood the

efforts of Kuropatkin to recapture the portions of his line on the Sha which had been lost on the 13th and 14th, and to again assume the offensive. The failure of these efforts ended the battle.

CHAPTER XV

Maps VII. and IX. and Map D

4TH TO 10TH OCTOBER

Kuropatkin's Orders for Advance—Comments—The Advance ordered to begin on the 5th—Initial Movements—Japanese Action—Russian Advance suspended—Umezawa escapes—Oyama's Orders—Russian Inaction—A "Centre" Group formed—Advance of the Eastern Group on the 8th—Actions at Weiningying—Japanese Action on the 8th—The Situation—Comments—Kuropatkin's Orders—Lack of Information—The Centre Group—The Eastern Group fail to reach Penhsihu—Arrival of the 12th Division—Comments—Oyama's Orders—Action on the 10th—Advanced Guard Action near Wulitaitzu—Comments—Oyama's Orders for the 11th

ON 28th September 1904 General Kuropatkin issued his orders for the advance of his army.

Kuropatkin's Orders for the Advance After enumerating with fair accuracy the positions and numbers of his enemy (he estimated the Japanese at ten divisions) he continued :

"I order the Manchurian Army entrusted to my command to attack the enemy in whatever position he may be occupying having as the main object to gain possession of the right bank of the Taitzu river."

So this was what the attack was to amount to : only to gain a river-bank as a "main object."

The army was divided into a Western Force, an Eastern Force, a General Reserve, two flank guards, two extreme flank guards, and a rearguard.

The Western Force, under Bilderling, consisting of the X. and XVII. Army Corps, with four regiments of Cossacks, under Grekov, was to concentrate on the line of the Sha river for an ultimate advance on both sides of the railway.

On the first day of the advance the main bodies were to close up on the advanced detachments, which were already pushed out southwards.

On the second day of the march the advanced guards were to occupy the line of villages between the Sha and Shili rivers and to entrench this line. The main bodies were to reach the line of the Sha river and to entrench a position.

The Eastern Force, under Stakelberg, consisted of the I., II. and III. Siberian Corps with a division of Cossacks, and amounted to some 34/158/73. Its orders were to advance between the road from Fushun to Sanchiatzu, and the road from Fuling, through Pienniulupu to Penhsihu, both roads inclusive. On the second day of advance the main bodies were to occupy the line, Pachiatzu-Feitsunpu-Taichiamiaotzu,¹ with advanced troops on the line,

¹ Not on Map.

Wangfuling ridge to Yingpan. "The main object of the operations of the Eastern Force will be to take possession of the enemy's positions at Pienniulupu."

The General Reserve was to be the IV. Siberian Corps, which was to move up to an area north of Huangshan; the I. Corps, which was to move to an area just west of that assigned to the IV. Corps; and Mischenko's Cossacks, which were to move to Liufantun on the Sha river.

The right flank guard, under Dembovski, consisted of the remnant of the V. Siberian Corps, 16/24/10, with a bridging train, which was to "safeguard the right flank of the army," moving to Fanchientai¹ with an advanced guard at Changchiafang.¹ On the second day it was to move to Hochiachangtz¹ with an advanced guard at Changtan,¹ secure the passage there, and make a bridge, covered by a double bridge-head.

The extreme right flank guard, under Kossagovski, 9/16/6 $\frac{1}{2}$, watched the line of the Liao and kept in touch with Dembovski.

The left flank guard, under Rennenkampf, 16/30/18, was to cover the left flank, with detachments to the eastwards.

The extreme left flank guard, under Madritov, 4/2/1, was to advance in the direction of Saimachi, a

¹ Not on Map.

place on the Fenghuangchang-Chiaotou road, and keep in touch with Rennenkampf.

The rearguard, under Sobolev, formed of the VI. Siberian Corps, 6/96/32, was to remain on the railway between Mukden and Tiehling until further orders.

Such were the orders issued by Kuropatkin for the advance of his army to attack and destroy the hitherto successful Japanese Army under Oyama.

It is a platitude of the military art that the preliminary dispositions are of the first importance.

Comments Nothing can retrieve a bad initial deployment except extreme energy and hard marching, combined with tactical success. Even so all the fruits of victory cannot be gathered if the initial distribution is faulty. It is of importance, therefore, to study these arrangements of Kuropatkin. We have already seen that, strategically, greater opportunities existed by making the main attack along the valley of the Hun river against the Japanese left. On the other hand, the distribution of troops was such that it was far simpler to attack the Japanese right. The movements necessary to alter the distribution of the army as it stood would have taken much time and advertised to the Japanese the direction from which the intended blow was to come. By accepting the distribution as it stood, Kuropatkin probably made a wise decision. Success could

certainly have been achieved, at any rate a limited success, by enveloping and cutting to pieces the Japanese right.

It was, however, necessary before all things to be rapid in movement, circumspect in action, and resolute in carrying through each phase of the operations. A study of Kuropatkin's orders does not reveal any firm determination to carry through the attack, cost what it might. The excessive care for both flanks, the elaborate orders for the exact movements of advanced guards and reconnoitring detachments, the careful arrangements for entrenching each successive line occupied, point rather to a fixed determination not to be defeated, rather than to a fixed determination to win at all costs. Eight and a half army corps were available. Of these three, including one at present guarding the rear, were retained as a General Reserve. Surely the Eastern Force could have been made stronger from the beginning and the VI. Corps used from the first as a General Reserve. The extreme flank guard on the right included six and a half battalions, that on the left one battalion. These detachments took no share in the battle; surely their duties could have been carried out by the Cossacks alone. The two flank guards proper were, it is to be noted, separated from the groups they protected. In these orders Dembovski and Rennenkampf commanded separate forces. It

would have been better to attach them from the first to the Western and Eastern Forces respectively, and make the group commanders responsible for the proper protection of their own flanks. The Western Group, two army corps (X. and XVII.), were faced by the 2nd and 4th Japanese Armies, estimated by Kuropatkin to consist of six, if not seven, divisions. These two corps numbered about 40,000 to 45,000 bayonets. Six Japanese divisions would number at least 65,000 to 72,000 bayonets. The holding attack then was weak. Their advance could not hope to pin superior numbers to their ground unless they attacked with extreme boldness and resolution. In fact, an attack reckless of all save victory could alone achieve the end of holding these superior numbers fast. Yet Kuropatkin's orders enjoin a most cautious advance and frequent delays for entrenching the ground gained. With Kossagovski's six battalions and Dembovski's ten added to this force a further 8000 to 10,000 bayonets would have made Bilderling's task easier, even if he had had to be particularly cautious of his right flank. He had a cavalry division with him, and this could have guarded his right.

There was to be a gap between the left of the Western Force and right of the Eastern Force. This is inevitable in all wide-turning movements. It has its danger, the danger that the enemy will penetrate between the two groups. This is a danger that has

been accepted over and over again by leaders of the past. The danger has been lessened by energy. Energy, rapid marching, hard fighting, keep the enemy too busy to find time either to concentrate against each group in turn or penetrate between them and turn both flanks.

The Eastern Force consisted of three weak army corps, mustering between them only seventy-three battalions. A cavalry division was attached. These seventy-three battalions probably included no more than 50,000 bayonets. They were to attack an army of three or four divisions, numbering, perhaps, 40,000 bayonets—no great numerical preponderance. Success could be achieved by concentrating the bulk of the available troops against a portion, probably the right wing, of the enemy. Yet Kuropatkin prescribed the line of advance of each corps, the frontage of the whole group. Nearly twenty miles was the front on which Stakelberg's three corps were to advance. The enemy might be expected to deploy, perhaps on the line Coal Mines to Penhsihu. That front must be broken or else turned by a movement on the southern bank of the Taitzu. These difficulties might have been surmounted had Stakelberg been left a free hand, but he was not. He was ordered first to capture the Pienniulupu position. The place he was to reach each night was prescribed. No opportunity was allowed or time given to concentrate troops for a

decisive attack. But in truth the first sentences of Kuropatkin's order show the spirit in which he acted. He did not write, "The army will attack the enemy and defeat him," but will attack the enemy "with the object of obtaining possession of the right bank of the Taitzu." He might just as well have ordered the army to capture a parallel of latitude. Detachments may be necessary to capture or gain possession of geographical lines or features, but the objective of an army moving to attack is the defeat of the enemy, not the occupation of a line. And it must be remembered that at this period of the year the Taitzu, never a very formidable obstacle, was hardly any obstacle at all.

On 1st October a cypher telegram warned all commanders that the advance was to commence **The Advance** on the 5th. On the 4th the final orders ordered to were issued. The only change made begin was that Dembovski was to halt at Fanchientai and reconnoitre towards Changtan. Two bridges were to be built and a dépôt was to be formed. Bilderling was again warned that his task was to draw the enemy's main body upon him, thus reducing the strength opposable to Stakelberg's attack. This order makes it clear that the rôle of the Western Group was that of a "holding" attack.

On 4th October Mischenko's Cossacks and the

Eastern Group broke camp and marched. Mischenko occupied Linchiangtun. Next day the Western Group also moved. On the 6th the situation was as follows:—Dembovski had reached Tawangkuanpu; the XVII. Corps, in two columns, were at Taliangtun and Linshengpu, with an advanced guard of one brigade on the stream between the Shili and the Sha. There was a detachment south of the Shili river. A flank guard, 5/2/1, under Stakhovich, was on the right bank of the Sha river. Grekov's Cossack Division was between the XVII. Corps and Dembovski. The X. Corps reached Shahopu with two strong advanced guards, one of 1/24/8 and the second of Mau's Brigade.

The Eastern Group also carried out its programme. This group advanced, with the I. Corps on the right, advanced guard, to Tsaichiatun; II. Corps in the centre, advanced guard to Yingpan; III. Corps on the left, with advanced guard to the Wangfuling Pass. The Cossack Division of Samsonov was in front of the III. Corps, and Rennenkampf was at Sanchiatzu on the Taitzu river.

Meanwhile the Japanese patrols had not been inactive. All day long reports of strong forces in movement on the right flank of the army reached Kuroki's headquarters. A force of 1/6/6, which had attempted to occupy the

Shuangtzushan hill, had been forced to retire, though patrols reached Tumentzu and Sankuaishihshan. The question eagerly debated on the Staff of the 1st Army was the isolated situation of the Umezawa Brigade.

So far the Russian movements were a success, but for some quite inscrutable reason Kuropatkin

In other Russian Movements ordered the Western Force to suspend its advance and spend the 7th October in entrenching their positions, while the advanced guards held the line they now occupied. Only reconnaissances pushed south. Two squadrons, X. Corps, met Japanese at Kushutzu and, supported by 4 guns and half-a-battalion, forced them to retire. The Japanese brought guns into action, and on a report that four Japanese battalions were advancing the detachment fell back, reporting that the Japanese force numbered a brigade and two batteries.

The Eastern Group, which could have now surrounded and destroyed the isolated Umezawa detachment, did but little. Whether this inactivity was by order of the Headquarters or not is by no means clear. Portions of the advanced guards of the III. Corps advanced to the Hsinhailing pass, and Samsonov moved to Lichiawopeng.

Umezawa received his orders to fall back early on the morning of the 7th, but, fearing to disclose the

movement, he stayed in his position till nightfall, and then fell back without a shot being fired. He sent a Kobi regiment and two guns to Penhsihu, **Umezawa** and distributed the rest of his brigade escapes between that place and the Tumentzung pass, which lies a little north of the Taling. The 12th Division was moved from Tayaopu to a position in echelon in front of the right of the army, and the Guard Division began to concentrate just north of Tayaopu.

Marshal Oyama issued his orders on the 7th. They were as clear and unambiguous as Kuropatkin's **Oyama's Orders** were obscure and doubtful. After enumerating what was actually known of the enemy, and stating that some six divisions were threatening the 1st Army, he says: "I wish to concentrate as much as possible so as to be able to *assume the offensive* at any time if required." The 1st Army was to concentrate on a line east of the Coal Mines. The 2nd and 4th Armies were to concentrate on their present position. The three Kobi brigades, the 1st Artillery Brigade and 14th Artillery Regiment formed the General Reserve and remained at Liaoyang.

In consequence of these orders the 2nd Army brought the 6th Division back in reserve and readjusted the line held by the 3rd and 4th Divisions. The 1st Cavalry Brigade was at Heikoutai.

It seems that Kuropatkin received no news of the progress of the Eastern Group during the 7th. He

Western Group still inactive therefore ordered the Western Group to move up to the position held by their advanced guards on the 8th and entrench. This position then became the "main position." The XVII. Corps even constructed a third line. As the Russians were not forcing the enemy to conform to their movements it became necessary to anticipate the possible movements of the enemy. The IV. Siberian Corps, with Mischenko's Cossack Division, together with the left advanced guard of the X. Corps, under Mau, to

The IV. Corps brought up to form a Centre Group whom was added an infantry regiment, were formed into a Centre Group and brought up to close the gap between the Eastern and Western Groups.

Stakelberg had intended to spend the day closing up with a view to delivering a great attack on the Pienniulupu position on the 9th. The position, however, was found abandoned. By nightfall on the 8th the advanced guards were well south of the Sha river and Samsonov was just east of the Taling pass. Rennenkampf drove in a Japanese post Action at Weiningying. This little affair was Weiningying a good example of the value of the modern weapons in a delaying action.

Ljubavin, with the Cossacks, was advancing on

the south bank of the Taitzu, which had been passed at Sanchiatzu. The infantry, under General Ekk, advanced on the north bank. A party of Cossacks on the south bank proceeded to recross the river at Weiningying to occupy and examine the village. They were met by heavy rifle fire. It became necessary to attack the village. The Cossacks obtained a footing on the north bank, mountain guns were brought into action. Ekk's advanced guard, under Peterev, —/4/4, arrived and deployed for attack. Finally the Japanese retired, having forced the enemy to expend much of the available mountain gun ammunition, to develop his strength and suffer considerable loss. The Japanese force in Weiningying appears to have been only a few troopers and a company of infantry.

Chiaotou also was in much danger. The commandant there only disposed of 200 men. He armed some military transport coolies with captured rifles and placed a small detachment on each of the three roads which lead from Penhsihu to Chiaotou.

Japanese Movements to-wards the Right Reinforcements of line of communication troops were being hurried up, but meanwhile the dépôt seemed lost if the Russians advanced.

At 9.20 A.M. on the 8th the 12th Division was ordered to move such troops as it had in reserve towards the Taling pass, and at 2 P.M., on the further

reports from Penhsihu arriving, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was ordered to march to Chiaotou.

Thus by the evening of the 8th September the advanced troops were in close contact all along the front. The situation, which is shown on Map VIII., was, briefly, as follows :—

Six Japanese divisions stood on a line running General east and west from the hills east of Situation the Coal Mines to a point across the Sha river, just south of San taitzu.

The 10th Kobi Brigade had joined the 4th Army, and the 2nd and 4th Armies had each received an artillery regiment.

In Army Reserve at Liaoyang were two Kobi brigades, an artillery regiment, and the Heavy Artillery. The Cavalry Brigade watched the left.

On the right of this long line, which from east to west is about twenty-two miles, stood the 12th Division, north of the Chengkouling pass. Away to the south-east, occupying a line from Penhsihu to the Taling pass, was the Umezawa Brigade, with the single battalion which formed the garrison of Penhsihu.

The Russian advanced guards of the XVII., X. and IV. Siberian Corps were on the line of the Shili river from its junction with the Sha to Meng-chiafen.

The advanced guards of the Eastern Group were

on a line from Pienniulupu to the Hsinkailing pass, with the II. Siberian Corps in rear of the centre.

Samsonov was just west of the Taling pass, and Rennenkampf's advanced troops had occupied Weiningying with the Cossacks under Ljubavin at Sanchiatzu.

Thus if the Russian West and Centre Groups continued their advance due south, three army

Comments corps would strike the positions of six Japanese divisions. On the Eastern

side three army corps, with the addition of Rennenkampf's detachment, would strike the position held by the 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade. Not only this, but the strong force under Rennenkampf, supported by the Cossacks of Samsonov and the advanced guards of the I. and III. Siberian Corps, ought to be able, if they attacked resolutely on the 9th, to overwhelm the Umezawa detachment, mustering only some seven battalions strung out on a front of eight miles or more, before the 12th Division could support the troops at Penhsihu on the right of the line. Rennenkampf mustered some ten battalions, while the distance from the 12th Division to Penhsihu was over twelve miles of very bad road.

Kuropatkin's Orders Kuropatkin had not heard of the successful occupation of the Pienniulupu position on the 8th of October, and his orders

were based on the assumption that this position was still held against the Eastern Group.

This was by no means the first nor the last of the Based on Bad series of blunders which arose from Information the want of proper means of communication between the left wing and the commander. Necessity for in-chief. This battle shows again very Good System clearly how absolutely essential good of Intercom- intercommunication is if these wide munication converging movements, or movements on different lines of operation, are to be successful. The proper timing of the moves of the separate positions of the army is above all other things the task of Headquarters. This proper timing depends on accurate information, and that depends on a good system of intercommunication.

Kuropatkin then expected that the 9th would be occupied by the capture of the Pienniulupu position and the 10th would see Stakelberg's decisive attack.

The Western Group was therefore ordered to close up to the line of the Shili river and to push its advanced guards a little south.

The left advanced guard of the X. Corps, under Mau, and Mischenko's Cossack Division had been allotted to a new Centre Group, of which the main strength was the IV. Siberian Corps. This group was ordered to echelon itself in front of the Western

Group. These orders were carried out. Mau occupied the Nanshan hill. Levestam, with the Formation of a Centre Group advanced guard (two regiments) of the IV. Siberian Corps, occupied the Sanchengtzushan hill. The main body of the corps was near Yensansai. Mischenko was between Mau and Levestam. The Japanese advanced troops fell back, and the only fighting was with the advanced guard of the X. Corps, which had to push back a Japanese post before occupying the knoll near Wulitaitzu. The I. and VI. Siberian Corps were brought up, the former behind the Centre Group, the latter behind the right of the Western Group.

Meanwhile Stakelberg, ignorant of the commander-in-chief's views, had decided to advance on 9th September.

The I. Siberian Corps advanced in two columns and a right flank guard. The right flank guard The Eastern Group got into touch with the IV. Siberian Corps and assisted it to push back some Japanese posts. The right column lost its way, and, after wandering about, found itself behind the left column. The left column reached Hsiaoshihchiaotzu with a regiment north of the Tumentzuling pass and a regiment near the Taling pass, where it relieved Samsonov.

The III. Siberian Corps advanced to Kaotaitzu.

One regiment of this corps supported Samsonov in an attack on the Taling pass and the height south. The attack failed.

Rennenkampf alone had serious fighting. His infantry, under Peterev, advancing north of the Taitzu, struck the posts of the two Kobi battalions extended from the Mingshan to the Shihshan. Although two battalions and a battery of the III. Siberian Corps supported the attack it was 5 P.M. before the Mingshan was captured. Every man of the post there was either dead or wounded. Soon after the Shihshan was captured too. But the gallant defenders of the two posts had accomplished their task, hopeless though it had seemed? A few hundred resolute men had held at bay a whole division until help arrived. At 8 P.M. the leading regiment and a battery of the 12th Division marched into Penhsihu. The losses by the Japanese were not heavy. The original garrison of Penhsihu, a battalion, 39th Kobi Regiment, lost 7 killed and 27 wounded. As 30 of these ³⁴ were, so it is stated, from the post on the Mingshan, the remainder of the long line cannot have been heavily engaged. The 1st Guard Kobi Regiment lost 34 killed and 68 wounded.

Thus the imminent danger to the right had passed. The bulk of the 12th Division joined Umezawa on the line of passes from the Tumentzuling to Penhsihu, and though the situation was dangerous these

15,000 rifles could be expected to withstand the shock of superior numbers for a day or two at least.

The battle was now joined. The armies were in such close touch that there could not be any breaking off of the fight except by mutual consent. Marshal Oyama was still as determined as ever to seize the initiative at the first opportunity, but as yet the situation was not, as he thought, cleared up.

Looking at the situation as it would have appeared to him, probably it may have seemed something as follows :—

The Russian army, three cavalry divisions and eight army corps, numbering perhaps 12,000 sabres and 200,000 bayonets, was advancing south. So far considerable forces had advanced down the Sha river and (*vide* Oyama's orders) their main strength on this wing seemed to be astride the Sha river from Liulingkou to Tatai. At present, advanced troops of three corps had appeared in front of the 2nd and 4th Armies.

The Russian right was very strongly guarded, and bridging was going on over the Hun river.

His own right had been attacked by a force estimated at six divisions and a cavalry division, while another cavalry division had crossed the Taitzu and enveloped the right wing about Penhsihu.

The right wing, however, was momentarily safe by the arrival of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and the 12th Division at Chiaotou and Penhsihu respectively. On this wing the dangerous point seemed to be the ground about the Chengkouling, the Tumentzuling and the Taling passes. But the whole front of the 1st Army was in danger, for it was very unduly prolonged; 45,000 bayonets to a front of over twenty miles.

The question was: where was the General Reserve of the Russians? Two corps were not yet located. If, as seemed probable, they were behind the right wing it would not do to weaken the left to reinforce the right except at the cost of giving up all hope of delivering a decisive counter-stroke. On the other hand, it was quite likely that the Russians might gain a success against the right because at present they had the initiative. Thus, unless the Russian reserves were pinned to their own right, they might move over and attack the 1st Army. By activity all along the line the very extensive Russian deployment might be found to have a weak spot, which spot, being found, could be hammered till a hole was made there and the Russian Reserve used up in stopping it. The danger was that the bridging of the Hun river precluded an attack from the west.

Possibly some such considerations as the above dictated Oyama's orders for the 10th, which were

for a cautious activity along the whole front. The whole army was to move towards the north-north-west: the Umezawa Brigade towards Oyama's Orders for the Hsiangshantzu, the rest of the 1st roth October Army towards Fengchipu, the 4th Army towards Shahopu, with its left on the road, and the 2nd Army up the valley of the Sha river, with its right on the road. Careful watch must be kept towards Changtan.

These orders mean that Oyama proposed to guard his flank with one cavalry brigade and one and a half divisions, while with one cavalry brigade and seven and a half divisions he attacked the Russian right wing. It is noteworthy that although two Russian army corps were not yet located he only retained two Kobi brigades and a strong force of artillery as an Army Reserve.

Kuropatkin, who expected Stakelberg's attack to begin on the 10th, proposed to continue the Action on the 10th advance. Unfortunately Stakelberg, whose caution throughout the operations was excessive, decided to devote the 10th to reconnoitring the position along the line of passes. During the morning of the 10th three Japanese companies recaptured the Shihshan hill under cover of a fog, and when the fog lifted an engagement became general all along the line south to the Mingshan. These attacks were made by Russian

reconnoitring parties. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade reached Chiaotou and relieved the garrison. It had not been attacked.

The Japanese Guard and 2nd Division could not advance till the 4th and 2nd Armies had come up in line. The 10th Division advanced to near Tumentzu. The advanced guard of the X. Corps, holding Kushutzu, was attacked by the advanced guard and right flank guard of the 5th Division. Owing to misunderstanding between the leaders of these two protective detachments, the attack on the Russian position south of the villages was delayed. The Russian advanced guard battery, in a well-concealed position, forced the six batteries of the 5th Division to come into action, and it was not till evening, after two batteries of the 10th Division had also given assistance, that the Russians withdrew to Kushutzu and a knoll west of that village. Meanwhile Wulitaitzu had been held by a post from the XVII. Corps. The Japanese attacked the knoll west of Kushutzu three times during the night, but were driven back on the third occasion by a counter-attack with the bayonet.

Here we have the converse of the action of the 9th at Penhsihu. There three Kobi battalions held at bay a Russian division for a whole day. Here three Russian battalions checked a Japanese

division for a whole day. These actions are of great interest. They show how the long range
Comments of the modern rifle and the indirect fire of the Q.F. gun have increased the power of detachments.

A Russian battery of 8 guns induced eight Japanese batteries (48 guns) to come into action. On this quarter of the field the situation must have become clear to the Russian leaders. West of the 5th Division moved the 3rd, 6th and 4th, in the order named. Here too the Russian advanced troops disputed the advance with some success. It was late in the evening before the Japanese had driven the protecting detachments back upon their main bodies. The Cavalry Brigade reached Shentanpu.

Oyama was now in a position to issue his orders for the attack. His instructions were simple. He said :

"I desire to drive the enemy at present east of the Mukden highway towards the north-east."

To carry out this, the 1st Army was to advance on Fengchipu ; the 4th Army was to capture Wulitaitzu at once and then wheel to the right and advance towards Liuchiangtun ; the 2nd Army was to drive back the enemy to its front and advance to the line, Shahopu-Kuanlinpu, "taking care to guard against an attack from the direction of the

Hun river, the right bank of which stream must be reconnoitred."

It is clear from these orders that Oyama's plan was to break the Russian centre with four divisions—Guard, 2nd, 10th and 5th—while the 12th and Umezawa Brigade held the right and the 2nd Army gripped the Russian right and drew upon itself the reserves which were probably on the road and railway, or else moving up the Hun valley to attack the left.

CHAPTER XVI

Map X. and Map D

11TH OCTOBER

The Russian Attack on the Passes—I. Siberian Attack—Attack not pressed—III. Siberians and Reinenkampf—Failure of the Cossacks—The Attack fails—The II. Siberian Corps is held back—Heavy Losses—The Attack of the Japanese Guard—The Attack of the 2nd Division—Capture of the Temple Hill—Comments—The 4th Army—The 2nd Army—Comments

ON the evening of 10th October Stakelberg issued a manifesto to his troops calling upon them for determined efforts on the morrow. For the attack on the enemy's front, from the Tumentzuling pass to the Mingshan mountain, he divided his group into a right attack, a left attack, and a reserve. The cavalry, consisting of 25 squadrons, under Ljubavin and Samsonov, was to operate on the south bank of the Taitzu river.

The Disposition of the Eastern Group

The right attack, to which was allotted the I. Siberian Army Corps, advanced in two columns, with a right flank guard of 4/8/3. This flank guard was ordered to seize and hold the Chengkouling

pass. The 4th E. S. Rifle Regiment was detailed for the flank guard. It had bivouacked for the night at Pachiatzu, with outposts on the I. Siberian hills 787 and 774. As it turned out, ^{The Attack of} Corps this regiment was itself attacked when the Japanese guard advanced, thus the 4th E. S. Rifle Regiment did not take part in the action of the I. Corps at all. The centre column, —/14/6, was to attack the Tumentzuling. The left column, —/28/9, with 8 machine guns, was to attack the Taling.

Apparently the remaining six battalions remained in reserve, as also the remaining battery of the corps. Whether this reserve was at the disposal of the Corps Commander or formed part of the Army Reserve is not clear.

We have seen how the right column was held fast by the guards' advance. The centre column had apparently received no very clear instructions. The country is exceedingly intricate and broken. There are no roads and no marked features to act as guiding points. As a matter of fact the Japanese left, though "in the air," rested on the wild block of mountains intervening between the right of the 23rd Brigade, 12th Division, and the left of the 12th Brigade, 12th Division.

The Japanese found it difficult to select any well-defined line of defence.

An advanced post, one battery, with a company as escort, had been pushed forward in front of the pass. Liovski, commanding the centre attack, detailed a battalion, 3rd E. S. Rifle Regiment, to guard the right. This battalion occupied the Chaohsienling pass. The rest of his troops he divided into two portions, to attack from the north and east.

About 9 A.M. the two batteries opened fire against the Japanese advanced post at a long range. Both portions of the Russian attack converged against this point. However, reinforced by another company, the post held out all day. The Russians never got within 600 yards. Even the arrival of a battalion, 1st E. S. Rifle Regiment, as reinforcement did not carry the attack forward. As soon as night fell the Japanese strengthened themselves against the probable night attack.

Thus 400 men and 6 guns checked 3000 men and 16 guns. Apparently the four mortars that accompanied Liovski did not come into action.

The left column, I. Siberian Corps, under Kondratovich, was to attack the Taling pass. Its orders

The Left Attack of the I. Siberians were that the left regiment, after obtaining touch with the III. Siberian Corps, was to turn the Japanese right on the Taling and penetrate to Hualiensai. One regiment was to make a frontal attack on the Taling; the third regiment was held in reserve.

All went well until the foot of the ridge on which the Japanese line rested was reached. Here the attack was checked, and it was decided to wait till darkness made a further advance possible. The Russian column, as we have seen, consisted of some 5000 bayonets. The Japanese consisted of three battalions, say 2750 bayonets, at the most. The country, however, was not favourable for hiding the direction of movement of the main attack.

To Ivanov, with the III. Siberian Corps and Rennenkampf's detachment, had been allotted the

The Attack of task of capturing the Japanese position
the III. from the Mingshan to the Shihshan.

Siberians and Ivanov distributed his troops into two
Rennenkampf's attacks and a reserve. The 6th E. S.
Infantry

Rifle Division was to attack the Shihshan, with a frontage of apparently about 3500 yards. Rennenkampf, whose twelve battalions had been increased to seventeen, was to advance on a line from the Mingshan to Hotikou and break into Penhsihu. It is said that the Shihshan was accounted the "key of the position." In that case it seems odd that whereas the 6th E. S. Rifle Division, mustering—with one infantry regiment and two battalions attached—eighteen battalions, was given a wide front, the seventeen battalions of Rennenkampf were given a comparatively narrow frontage. The cavalry was to advance south of the Taitzu river.

The cavalry action may be dismissed at once.

A composite battalion of odd companies from various regiments had been sent south of the river, Failure of the and two mountain guns placed to Cossacks enfilade the Russian advance. This sufficed to drive Ljubavin back on to Samsonov, who, on his part, did nothing. It is said that the ammunition of the Cossack batteries had been exhausted by firing on the Japanese boat-bridge and during the outpost engagement at Weiningying.

The Japanese troops holding the Mingshan-Shihshan line amounted to some seven battalions and 8 guns.

The 6th E. S. Rifle Division advanced with the six attached battalions on the left, two battalions in the centre, and two on the right.

It is not known how Rennenkampf's troops were distributed. The day, cool in the morning, was broiling hot by noon. The men, slipping and scrambling over the rocks and dry, steep, slippery grass slopes, were soon exhausted, the more so as they were in heavy marching order. Again and again they attempted to advance to close range. Generals and other leaders cheered them on by example and encouragement, but the attacks failed. The artillery support was very poor, as apparently the guns could find no suitable positions at much less than 5000 yards' range.

When by midday no advance to close range had

been accomplished Stakelberg called upon the leaders "to carry the attack forward at once." The reserve were then sent in, but though each reinforcement carried the firing lines a little forward no success crowned the efforts of the troops except the capture of a few advanced trenches on the Mingshan, where, as the Russians held the summit, the Japanese were subjected to a plunging fire.

But although Stakelberg had called upon his troops for a final effort he himself did not steel ^{The II.} Siberian Corps his heart to set in his own reserve. The ^{held back} twelve battalions of the II. Siberian Corps remained idle at Hsiaoshihchiaotzu.

The losses testify to the gallantry of the troops. Five thousand men were killed or wounded. Nor Heavy ^{Losses} did the defenders come off unscathed. The German official account states that a third were killed or wounded. As the total loss of the 12th Division and Guard Kobi Brigade, with attached troops, was only 1200, on 11th October, and as only one and three quarter battalions were in reserve, the losses cannot, after all, have been so serious as 33 per cent., even in Honda's composite battalion, which was holding the right at the Ming-shan, and suffered the most severely.

The news from the right, where the IV. Siberian Corps was unable to hold all its positions against the attacks of the Guard and 2nd Divisions, caused

Stakelberg much alarm. About 5 P.M. he sent one regiment of the II. Corps to reinforce the battalion of the I. Corps on the Chaohsienling, Siberian Corps and counter-ordered his previous orders to carry the Japanese positions by a night attack. With the imperfect Russian arrangements for communications it was some hours before his orders reached the troops, who, as we shall see, had already delivered several night assaults. About midnight Stakelberg issued fresh instructions. The Corps Commanders were to make every effort to collect reserves. The positions already gained were to be entrenched. The II. Corps, with some guns of the III. Corps, was to retire to Hsiapingtaitzu and prepare a position, placing two regiments and two batteries on Twopeaked hill. If the IV. Siberian Corps continued to fall back a small force was to be left in this position and the remainder were to push forward against the right flank of the advancing Japanese. These last instructions were, however, vitiated by the previous orders to stand fast.

While Kuroki's right was thus bravely holding its ground the Guard and 2nd Divisions advanced The Guards' to the attack. The Guard Division was Advance to capture the high ground north of Pachiatzu. To do this, Asada, the Commander of the Guard Division, decided to try to occupy the Russian

outpost line on hills 787 and 774, before dawn on the 11th. Hill 787 was occupied by the 1st Guard Brigade without difficulty. The 2nd Guard Brigade advanced, with the 4th Regiment leading directly on hill 774. This regiment placed two battalions in the first line and one in local reserve. The scouts were discovered by the Russian sentries, who opened fire and fell back on to the line of pickets which was placed along the crest. As day broke the Russian firing line showed up very clearly against the skyline and lost heavily. The 3rd Guard Regiment came up on the right and captured the hill east of 774 without difficulty. The outposts on 774 then withdrew.

The Russians consisted of the 4th E. S. Rifle Regiment and Mischenko's Cossacks. This weak force could not have held out long, but that a brigade, IV. Corps, which was marching to join Stakelberg, thrust in on the Russian left, strengthened the garrison of the Watanabe Yama, and occupied Mienhuapu. Two batteries were brought into action against 787 and 774. An enveloping movement via Mienhuakou was attempted.

Attacks were attempted by mounted Cossacks against the left of the 3rd Brigade, and here a dangerous attack developed in the course of the morning, while a force, estimated at five battalions, pressed the right. While the fight was raging along the front of

the Guard the 2nd Division was in difficulties. General Asada, the Commander of the Guard, was called upon by 1st Army Headquarters to assist the 2nd Division in spite of the severe pressure to which his own division was exposed. Asada had already despatched his divisional reserve to join his front line. He therefore called on his left brigade to find some troops. Two battalions were collected and ordered to attack westwards, but before the attack was

Mistake in
Messages
between
2nd and
Guard
Divisions

launched the 2nd Division reported that it could not move and the attack was therefore counter-ordered. It transpired that the message had been wrongly delivered, and so about 5 P.M. the attack was finally launched, coupled with a forward movement of the 2nd Division.

No considerable advance was made, however, though a village N.E. from Tashan was reached. After dark the two battalions of the guard fell back. The guard had no intention, however, of discontinuing its attempt to capture the hills in front, and prepared for a night attack. It will be conceded that throughout the day the fifteen weak Russian battalions, which with 22 guns and 16 squadrons held a line some three miles long and delivered several sustained counter-attacks against their very formidable adversaries, consisting of twelve strong battalions, 36 guns and 3 squadrons, fought remarkably well.

Westwards of the position held by Mischenko, Shileiko and the 4th E. S. Rifle Regiment, which the ~~The Attack~~ guards had attacked, stands the San-chengtzushan mountain. This bare ~~of the~~ 2nd Division and craggy eminence presents a very formidable aspect to south, east and west. It was held by three regiments (twelve battalions) of the IV. Corps. Echeloned to the rear and over 3000 yards behind it stands the Temple hill, which is a knoll rising sharply some eighty feet above the plain. The knoll is connected by a low col with a small chain of hills a couple of miles long, running east and west. These hills are called the Nanshan, whose western bastion is the Sankuaishishan. This mass of hill was held by Mau's Brigade, X. Corps, attached to the Centre Group. A regiment of the I. Corps was attached to Mau, bringing his strength up to twelve battalions. In front of the Temple hill, for nearly 2000 yards, stretches a perfectly level, open plain. Such was the position which the 2nd Division had to assail.

General Nishijima detailed a brigade to attack each portion of the Russian line.

The Shiliho, which covered the Russian front, is no obstacle to movement, but is really an assistance to the attack, affording cover for local reserves.

The right brigade, the 3rd, had occupied Panla-shantzu before daybreak. The Russian standing

patrols there had already fallen back. At 5 A.M. the whole brigade advanced and the Russian outposts fell back. The Japanese were fired upon by the two battalions on the slopes south-west of the Sanchengtzushan.

Towards 7 A.M. the artillery opened fire, though the morning mist hung over the Shili valley. Two batteries came into action south of Ishiyama, and one west of that knoll ; two batteries were placed on the Tashan, and one in the valley by Chientuo.

Towards 9 A.M. a movement of troops to reinforce the advanced line was visible, and as about the same time a fierce bombardment of the batteries on the Ishiyama was commenced, it was thought that a counter-attack was brewing against the left of the 3rd Brigade. Movements towards the north from Temple hill were seen. An advance on the east of Sanchengtzushan made itself apparent. Towards 11 A.M. the infantry on the Tashan was ordered to advance.

Between that hill and Sanchengtzushan the ground is undulating, and on the crest of each rise furious encounters took place. By 1.40 P.M. the Russian advanced troops had all been driven in. One attempt was made to push up the steep, strongly held slopes, but was given up. Wherever they gained ground the Japanese threw up shelter trenches. The assistance of the guard was now asked, but, as we have seen, nothing finally came of it.

The 15th Brigade meanwhile, which had also occupied Panlashantzu before dawn, advanced no farther, for without the assistance of the advance of the 10th Division the brigade would be exposed to attack from all directions.

Capture of the Temple Hill
The 10th Division made no move, and at last Kuroki ordered the 15th Brigade to move alone.

Okasaki, commanding the brigade, sent the 16th Regiment, less half-a-battalion, against Sanchiatzu, and the 30th, less one and a half battalions, against Kuchiatzu. Thence a rush was to be made on the Temple hill.

The firing line formed one long, continuous line, with hardly any extension whatever. The supports followed at 200 yards' distance, also in single line. The reserves followed 400 yards behind the support in a two-deep shoulder-to-shoulder line. The advance was made in rushes by companies. Kuchiatzu and the line of the brook was reached towards 4 P.M.

It was now clear that the Russian firing line, whose general situation had all along been fairly visible, for the Russians as usual took but little care to hide their movements, was in a sunken road about 500 yards from the exit of the village.

After about three-quarters of an hour's pause to recover from the long advance at the double the Japanese again advanced, but now in several lines,

with three paces' interval between the men. Only one stop to fire was made in the 500 yards, and then the whole four battalions dashed into the Russian position. A desperate bayonet fight took place, which left the Japanese masters of the hill. At once they turned to make their position secure against the inevitable counter-attack, and it was well they did so.

Within a few moments a Russian battery was raining shell upon the Temple hill and two battalions advanced from the Nanshan, but the Japanese artillery was prepared for this, and checked it.

Nevertheless the Russians made three separate efforts to regain the lost point. Had they held a portion of their troops in local reserve ready for a counter-stroke they might never have lost the hill, but they filled their firing line with men standing shoulder to shoulder, many of whom could not see to shoot. Consequently, when driven back there was no local reserve ready for the counter-stroke. The delay in collecting troops for this purpose proved fatal. In the evening Sanchiatzu was occupied by 6 companies of the 3rd Brigade and 3 companies, 15th Brigade, and was defended against a counter-attack.

Undoubtedly the Japanese success was due to the
Comments bayonet attack over nearly 500 yards
of open ground. Had they stayed to gain "fire superiority" they would not have got in that day.

The Japanese had rarely attempted such tactics as these. The speed with which the 500 yards' dash was made saved them many casualties. The total casualties amounted to 600, of whom most were killed by the artillery fire after the hill was gained. Five hundred yards can be covered by a line of soldiers in under two minutes without getting unduly blown and unable to use the bayonet.

The success of this attack seems to indicate that cold steel may play a more important rôle in the modern infantry fight than is yet realised. But to employ it the men must be very fit, and very skilful use of ground must be made to bring up a sufficient number of men to a point whence the dash can be made. Then, with really accurate artillery shooting and skilful covering fire by the battalion machine guns, it would seem that it would constantly be more profitable to make a dash in with the bayonet than spend days in fighting out a so-called "fire-fight," which is often only a trial of endurance involving an absurd expenditure of ammunition. But the men who are going to make the dash cannot do it in shoulder-to-shoulder "*parade-marsch*" style, with cloaks and whatnots decorating their manly backs and towering above their shoulders.

Only the very best training, physical and military, will carry through such an attack. Speed is essential, and it is dash and use of ground by every man and

boy in the army which alone will carry the attack home. Physical fitness and high training are of more importance even than good musketry. This is particularly the case if the gunner is perfect in his shooting, and above all is able to keep in touch with the infantry he supports. Of course heavy losses will result, but provided the covering fire is accurate the loss will not be more severe than a long musketry duel at close range. This will be even more the case in a fight with better marksmen than were the Russians.

To the left the 4th Army had made but little progress during the day. The 10th Division on the right had for its allotted task to capture ^{The 4th Army} the Sankuaishishan. As, however, the wheel of the 4th Army to the right was to be made on the 10th Division as a pivot, it was necessary to "mark time" to let the 5th Division bring up their left shoulders. By 6.30 the 10th Division had closed up to its outposts and was ready to advance.

About 8.30, as the 5th Division was apparently unable to move, the 10th Division decided to wait no longer. But about 9 A.M. the Russians were observed to be reinforcing their advanced troops. Up to this time eight Russian batteries had been located, and a strong reserve was visible east of the Lotashan. The 10th Division therefore postponed advance from the shelter of the knolls behind which it stood. The

whole of the guns, with the division, were brought into action and the Russian trenches bombarded.

Towards 2 P.M. fresh orders for advance were issued, but as three fresh Russian batteries came into action the idea was again abandoned, although the 10th Kobi Brigade was placed at the disposal of the 10th Division. The fresh troops observed were probably part of the 37th Division, belonging to the I. Army Corps, which had reinforced the Centre Group and occupied the Sankuaishihshan.

Late in the afternoon the 36 guns of the 15th Artillery Regiment came into action in support of the 10th Division, thus bringing the number of guns in action against the right of the Russian Centre Group up to 72. Preparations for a night attack were made. About 6.30 two battalions were despatched to join the hard-pressed 15th Brigade, 3rd Division, on the Temple hill. The Army Reserve was now at Yentai, and was at the disposal of the 4th Army.

The 5th Division had first of all to drive in the advanced troops of the X. Corps, with whom it had been fighting on the 10th. It was 5 A.M. before Wulitaitzu was cleared of Russians and in the hands of the division. But even now the fight put up by Ryabinkin's advanced guard, which consisted of the Voronej Regiment, under Colonel Solomka, and one battery, was not ended. The hillock between Wulitaitzu and Kushutzu was still held. About 5.30

A.M. a bayonet charge in overwhelming strength cleared this hill. The 5th Division now closed up, the right brigade to Kushutzu, the left to Wulitaitzu. Ryabinkin had brought two batteries into action at Hungchiachuang. These batteries checked the firing line of the right brigade. Three Japanese batteries were brought into action against them from a position near Kushutzu.

It was clear that the loss of the Wulitaitzu hillock endangered the Russian position along the edge of the Shili river bank.

Kuropatkin called for a report for an attack on this point, and was informed that an infantry division was required and that a frontal and western flank attack should be simultaneous. A regiment and two batteries were sent to reinforce Ryabinkin. They moved from the direction of Shiliho village. However, the danger that the Japanese might break in between Mau on the Nanshan and Ryabinkin was now so pressing that it became necessary to reinforce and prolong the left of Ryabinkin's line, and to this point the reinforcement was diverted.

Ryabinkin's reserve had been absorbed into the firing line, and as the rest of the X. Corps was not ordered up no attack was delivered. The brunt of the fighting for the day, therefore, fell on the two batteries at Hungchiachuang. They were nearly annihilated, losing 30 per cent. killed and wounded.

On the left of the 4th Army the 2nd Army attacked the position of the XVII. Corps. The position was held by Yanjul's Division while Stak-hovich, with the flank guard, was on the right bank of the Sha river. Grekov's Cavalry Division covered the right of the line. Behind the right stood the VI. Siberian Corps.

The 2nd Army General Oku had retained a brigade of each division as an Army Reserve. The remaining brigade of the 3rd Division advanced in two columns, a right attack of two battalions and a left attack of three battalions. The right attack was to move on Shiliho, east of the railway. The left attack was to move on Yentaoniu. One battalion was in reserve.

At 6 A.M. the seven batteries of the 3rd Division came into action north of Menghulutun. In front of Yentaoniu the Russian batteries were not able to fire with effect, but from Shiliho 24 Russian guns swept the plain and checked the progress of the right attack. About 8 A.M. Oku returned four battalions to the division, but though the right wing was reinforced by two battalions, it made no progress.

The left attack had by now got within 1000 yards of Yentaoniu, but beyond that the men could not be induced to advance, and the firing line entrenched itself. About 11 A.M. a further effort

was made on the right and Hsiaohsienkou was reached.

Meanwhile the left wing had again advanced towards Yentaoniulu, and a portion of the firing line crept up to within fifty paces and prepared to charge.

The Russian local reserves, however, were ready, and two battalions of the Novoingermanland Regiment bore down upon the exhausted Japanese with bayonets fixed. The Japanese were forced back on Erhtaitzu, with a loss of some 200 to 300 men. The Russians lost much the same number. This check put a stop to the advance for some hours.

In the evening, when all but two companies had been returned to the division by Oku, the divisional commander reinforced his left attack by a regiment, less two companies. Some alteration in the artillery distribution was made, and the left advanced again. The village south of Yentaoniulu was found abandoned, and occupied. Under this cover the 18th Regiment collected and assaulted Yentaoniulu itself. After desperate fighting the village was captured.

As the advance of the 6th Division had forced the cavalry and flank guard to fall back the right wing of Yanju's position was now in great danger.

The XVII. Corps could not, however, leave Yentaoniulu in Japanese hands, so the Commander of the

Corps Reserve was ordered to retake the village at night; while a portion of the reserve was sent to the right to face the attack of the 6th Division.

The 6th Division, less one brigade in Army Reserve, advanced about 6 A.M. By 8.30 A.M. a flank detachment of one battalion was about 600 yards from Yangchiawan and the firing line of the main attack was about Sanchialintzu. The two guns of the Russian flank guard were firing with great effect against this attack, and were not located by the three batteries of the 6th Division placed at Tatungshanpu. The fight now degenerated into a bombardment. When the 3rd Division was forced back from Yentaoniu, the right flank of the 6th Division was obliged to conform, but, being reinforced, again advanced.

About 1.30 two battalions of the brigade in Army Reserve joined their division, and the 13th Artillery Regiment came into action. Thus six batteries were in action against the battalion in Yangchiawan and the right of Yanjul's position. Yangchiawan was abandoned by the Russians and occupied by the Japanese about 2.30, when the whole line advanced on Langtzutai but did not get within 1000 yards of that place.

The 4th Division, less one brigade, was to

wheel up and outflank the Russian right. It was opposed by Grekov's Cavalry Division. A flank guard of two squadrons and one battalion moved on Litajentun, which it seized and occupied about 9 A.M. The advanced guard, one regiment and The 4th three batteries, reached Yuchiachiantzu Division about 8 A.M. At 9 A.M. the division was ordered to reach Kuanlinpu. The advanced guard at once pressed forward. It soon found itself opposed by a horse artillery battery and dismounted troopers. The villages in front were held in varying strength, and other guns were in action to the west. The advance was not pressed, except that one battalion of the advanced guard by moving north caused the retreat of the Russian flank guard at Yangchiawan.

On this flank then for the first time we find Cossacks attaining some measure of success. The slow movements of the 4th Division were due to skilful handling of their men by the Cossack leaders, who occupied each clump of bushes, wall or heap of stones, and by this action concealed their real weakness. Grekov disposed of 22 squadrons, possibly some 1500 sabres, and 6 guns. The Japanese advanced guard alone amounted to 2500 to 3000 rifles and 18 guns. Their flank was covered by a strong flank guard and by the 1st Cavalry Brigade. It is right to give the devil his due, and it must be

admitted that here and in the centre, where Mischenko's squadrons fought, the Cossacks did well this day.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade advanced about three miles. It met some of Dembovski's advanced troops, **The 1st Cavalry** which paralysed the movements of the **Brigade** Japanese cavalry. It is impossible to refrain from reflecting what would have been the result of a determined advance by Dembovski's force on this day. Had he moved south on Shentanpu and pressed his advance against the left rear of the 4th Division there can be but little doubt that the Japanese left would have been obliged to fall back across the Sha river. The Japanese reserves would have had to move to that flank, and though the result might have ended in a deadlock if Kuropatkin had not made up his mind to use the VI. Corps boldly, yet success could not have rested, as it certainly did, on the standards of the Japanese.

Comments on the Use of the Reserves Looking at the broad outlines of the day after studying the details as far as we know them, the first thing that strikes one is the very different use of reserves made by either side. At the beginning of the day the reserves may be summed up in a tabular form as follows :—

Class of Reserve	Japanese	Russian
C. in C.'s Reserve	12,000 bayonets, 36 field-guns, some heavy guns	I. Corps VI. Corps Dembovski Kossagovski } 2500 sabres 50,000 bayonets 262 guns
Army or Group Re- serves	1st Army— Part of a bri- gade, 12th Division 4th Army— 10th Kobi Brigade 2nd Army— 16 battalions Total at high estimate— 25,000 bayo- nets	Stakelberg— 17 battalions, about 10,000 bayonets Zarubaiev— 12,000 bayonets X. Corps— 9000 bayonets XVII. Corps— 9000 bayonets Total at a low estimate— 47,000 bayonets, a large number of guns

It is not possible to estimate the reserves held by the Russians on their defensive positions, but it may be noted that their method appeared to be to occupy a number of points weakly and then, when an attack developed, to bring up more troops to the threatened point. This system is diametrically opposite to our practice, which is to arrange a line of defence and place troops to hold it. Alternative lines may be and are selected. A portion of the troops told off to hold the line form local reserves. The General Reserve is for offensive action pure and simple. The rôles of the two portions of the force are quite distinct, and it is contrary to our practice to reinforce the

troops detailed for the defence of the position from the General Reserve.

Thus when the Western Group, advancing with two army corps in line, halted and prepared to defend their positions, each army corps would have detailed the numbers requisite to defend these positions and have handed over the troops so detailed to a commander responsible for the section of the line to be held by each corps. This commander would have retained a portion of his troops in local reserve to the defence and placed the others in the firing line. The troops detailed for the firing line would have been so disposed as to cover the whole line allotted to the section of defence, and the remainder of the troops allotted to the defence would have been placed in suitable positions behind the firing line, ready to deliver local counter-attacks without calling on the General Reserve held back for ultimate offensive action. The number of troops required for the defence would have been arranged from the first to defend the whole line, and according as the ground demanded strong or weak forces, so would the General Reserve—*i.e.* the remainder of the corps after the troops for the defence were told off—have been strong or weak.

It is clear that this system is different from that adopted by the Russians, who occupied a few points and then dribbled up battalions and batteries from

the General Reserve to fill up gaps in the line wherever the Japanese seemed threatening at the moment.

Instead of each commander of a section of defence knowing what his task was, and the means at his disposal for carrying it out, no commander knew exactly what was required, and called for reinforcements as soon as the enemy appeared.

In the particular case under discussion we may assume that the strengths of the two corps, X. and XVII., were 20,000 rifles and 100 guns each. The front of advance of the Western Group was approximately eight miles from Tatungshanpu to Yingpan—that is to say, some 14,000 yards of front. Assuming that it was decided after careful reconnaissance to put 20,000 men to hold this line, each corps might have placed troops equal to a division in the defensive position and held back one division to resume the advance when it was decided to do so.

It should be noted that a more satisfactory arrangement would have been to order one corps to hold the defensive position and keep back the other for attack, but such a formation could not be effected now.

The position was actually occupied as follows:—The XVII. Corps was on the right. West of the Sha river stood Stakhovich, with a flank guard of 5/2/1. The main position from the Sha river to Shiliho village inclusive was held by Yanjul's 3rd Division,

less one battalion—that is to say, one division, about 9000 bayonets, on a front of six miles.

The remaining division of the corps was in reserve, and with it were its guns.

The X. Corps had placed one brigade under Ryabinkin in the main position on the left of the XVII., and held one division in reserve—that is, about 4000 to 5000 bayonets on a front of about two miles.

The position was successfully defended, but all the troops were placed *in the firing line*. Only one local counter-attack of any importance was made, and when in the afternoon Yentaoniulu was lost it was necessary to call on the General Reserve of the XVII. Corps to supply troops to retake the captured village. By nightfall the whole of the Corps General Reserve had been absorbed into the defensive line, for the 137th Regiment, with the divisional artillery, had been moved westwards to defend the right flank.

Of the X. Corps only two batteries and of the XVII. only eight had been engaged.

Had the Russian firing line been carefully posted with due regard to economising numbers, and had local reserves been retained in each section of the defence for the specific duty of delivering local counter-attacks, the whole line could have been held without recourse to the General Reserve.

It should be noted that, except at Yentaoniulu, the

Japanese infantry did not approach to close range, so that the units pushed into the Russian firing line after the commencement of the action were only called upon to withstand an artillery bombardment.

The fact is that the Russians do not seem to have appreciated either the holding power of extended lines carefully placed to cover all the ground to the front, and the value of such positions as " pivots of manœuvre."

A fact which asserts itself in this day's fighting is the absolute necessity for every officer to study and

Value of examine the ground to the front during
Tactical Re- pauses in action. The Japanese always
connaissance did this, and consequently often found joints in their enemy's armour, as, for instance, the abandonment of the village south of Yentaonilu, and were also prepared for and did not lose their way in the night attacks which followed the failure to make ground by day.

The vital necessity for speed in the attack was demonstrated again. The great effect of the fire of concealed guns, even though it be but two or three batteries, was also manifested anew.

CHAPTER XVII

Map X. and Map D

NIGHT OPERATIONS, 11TH-12TH OCTOBER

Preparations—Russian Attack on Yentaoniulu—Attack of the 10th Division on the Sankueishihshan—Attack of 2nd Division—Attacks by the I. and III. Siberian Corps—Note on the Night Attacks

As the sun descended and the dusk of evening merged into the dark of night a hush fell across the battle-field, only broken by occasional shots fired at some moving shape to his front, or by an occasional rattle of musketry when a reconnoitring patrol came into contact with a picket in some village or belt of trees. Now at last the men could get something to appease their hunger and thirst. The Russian field kitchens drove up to the firing lines, and soon the whole plain was dotted everywhere with the little fires of kaoliang stalks made to heat up the rice or soup.

The pause was utilised by both sides to re-collect their companies and battalions, to replenish ammunition, and to prepare for night movements. As we have seen, both sides had realised the inevitable in

this matter. The XVII. Corps had determined to recapture Yentaoniulu, and the I. and III. Siberian Corps both proposed to renew their assaults on the passes during the night. The Japanese Guard, 2nd, 10th and 5th Divisions, all proposed to renew their attacks by night, or at the least to push their attacking lines across the plain which by day was swept by the shells of the Russian batteries.

At five points the night operations assumed importance.

The six battalions, XVII. Corps, detailed to recapture Yentaoniulu had already received their Russian Attack on Yentaoniulu orders. The attack was carried out with success. While four battalions forced their way into the village from the north and west another battalion simultaneously entered from the east. A very fierce bayonet fight took place, ending in the complete discomfiture of the Japanese, who had been so entirely surprised that some of the men did not reach their alarm posts and remove their rifles from the piles. Leaving several hundred dead and wounded behind them, the survivors fell back to the advanced trenches.

Thus the line of the XVII. Corps was re-established, but the whole corps was committed now to the defence of the "advanced" position, for the commander had only three battalions left in reserve.

While this sanguinary conflict was taking place the 10th Division had been forcing its way across the wide plain which stretches to the south-west of the Sankuaishihshan. This hill was defended by a brigade and three batteries of the 37th Division of the I. European Corps. Newly arrived from Europe, this was their first experience of war. The three batteries had already contributed to enforce caution on the 4th Army, but the infantry had only had to suffer some bombardment.

Sankuaishihshan is a rocky outcrop some 500 yards long and 50 yards broad, rising to two little peaks at the extremities. This outcrop rises from a grassy hillside which itself rises gently from the ploughed fields which stretch away for 600 to 1000 yards southwards, westwards and northwards. Between the two peaks is a temple, and at the foot of the rocky outcrop is a village with a mud wall. Village and hill were defended by the 145th Regiment. The Russian line of pickets was on the grassy slope some 150 yards in front of the village, and standing patrols were out on the tracks in front. The Nanshan hill to the east of Sankuaishihshan was held by Mau's detachment of the X. Corps attached to the Centre Group.

The right brigade was to attack "the hill north of Taa," the 8th Brigade was to attack the Sankua-

shihshan, and both together were to capture the Nanshan. The 10th Kobi Brigade was in reserve. The four regiments of the 10th Division were formed in line, each regiment being in two lines, with a line of scouts in front. White arm-badges were worn over the greatcoats and strict orders were given not to fire.

The advance was commenced soon after 11, but it was 3 A.M. before the Russian patrols were encountered, although the distance was only about a mile or a mile and a half. The Russian outposts defended themselves bravely, and only fell back to the village walls when obliged to. The Japanese opened fire and consequently the advance was stayed. Many casualties occurred, brigade commanders and regimental commanders were killed. The whole line swung up to attack the Sankuaishihshan.

At last a volunteer party scaled the walls of the village and the 10,000 Japanese who were now surrounding the 2000 or 3000 Russians broke in to their lines. Even now the struggle was not ended, for a fierce bayonet fight took place. The Japanese troops were thrown into terrible confusion by the converging of the whole of six regiments, for the 10th Kobi Brigade had joined the fray, into the small space held by the one Russian regiment. The Russians lost about 800 men, killed and wounded, about 33 per cent. of their strength, and in addition 200 prisoners and 2 guns. The Japanese losses were 60 officers and 1250 men.

Eastwards of this fierce struggle the Guard and 2nd Divisions, urged on by their hard-fighting general, were renewing the assaults on the IV. Siberian Corps.

Attack of the Guard and 2nd Divisions The 15th Brigade, 2nd Division, had already occupied Temple hill. The 3rd Brigade, supported by the fire of the 15th, now succeeded in capturing the Sanchengtzushan. This attack was commenced about 8 P.M., and was successful before 10 P.M. But little is known of this action except that it was fiercely contested. It is by no means clear who were the troops encountered by the 3rd Brigade on the Sanchengtzushan. Probably they were only a rearguard belonging to the 5th Siberian Infantry Regiment of the IV. Corps.

The Guard Division had proposed to continue its advance at 2.30 A.M. However, it did not start until fully an hour later. As it only advanced encountered and followed up the Russian rearguards its movements more properly belong to the 12th October.

Attacks by the I. and III. Siberian Corps As we have already seen, Stakelberg had decided to call off the troops of the I. Siberian and III. Siberian Corps. Before their orders reached them the troops had themselves initiated a series of severe night attacks.

Although they took place in the small hours of the

12th October they were night operations, and as a matter of fact practically ended the efforts of the Eastern Group to effect a lodgment in the Japanese lines.

At the Taling pass two separate attacks were made by the Russians. The first, about 3 A.M., failed completely. It was anticipated and prepared for. The second, delivered by portions of the 34th and 36th E. S. Rifle Regiments, captured the post on Standard hill which had been held all day. The Japanese counter-attacked in the early hours of the morning. The first attempt failed, but Colonel Ota, the colonel of the regiment making the assault, seized the colours, and at the head of the colour company assaulted the hill, followed by several other companies. Four officers, one after another, were killed with the colours, but the gallant example sufficed and the men were not to be denied. Very soon the hill was again in Japanese hands.

It is noteworthy that the Russians had not taken steps to make good their position as soon as they captured it. This the Japanese invariably did.

At the Tumentzuling an almost similar thing happened. The Russians made good their footing in one portion of the line, but failed to make preparation against the inevitable counter-stroke and to bring up the reserves; consequently they were driven back at daybreak with great loss.

Meanwhile a very desperate affair was taking place north of the Mingshan. Mordanov's Brigade had

received orders to cross the river, and then to recross, and await orders at the foot of the hills. The guides provided lost their way, and it was 3 A.M. before the troops reached the place of assembly. At last, about 5 A.M., the troops were deployed and assaulted. The Japanese line, however, was not to be taken. Again and again the officers led their men up, only to be mown down by the steady magazine fire from the trenches. Before daybreak the assaults ceased, and the assailants drew off, leaving 300 dead in front of this small section of the line.

THE NIGHT ATTACKS, 11TH-12TH OCTOBER


Attack on Yentaonilu

The six battalions detailed for the attack were on their way before dark.

General Glasko, who was in charge of the operation, gave Chienlintangkou¹ as a place of assembly. Thence he advanced across country with his troops in a close formation. The direction of march was Lungwangmiao. Suddenly rifle fire broke out from that village. As it appeared that the movement was discovered, it was decided to halt till dawn. But the firing died away and all was silent in front of the outposts. Glasko then advanced again, and reached Lungwangmiao, where he proposed to deploy the troops for attack. Here blankets were discarded and final orders issued. The force was formed as follows:—The main attack consisted of four battalions. The leading battalion, leaving one company as escort to the colours, deployed two companies on the track, Lungwangmiao-Langtzutai, with one company as a support formed in column of sections. Behind

¹ Not marked in Map.

the leading battalions followed the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, formed in line of companies each in column of double sections. Behind this came the 4th Battalion, in similar formation. The distances between lines was 50 paces. The skirmishers were 150 paces to the front. The formation thus became :



Intervals between Cos 25 Paces

The 1st Battalion of the Zaraisk Regiment was sent through Lungwangmiao so as to attack from the east. The 2nd Battalion of that regiment was formed up at Lungwangmiao as a reserve.

When the deployment was reported complete, Glasko ordered the troops to advance. The troops had fixed bayonets. Fire was opened by the Japanese in the village, but the skirmishing line pushed straight on across the riverbed and the company in support joined the skirmishers. The 3rd Battalion came up on the right and entered the village from the west, while the 1st Battalion Zaraisk Regiment entered it from the east. The timing was perfect and the Japanese were completely defeated, leaving many hundreds killed and wounded in the village. The remnants fell back to the nearest trenches.

The Attack on the Sankuaishihshan


The orders for the assault of Sankuaishihshan were issued at 6.30 P.M. on the 11th. Although these orders do not explicitly say so, it is clear that the first task of the division was to reach a line east and west through Hsiaopu. The west end of Hsiaopu to the south-west of the hill north-east of Taa was given as a dividing line between the two brigades. Each brigade was ordered to form in two lines, firing line and reserve. Two regiments, 10th Kobi Brigade, were in divisional reserve and were to follow the centre. The advance was to begin at 1 A.M. As a matter of fact the whole 10th Kobi Brigade, three regiments, formed the reserve.

By 11 P.M. the advance to the position of deployment was completed and the troops were deployed. It seems that the 10th Kobi Brigade actually came right up to Hsiaopu, for the British official account states that the line was formed as follows :—

The four regiments of the division were in line ; two battalions each in first line formed in line and one each in second line, at 50 paces' distance, formed in line of section columns.

The Kobi Brigade was formed up 150 paces in rear of the centre, two regiments (four battalions) in first line, one regiment (two battalions) in second line. The formation of these regiments is not stated.

The following diagram probably represents fairly accurately the disposition for the attack :—



The German official account of the dispositions for the attack does not quite tally with that of the British. The German account, which seems to indicate that Tapu, not Hsiaopu, was the line of deployment, says distinctly that the right regiment of the line was in echelon some distance in rear.

The German official account also states that the 12th Kobi Regiment, 11th Kobi Brigade, was with the left brigade, which seems, according to this account, to have formed up facing east. Perhaps these are not matters of very great importance. It is sufficient to note that the utmost care was taken about timing, that plenty of time was given for the deployment, and that a signal clearly visible to all parts of the line was arranged to initiate the movement.

The advance was made at a very slow rate. It commenced punctually at 1 A.M. By 3 A.M. the left was about 600 yards south-east of the Sankuaishihshan. Here a Russian patrol was encountered. A few minutes afterwards volley firing opened from the position and from Sankuaishih village. The right brigade, attracted by the sound of the firing and not encountering opposition in their own front, began to bring their right shoulders up and advance north-west instead of north by east. By this time the Kobi Brigade had reached Taa, and two regiments of it were directed to advance in the direction originally assigned to the right brigade, 10th Division—that is, towards Nanshan. However, the magnetic influence of a fight drew in one of the regiments of the Kobi Brigade towards Sankuaishih village.

The brigade on the left continued to press on along the flanks of the hill, meeting everywhere with serious resistance. The brigade on the right, with the Kobi Regiment, were brought up by the walls of the village and were drawn into an exchange of musketry. The senior officers were many of them shot down. The brigade-major called for volunteers, and a forlorn hope of 200 men soon fell in. In spite of losses, this party climbed the walls, and very soon the whole seven battalions stormed into the village. A long and very severe bayonet fight took place. The senior officer present,

Lieutenant-Colonel Gripenberg, though desperately wounded, declined to put up the white flag. However, about a hundred men did so, but still a handful maintained the unequal struggle. Meanwhile the right regiment of the Kobi Brigade had continued its advance northwards as ordered, and finally came into contact with the extreme left of the left brigade, which had brought their left shoulders up until they were facing south.

What was happening to General Mau's detachment on the Nanshan and Lotashan while their comrades upheld the honour of their country in their desperate fight against four-fold superiority of numbers is not clear. As far as can be ascertained, after the failure of his counter-attack against the Temple hill Mau had occupied a position on the Lotashan, abandoning at any rate the western end of Nanshan. The losses in this action were heavy. The Russians lost 200 prisoners and 800 killed and wounded, while the Japanese lost 20 officers and 2250 men killed and wounded. The centre of the whole Russian line was broken and a wedge driven in between the Western and Centre Group. There was no chance of relieving the situation except by engaging most of the Reserve which was still available for offensive action.

CHAPTER XVIII

Map XI. and Map E

12TH OCTOBER

Kuropatkin's Orders and Oyama's Orders contrasted—The 4th Army—The Guard and 2nd Division—Russian Arrangements—The Eastern Group breaks off the Fight—The X. Corps and the I. Siberian Corps—The 2nd Army captures the Line of the Shili—Russian Position at Nightfall—Comments—Note on the Action of the Guard and 2nd Divisions

THE orders issued by Kuropatkin on the night of the 11th were based on the events of the 11th, and a study

Kuropatkin's Orders for the 12th of them might have been made after the account of the operations of the 11th.

The right wing and centre were ordered to hold their ground. Reports of success on the left were hourly expected. It was in pursuance of these orders that the XVII. Corps had recaptured the broken portion of its line by a night attack, and, counting on the assistance of the V. Siberian and the VI. Siberian Corps, it now placed its whole strength in the entrenched position along the Shili river. Only three battalions were held in reserve. The X. Corps sent two battalions to prolong

the left of the line held by its advanced troops under Ryabinkin and to connect with the portions of the I. European Corps on the Sankuaishishan. Thus of the original thirty-two battalions, X. Corps, twenty-two were now in the position and ten in reserve. The night had been utilised to remedy the positions of the artillery and allow the two devoted batteries which had stood at Hungchiachuang to withdraw.

No details are available of any special orders to the Centre Group.

Marshal Oyama's orders were simple in the extreme. After detailing the situation so far as he knew it, he continued : " My intention is unchanged. The 4th Army will drive back the enemy at Sanchiatzu to-night. To this army are allotted the 3rd and 11th Kobi Brigades but the 5th Division will come under my orders. The 1st Army will maintain its positions, except that the 2nd Division will co-operate with the 4th Army. The 2nd Army will attack the Shahopu position." Headquarters will continue at Yentai."


The night was utilised by the 5th Division to assemble at Huangti. A regiment and six batteries were left near Wulitaitzu. This detachment was known as the Yamada detachment.

These orders were afterwards amplified to the 2nd Army by a directive worded as follows :— " The

principal object of your army during the day will be to drive the enemy from the neighbourhood of Panchiaopu and Liutangkou so as to facilitate the wheel of the 4th Army to the right. Your left flank division should therefore gradually move to the east so as to attack the enemy's right flank."

These orders explain clearly the idea of each Comments commander. In the evening of 11th October the situation can be put diagrammatically thus :

Diagram of Situation Evening Oct. 11th



Kuropatkin's plan was for West and Centre to stand fast while East advanced westwards.

Oyama's plan was for East to stand fast while West advanced northwards, then Centre would wheel eastwards, separating the Russian East and Centre from West.

In order to give the 4th Army room to wheel up it

was necessary to drive back the Russian Western Group. The 2nd Army was therefore ordered to envelop the Russian right with the 4th Division. The Russian centre and left were to be cut off from their line of communication and obliged to retreat over difficult mountain roads.

It is quite clear both from his orders and from his dispositions that Oyama did not know of the position of the VI. Siberian Corps and Dembovski's detachment of the V. Siberian Corps. The confidence with which the Japanese continued to trust in the holding powers of the 12th Division and Umezawa's Brigade is of great interest. It proved beyond a doubt that the Japanese knew and realised the advantage which modern weapons give to troops fighting a delaying action when in the hands of men who know how to use them and use the ground. It was clear that they understood the use of a "pivot of manœuvre." Oyama's orders show that the great superiority of the Russian on the eastern flanks was fully realised.

The Operations
of the 10th
Division with
the three Kobi
Brigades

As we have seen, the night attacks by the 10th and 2nd Divisions were punctually carried out, but the extreme confusion in the 10th Division and 10th Kobi Brigade obliged General Nodzu to attempt to continue with the 11th Kobi Brigade the movement initiated at night by the 10th

Division and 10th Kobi Brigade. But the advance could not be begun early in the day.

The 1st Army advanced very early in the morning. The left brigade of the 2nd Division attacked General

The 2nd Division and the Guard Mau's position on the Lotashan about 4 A.M., while the right brigade of the division, when order had been established after its brilliant night attack on the Sanchengtzushan, pursued its advance until it came into line with the left brigade.

Kuroki had indicated Tumentzu as the objective for the Guard Division. Accordingly the Guard advanced about 3.30 A.M. The right brigade of the division not only captured the hill north of Mien-huapu but by 7 A.M. was established on the Shanchengtzuling Pass. The left brigade, which had been expected to meet the most severe opposition, advanced at the same time. The right regiment of the brigade had a desperate bayonet fight on the Watanabe Yama, in which one battalion alone lost 200 killed and wounded. The brigade followed up their success by advancing to Pachiatzu.

The IV. Corps fell back to a position south and south-east of Yensansai.

Mau still held the Lotashan. About 7 A.M. the right brigade of the 2nd Division advanced, and under heavy fire from the Russian artillery reached Fuchuyao. About 11.30 A.M. the order to advance

from the village was given. This the brigade did with the same rapidity that its sister brigade had done on the attack on the Temple hill on the previous day. But the affair did not come to push of bayonet, for the Russians were already in retreat, and though their retiring lines were swept by a storm of shot and shell they never increased their pace and quietly retired to a rallying position in rear. The whole of the Guard and 2nd Divisions were now across the Shili river. The Guard were occupying a line facing a little west of north and the 2nd Division a little east of north, enclosing the IV. Siberian Corps and Mau's Division.

It was clear that the IV. Corps needed help. Zarubaiev was informed by Kuropatkin that the II. Siberian Corps would be sent to his aid. Later he was told that the 22nd Division of the I. European Corps would support him, but as he considered that he could hold his own with the aid of the II. Siberians he refused this offer.

Meanwhile a protracted correspondence between Stakelberg and Kuropatkin was carried on. This resulted in the II. Siberian Corps remaining where it was, and taking no part in the fight either of the Eastern or Centre Groups.

In the afternoon the right brigade of the 2nd Division, under Matsunaga, was ordered to withdraw its firing line and to move behind the Guard

Division to the Chaohsienling to assist the 12th Division by a counter-attack against the right of the Eastern Russian Group. Kuroki's action was based apparently on a mistaken impression as to the importance of the successes of the 4th Army.

Meanwhile the I. Siberian Corps and III. Siberian Corps had commenced to follow up their unsuccessful night attacks, and all along Further Attacks by the front the Russian firing lines were Eastern Group trying to advance. An unexpected come to an End event completely upset Stakelberg's calculation, and finally decided him to abandon his efforts and to retreat.

Prince Kanin, with 8 squadrons of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, had reached Chiaotou on the 10th. On the Intervention of the 2nd Japanese Cavalry Brigade 12th, supported by 1200 men collected from the lines of communication, he boldly advanced against Samsonov's and Ljubavin's 25 squadrons. The roads were bad, the vehicles carrying the machine guns had to be manhandled, and the guns themselves carried. Cossack patrols were met, but in spite of that Samsonov's Cavalry were completely surprised and fired into while in mass. Both Cossack divisions fell back, exposing the left of Rennenkampf's Infantry on the north bank of the river. Some reserves were observed in close formation, and were

fired into by the machine guns. Their loss was heavy. Rennenkampf, disconcerted, fell back on Weiningying; and though Ivanov held on till dark, retreat was decided on.

Thus the Japanese 1st Army had achieved all, or almost all, that was required of it. The right had finally discomfited the Russian main attack, which by evening was withdrawing, unmolested, it is true, but completely repulsed. The Guard and 2nd Division had forced the IV. Siberian Corps to withdraw, and, though Mau's troops still held out on the Lotashan, it was clear that the Centre Group of the Russian army was in a precarious position.

The 4th Army, on the other hand, was not able
4th Army to push forward beyond the line cap-
tured during the night.

The withdrawal of the bulk of the 5th Division precluded any possibility of driving in the wedge between the Centre and Western Russian Groups, for the disorganised condition of the 10th Division and 10th Kobi Brigade left available only the Yamada detachment and the 3rd and 11th Kobi Brigades, in all fifteen battalions. As the Yamada detachment was engaged with the left of the X. Corps, and the 11th Kobi Brigade was engaged with the troops of the I. European Corps, really only

the 3rd Kobi Brigade, six battalions, was available for an attack towards Mengchiafen.

The disorder into which the splendid 10th Division was thrown by its night advance and assault, and its consequent immobility on the 12th Comment October, is instructive. A day attack would not have had the same result, though, on the other hand, it would probably have been more costly.

Behind the gap in the Russian line, with an advanced guard on the hills west of Mengchiafen, The I. European Corps, less the pean Corps stood the I. European Corps, less the two regiments on the Shuangtzushan. The only way to make a further advance in the direction of Mengchiafen was to put in the main body of the 5th Division. This Oyama was reluctant to do. Consequently there was but little movement by the 4th Army all day.

While these events were happening in the Centre and East the Western Group was being attacked The Western by the 2nd Army. On the right, the Group XVII. Corps, reinforced by one brigade of the VI. Siberian Corps, had to face the assaults of two and a half Japanese divisions.

Some assistance was given by Grekov's Cavalry, which retarded to some degree the advance of the left Japanese Division, the 4th, but the corps was severely defeated.

Before considering this action it will be as well to consider the action of the X. Corps on this day.

The X. Corps belonged to the Western Group, and should have received its orders from Bilderling.

The X. Corps Kuropatkin, however, dealt direct with Sluchevski, the Corps Commander, and is therefore directly and personally responsible for the confusion which ensued.

At 6.30 A.M. Sluchevski received orders direct from Headquarters ordering a retreat to the "main position"—that is, the position in which the reserve of the corps stood, for the line of the Shili river was called "the advanced position." Sluchevski was also ordered to collect a reserve of at least a division, to be "used with caution." Such a phrase is worthy of the best efforts of the Delphic priests.

Orders were at once issued for a withdrawal by echelons from the left.

At 8.15 the counter-order arrived, this time from Bilderling. About 8.30 two more orders arrived almost simultaneously; the first from Kuropatkin, ordering Sluchevski to keep his reserve behind his left, ready to support Mau, and the second from Bilderling, ordering him to keep his reserve behind his right.

By now the advanced position was under heavy fire from the guns of the 5th Division, which were with the Yamada detachment, but as the orders to

retire were not yet cancelled the left regiment of the line fell back from Yingpan. Elsewhere the advanced position was maintained for the present.

In order to satisfy both orders as to the disposal of his reserve, Sluchevski placed two regiments on the left, and the rest of such troops as he could collect on the right.

Towards noon the Yamada detachment, reinforced by a battalion from the main body of the 5th Division, advanced in conjunction with the 3rd Division. About the same time Sluchevski was ordered both by Bilderling and Kuropatkin to send at least a brigade to the XVII. Corps.

Six battalions were at once despatched, and a regiment which was on the left ready to reinforce Mau was brought back to near Ningkuantun.

The advanced position had now to be abandoned, for the XVII. Corps was in retreat.

The regiment which had fallen back from Yingpan was at Takou. It was ordered to a position east of Ningkuantun. Then the five batteries fell back, covered by the Koslov Regiment. Last of all the Voronej Regiment fell back, under cover of the guns.

Until evening the X. Corps showed a bold front to the Yamada detachment and the right of the 3rd Division. It was not till 7 p.m. that Sluchevski realised that the XVII. Corps had been defeated. He then decided to retire, but received orders from

Kuropatkin to hold on. However, about 11 P.M. orders to retire reached him from Bilderling, and about midnight, in pouring rain, the retreat commenced. The last regiment to retire was the 33rd Regiment, between Hungpaoshan and Ningkuantun. This regiment was attacked about 9 P.M. by two battalions of the Yamada detachment, which were beaten off with heavy loss. The X. Corps, less the infantry of Mau's detachment, had entered the lines south of Shahopu by 5 A.M.

The Yamada detachment halted at Hsinchuang. The main body of the 5th Division was north of Tumentzu, where were also half the guns of the division withdrawn from the Yamada detachment.

Oku's orders had been already issued when those of Army Headquarters reached him, and he did not need to alter them.

The Attack of the 2nd Army The Russian position was to be gripped in front by the 3rd and 6th Divisions, and turned, by the advance of the 4th Division, west of the Sha river.

The XVII. Corps had been reinforced by a brigade, eight battalions, of the VI. Siberians. This formed a reserve to the corps.

On the right bank of the Sha stood Stakhovich's flank guard, now increased to 6/10/3.

As we have seen, troops of the 3rd Division had

occupied Yentaoniulu on the 11th, and had been driven back by a night attack.

During the small hours these troops, with their supports, had entrenched about 400 yards from **3rd Division** Yentaoniulu, and about 6.30 they commenced the action. The right wing of the division was exposed to severe artillery fire, principally coming from the lines of the X. Corps, and as the left was advanced in front of the general line it was obliged to await the advance of the 6th Division. Towards 11 A.M. this latter division reached Langzutai, and finally the Russians abandoned Yentaoniulu. The 3rd Japanese Division then occupied the village. The division then crossed the Shili river, and after sharp fighting the Russians abandoned Shiliho village and fell back.

The engagement of the 6th Division commenced with an artillery battle. The artillery of the division and **6th Division** 13th Artillery Regiment over-powered the Russian guns on the right of the Russian line, and the infantry were able to advance about 10 A.M. An infantry regiment worked its way up the bed of the Sha river, and when Tayungchupu was taken by the 4th Division more troops were passed up the river-bed to take the Russian position in reverse.

The VI. Siberian Corps did nothing, and finally General Zaschuk, commanding the advanced troops

of the XVII. Corps, decided to withdraw before it was too late. Part of the right of the 6th Division then helped the 3rd Division to attack Yentaoniulu. The reserves were brought up to carry on the pursuit, but the delay enabled the Russians to withdraw in comparatively good order and place a few battalions, skilfully disposed, about a mile north of Langtzutai to serve as a rallying point.

But the Russian officers had not despaired of regaining the lost ground. Colonel Vannovski, of the General Staff, prepared to make a counter-attack ^{Russian} with such troops as could be collected. ^{Counter-attack} He called on Stakhovich to help, and on Martinov, still in Yentaoniulu, to hold on. This the latter was unable to do, but Stakhovich advanced.

At this time a regiment of the VI. Corps from the reserve of the XVII. Corps arrived, and advanced on Vannovski's right.

Without pausing to establish connection, it pushed forward in serried ranks towards Langtzutai. The defenders of Yentaoniulu were met retreating. Coolly, as if on the barrack square, the regiment opened the ranks and let them pass, and then reformed and advanced again, after taking ground to the right a little. The Japanese in Yentaoniulu waited the advance calmly, and when the regiment was about 600 yards away 66 guns and several thousand rifles poured a storm of lead into the serried ranks.

The regiment paused, wavered, broke and fled, leaving 22 officers and 832 men shot down within five minutes. Such was the penalty for disregarding the power of modern weapons. So terrible a loss, over 25 per cent. in five minutes, has seldom befallen a regiment on a field of battle.

The counter-attack was stopped, but towards 3 P.M. another effort was made, and failed. Thereupon Vannovski withdrew his gallant troops.

The 4th Division on the left advanced successfully until about noon, but by that time began to encounter serious opposition from Stakhovich and portions of the VI. Siberian Corps which had reached Tatai. Stakhovich endeavoured to assist Vannovski in his counter-attack, but about 3.30 P.M. he withdrew. About 3.30 P.M. part of the VI. Corps advanced southwards of Tatai, but was overwhelmed and driven back.

At nightfall the XVII. Corps had fallen back to a line, Kuchiatzu-Lamutun. The X. Russian Corps then conformed, and prolonged the left south of Shahopu.
Situation at Nightfall

The I. European Corps held the Mengchiafen hill with a reserve at Kuoshanssu. The IV. Siberian Corps occupied the hills south and east of Yensansai, with Mau on the Lotashan and Shuangtzushan. Mischenko

with one regiment, I. Siberian Corps, was behind the left of the IV. Siberian. The I. and III. Siberian Corps still faced the 12th Division at the passes. The II. Corps had occupied a position south-west of Pienniulupu to cover their withdrawal. Rennenkampf was at Sanchiatzu.

The XVII. Corps and those portions of the VI. Corps which had supported it had been severely defeated, but Oyama's comments plans had not achieved complete success.

The fact was that numbers told. The gallant stand of the Russian XVII. Corps, the splendid courage with which the men driven out of Langtzutai rallied less than a mile north and placed themselves in a posture of defence, the excellent handling of the little flank guard by Stakhovich, the courage which refused to recognise defeat, all contributed, but undoubtedly it was the weight of numbers which told.

The 12th October was the critical day of the battle. Up to that time the ace of trumps was still in Kuropatkin's hands, in the shape of the 50,000 bayonets and 250 guns which had not yet been put into the fight. But the 12th October passed, and still Dembovski and the main bodies of the VI. Siberian Corps and I. European Corps were not employed, still the II. Siberian Corps stood in its "position" five miles from the battle of the I. Siberian Corps at the Tumentzuling. Throughout

the battle the action of the detached wing under Stakelberg had been indecisive. The troops had fought well and had been fairly well led, but frontal attacks are slow work, and no attempt was made to turn the Japanese flanks or to concentrate in overwhelming force at one point. Consequently Oyama was able to concentrate "superior numbers against the decisive point" on the Russian right, and here three divisions attacked an army corps, 32,000 against some 20,000 to 25,000, attack pitted against defence, the initiative against passivity, determination to conquer against determination not to be beaten, high training, physical and military, against brute force and obsolete methods of war.

Who will say that the Japanese showed more courage than the Russians? Surely such a statement is absurd. Personal courage was even more conspicuous on the Russian side than on the Japanese. But personal physical courage is the attribute of some of the races lowest in the social scale. Without personal courage all military skill is, of course, nothing, but personal courage alone is useless without military training and military knowledge. No "aptitude for war" could have helped the Russians that day without good training, good rifle shooting, skilful use of ground. Each and all were required to make the sum total of the qualities which, together with personal courage and physical fitness, brought victory to the banner of the Rising Sun.

It has been repeatedly asserted that Oyama sought to do too much, and consequently failed to achieve anything decisive. It has been asserted that, firstly, his confidence in the ability of the right to hold out unsupported was rash; secondly, that it is not possible for an army to make a right wheel during the progress of a battle; and lastly, that his endeavour to envelop the Russian right before he had established the position of their reserves was rash in the extreme.

Let us take these objections *seriatim*. Was it rash to leave 15,000 men to hold in check the 50,000 to 60,000 which were fully understood to be massed against them? Firstly, what would have been the consequence of failure? The loss of Pênhshiu, and with it the main line of communication of the 1st Army. But the 1st Army was not absolutely dependent on this line, and in fact during the battle received supplies of all sorts from Liaoyang. That is the first result. Would anything more serious have happened? Surely not. Oyama was entitled to count on his troops being able to withdraw in good order, even if they did have to abandon the passes, and then occupy another position in rear. Suppose that Umezawa had been assailed on the 10th, the day on which Oyama expected him to be attacked. Suppose that after hard fighting he had been obliged to fall back on to the 12th Division, which would have occupied a secondary position perhaps on the line,

Chengkouling-Penhsihu. It would not have been early on the 11th that the Russians would have been able to recommence their attack, for Oyama could safely count that the resistance offered would have disorganised the Russians.

The 11th, then, would not have seen the defeat of his right, and meanwhile Oyama was justified in hoping that he would so deal with the Russian right and centre that victory in the decisive section would more than counterbalance retreat elsewhere. Besides this, he who when inferior in numbers does not take risks cannot possibly hope to collect superiority of force at any point in the battlefield. Oyama was inferior in numbers, and knew it. His only chance was to be weak somewhere, and so gain strength elsewhere. However, it will be noted that Oyama's orders actually contemplated an advance on his right. This is perfectly sound. He was determined not to allow passivity on this flank. If the Russians did not attack themselves they were to be attacked and held fast. The 1st Army was his "holding attack," or his "pivot of manœuvre," as events might turn out.

Coupled with the criticism made on the great extension of front on the right is the criticism of the dangerous situation of Umezawa on 7th and 8th October, and again when he was attacked in force at Penhsihu on the 9th. Certainly we find something that appears unnecessarily risky here. The

question as to whether or not Umezawa's position at Pienniulupu was unwarrantably advanced or not was discussed previously. His position as a matter of history proved the salvation of the Japanese. Stakelberg's advancing columns ran up against this strong and skilfully prepared position on the 6th. The country was very difficult. Stakelberg was, above all things, anxious to gain an initial success, and spent the whole of the 7th reconnoitring and bringing up his troops to attack the Pienniulupu position. Umezawa showed a bold front all day, and then fell back. It took Stakelberg all the 8th to get his columns in motion again, and during that day Umezawa was able to distribute his troops satisfactorily on the passes. The 9th found the Japanese ready, and the Russian attack was staved off. On the 10th the 12th Division was brought up. It is contended that had Umezawa been placed from the beginning on the Taling and Tumentzuling passes instead of at Pienniulupu that the Russians would have been saved two days and would certainly have cut the line of communications of the 1st Army, though this might not have been a very serious matter.

Pass now to the next criticism ; which is directed against Oyama's order to the 4th Army to advance, drive back the enemy, and then make a right wheel. It is contended that such an operation is not possible. It is contended that troops can only

advance straight forward in the direction originally assigned to them, and follow up the enemy's troops as they retreat. If they retreat towards a flank, then, as the victor may turn and follow them, his movements bear the appearance of a wheel, but are not really so. There is force in this contention, but is it fully applicable as a criticism of Oyama's plan? Oyama saw, or thought he saw, a gap in the centre of the enemy's line. Into this gap he proposed to drive the left of the 4th Army, which, meeting less resistance, would progress more rapidly than the right of the 4th Army, and could then bear to the eastwards and cut off the Russian right from the Russian left. The Russian right, meanwhile, was to be dealt with by the 2nd Army. This criticism may be better dealt with concurrently with that which asserts that Oyama's action in endeavouring to envelop the Russian right before he knew the situation of the reserves was very dangerous. All war is dangerous. Unless he attacked he could not wrest the initiative from the Russians, or force him to play that trump card of his, the 50,000 bayonets in reserve.

It is said that these two directions, first that the 4th Army was to wheel to the right, and second that the 2nd Army was to envelop the Russian right, mean that Oyama was trying to do two things at once, to penetrate the centre and to envelop a flank.

Oyama's orders were clear, the 2nd Army was "to

assist the wheel of the 4th Army" by forcing the Russian Western Group to retire. This was to be done by attacking them both in front and flank at once. This is quite natural. The 2nd Army would do this instinctively. It would not butt its head directly against the Russian front, it would naturally attack both in front and flank.

On the 12th October it looked as if Oyama's plan would be successful. When the XVII. and X. Corps fell back and the 4th Army prepared to advance from the Sankuaishihshan to envelop the right of the IV. Corps, all looked well, but though the XVII. Corps suffered a disaster, and the 1st Army continued its advance, yet the numbers of the Russians proved too much. The VI. Siberian Corps on the right and the I. European Corps in the centre made their presence felt. The 2nd Army could not repeat its enveloping tactics, the 4th Army could not complete its wheel by which it was hoped to separate the Russian army into two parts. Thus once again the weight of numbers told.

Oyanma was not slow to adapt himself to the altered conditions, and on the night of the 12th he issued orders assigning a somewhat different rôle to each army.

ACTION OF THE GUARD AND 2ND DIVISIONS

The Centre Group, IV. Siberian Corps, Mau's Brigade,

two regiments, I. European, one regiment, I. Siberian, and Mischenko's Cossacks, was placed as follows:—

The 146th and 121st Regiments held the Shuangtushan, and the 122nd Regiment the Lotashan. Two batteries were, in the course of the morning, placed on the Lotashan. The position was very strong. General Mau, who was in command, received orders during the day from Kuropatkin, from Zarubaiev, and from Meiendorf. The Lotashan is separated from the hills south of Yensansai by a side valley. On the southern spur, just north of Fuchuyao, was the 12th Regiment, which had been driven during the night from Sanchengtzu. Here were two batteries. To the left of Mau, Shileiko, with the 9th Regiment and two battalions, 10th Regiment, held out until the early hours of the morning on the Watanabe Yama and on the hills south-east of Pachiatzu. East of that the Sanchengtzhushan was held by Mischenko and the 4th E. S. Rifle Regiment. In reserve, at Heinuitun, stood three regiments. Shileiko and Mischenko were to retire during the night to the hills south and east of Yensansai.

Taking the actions in their chronological sequence, the first to be considered is the advance of the Guard against Shileiko and Mischenko.

Asada, the commander of the Guard Brigade, had received orders to consider the village of Tumentzu and the heights above it as the ultimate objective of his division. He gave orders that the 1st Brigade was to capture the hill north of Mienhuapu before daylight, and the 2nd Brigade was to capture the Watanabe Yama and Pachiatzu also before dawn. The orders took some time to reach the troops, and it was 3.30 A.M. before the force advanced.


The right brigade advanced one regiment on Mienhuapu, one regiment on the hill east of that village. No resistance was met with.

The left brigade also advanced its two regiments on separate objectives. One regiment advanced on the little hill just east of Pachiatzu, and one regiment along the Watanabe Yama.


The right regiment, only two battalions, advanced very slowly, but met no resistance until it reached Pachiatzu. Here a picket was overrun, and a company holding the little steep hill east of the village was charged with the bayonet. A battery which was visible in the dawning day trotting along the road from the west was nearly caught.

Meanwhile the regiment on the left had come upon the Russian rearguard on the Watanabe Yama. The regiment, two battalions, placed one battalion to advance along the ridge from 774 on to the Watanabe Yama, and three companies to advance on the right along the valley and turn the position. One company remained in reserve.

The battalion to advance along the narrow, sharp-backed ridge which separates 774 from the Watanabe Yama formed up thus :



The three companies to advance along the valley formed up thus :



Companies in Column of Sections

The night was very dark, and the formations were suited to the ground and weather.

One company from Brigade Reserve was to attack a knoll west of the Watanabe Yama.

The detailed reasons for adopting the formation and action stated above are set forth in the report by Major Hume, R.A., in Reports of British Officers, and gives a wonderfully clear account of the process of finding out "what the fellow on the other side of the hill is up to."

Major Hume's report is as follows :—

" Major-General Watanabe had from his post on 774 been carefully watching the Russians in his front during the 11th, and though the occupants of the ridge kept well out of sight behind the crests of the spurs the actions of the few who showed themselves gave a pretty good idea of their dispositions and enabled him to decide on the plan of attack which he adopted. At one time during the day he saw some mounted officers come up the valley from the north-west to a certain point. There they stopped for some time and through his glass Major-General Watanabe could see that someone who was evidently the commander was arranging something, and from his actions he concluded that there

must be a considerable force at a second point from the neighbourhood of which many volleys had come during the day. The officers then went back to the north-west, but stopped about three minutes at a third and again at a fourth point, speaking to someone at each spot.

"The General therefore came to the conclusion that there was considerable strength on the crest of the ridge and on its western slopes at the four points mentioned. At the same time the commander of the 4th Regiment reported that the enemy was holding a spur on the east side, and as the General was very anxious to know what force the enemy had on the east side of the valley he watched and examined it carefully. He made out that the trenches could not accommodate more than a battalion, and he could also see men carrying things to the more forward positions. Further, the movements of the enemy's cavalry patrols convinced him that he had no strong force opposed to him on the right front.

"Putting the result of his observations together he came to the conclusion that the main force in his front was posted on the principal ridge of the Watanabe Yama, and on its western slopes, and that it would be possible to move the 4th Regiment round the enemy's left to Pachiatzu before daybreak. In the meantime he would attack the Russians on the ridge with the 3rd Regiment; and even if he should have made a mistake in his dispositions for attack and the 3rd Regiment be checked, yet the presence of the 4th Regiment at Pachiatzu would ensure its eventual success."

The three parties advanced as arranged—that is, the three companies in the valley, the battalion along the ridge, and a company from the Brigade Reserve to attack a knoll on the left and protect the left.

The companies in the valley of course moved the faster, but the battalion on the ridge was the first to meet the enemy. The battalion on the ridge appears to have been ordered to draw attention to itself, for its leading sections halted and opened fire when 150 yards or so from the enemy's trenches. After a time the advance was resumed. About forty yards

from the trenches whistles were heard, and the men flung themselves on the ground to allow the first storm of lead to pass over them. The next twenty yards cost many lives. More sections from the supports deployed. Meanwhile the battalion on the right, in spite of a galling fire in its own right flank, had wheeled up. Twice was the bayonet attack repulsed, but at last it succeeded, and the gallant rearguard of the 9th Regiment retreated, leaving 108 bodies on the crest. The Japanese rushed on to fire into the retreating enemy, who also received heavy fire from the right regiment, which had reached Pachiatzu. Three hundred bodies of this rearguard strewed the northern slopes of the Watanabe Yama before shelter was reached. By 10 A.M. the left brigade was at Pachiatzu, two batteries were on the little hill east of Pachiatzu, one battery was in the plain, and one in a covered position on a spur of the Watanabe Yama.

We left the right brigade of the division, having successfully occupied Mienhuapu and the hills eastwards with orders to "time its advance by the troops on the left." The brigade commander could hear the heavy firing on Watanabe Yama. Should he await the advance of the left, or should he take his courage in both hands and cross the valley, orders or no orders? He took the risk, and, driving in Mischenko's rearguard, he occupied the Shanchengtzushan and the Shanchengtztuling. While the Guard was advancing the right brigade, 2nd Division, was also preparing to advance across the valley from the Shanchengtzushan, which had been captured about 1 A.M. The batteries of the 2nd Division were in position before dawn just north-east of Panlashantzu, and at 7 A.M. the infantry advanced from Shanchengtzushan to the shelter of the houses and trees of Fuchuyao.

At 10 A.M. two batteries of the Guard opened fire from near Pachiatzu, and three batteries of the 2nd Division opened fire at the same time. A Russian battery which was in close support of the infantry north of Fuchuyao was silenced, but batteries north of Tumentzu, behind the line

now occupied by Shileiko's infantry, continued in action. Yet, though 32 guns seem to have poured their shell into Fuchuyao, the loss of life was small. No doubt had the Russians possessed some high explosive, or even common shell, the effect might have been better.

The village of Fuchuyao is some 2000 yards or more from the Russian position, which was placed on a knoll or small ridge rising from broken ground. From this broken ground to Fuchuyao itself there is some 600 yards of perfectly open level plain. This plain was swept by the fire of 32 guns and 2000 rifles. At 11.30 the word to advance was given. The brigade was formed strictly according to regulations in firing line supports and reserves. The supports and reserves were in line of company columns.

The advance was made as rapidly as possible, and Captain Vincent, Royal Artillery, who watched the attack, says that formation was not bothered about, only speed of movement. "In fact the attack seemed to be carried out in successive lines of men, who from the moment they left the village raced across the open under shell and rifle fire." The loss was slight.

The Barnaul Regiment, opposed to them, had been suffering very heavily, 17 officers (including the colonel, who was killed) were disabled, and nearly 400 men were dead or wounded.

The reserves of the IV. Corps, with two battalions, I. Corps, and two batteries, I. Corps, had prepared a position south of Yensarisai, and orders to retreat were issued to the Barnauls. The 3rd Brigade, therefore, was able to occupy the trenches without hand-to-hand fighting. The Russians retired, under a tornado of shot and shell, in perfect order to their new position.

The 3rd Brigade was just contemplating a further advance when it received orders to move to the left behind the Guard Division and occupy the pass at Chaohsienling. This movement was impossible by day and so was deferred till dark. The men of the brigade were therefore ordered to cook and rest. It remains to consider the action of the left brigade of the 2nd Division.

At 4 A.M. one and a half battalions, right brigade, attached to the left brigade, advanced against the Lotashan. A regiment attacked Nanshan from the south, and another from the west.

After several hours' fighting Nanshan was occupied and handed over to the 4th Army, and the 11th Kobi Brigade of that army attacked the Shuangtzushan, while the 15th Brigade attacked the Lotashan. The artillery support was not effective, the position was very strong, and the attack did not progress all day, in spite of gallant efforts which cost nearly 600 men, or nearly 12 per cent. of their strength.

Following the bloody losses of the day before, it is not to be wondered at that even a final attack under cover of the thunderstorm failed also.

The action on the right of the Japanese Army does not require any detailed description. The neglect of the Cossacks to guard the Penhishu-Chiaotou road allowed the Japanese Cavalry Brigade to come up on the south of the river to a position which made the situation of Rennenkampf's attacking infantry on the north bank quite untenable.

CHAPTER XIX

Map XII. and Map F

13TH OCTOBER

The Situation—Oyama's Orders—Attempt to cut off the Russian Eastern Group—Kuropatkin's Orders—Progress of the Attack on the Right of the Russian Eastern Group—A Counter-attack by the II. Siberian Corps—The Retreat of the Eastern Group—Action of the Guard and 2nd Divisions—Withdrawal of the Centre Group and I. European Corps—Main Body, 6th Division, is moved to the Right of the 2nd Army—The 5th Division is despatched to the Right of the Guard

As a result of the fighting of 12th October the initiative had definitely passed from the hands of ^{The} Kuropatkin to those of Oyama. In ^{The} Situation the struggle of will the Mongol general had proved more resolute than the Muscovite, and as war is pre-eminently a contest of wills the Mongol had gained his point. Yet Oyama had failed to accomplish his whole purpose. He had aimed, not only at wresting the initiative from his opponent by promptly attacking, but also at destroying a portion of his army.

True, the 2nd Army had inflicted a bloody defeat upon one of the Russian corps, but still that corps

had escaped, and though weakened in numbers, and with moral severely shaken, it had formed a line of battle with its wings protected by unbroken troops, and evidently still possessed fighting power.

The bold and resolute action of the Japanese leaders in attack was in marked contrast with that of the Russian leader, Stakelberg. Although he well knew that the whole issue of the battle turned on his success yet he did not engage his reserves, and when his left flank was struck by Kanin's weak force and retired on Weiningying he welcomed the opportunity to break off the fight.

As Oyama had now definitely failed to destroy the Russian right wing it was necessary to decide Oyama's what further action he would take.
Orders The initiative was with him. His troops, uniformly successful, though fatigued by their exertion, were in high spirits, whereas as an experienced leader, educated and thoughtful, he knew that his opponents were at least equally fatigued and must have suffered severely in the most important of the attributes of a soldier—that is, in their moral.

It seems probable that Oyama did not know how strong Dembovski's detachment was nor realise that the whole VI. Siberian Corps was on the right of the XVII. He must have been in some doubt

as to the exact position of the II. Siberian and I. European Corps.

Nevertheless it was necessary to strike a blow at once, and so, in a very different spirit from that of his opponent, he issued orders that his armies should "pursue the enemy as far as the left bank of the Sha river."

The 1st Army had already decided to try and cut off the enemy in the mountains. The 3rd Brigade was to be followed by one of the brigades of the Guard in its march eastwards to endeavour to cut off the Eastern Russian Group. The rest of the 1st Army was ordered to try to reach the line of the Sha river and to endeavour to occupy the hill north of Fengchipu. The 4th Army was ordered to try to reach the line Putsaoa-Changlingtzu. The 2nd Army was to try to reach the line Shahopu-Linshengpu, and to send a strong detachment to Kuanlinpu to protect the left flank from the direction of Sahuchiapu.¹ The 2nd Army, however, was ordered not to attack the Shahopu position if it were strongly prepared for defence. The General Reserve remained near Tumentzu, and the Yamada detachment was to advance on the right of the 2nd Army.

Lines of demarcation between the areas assigned to the 1st and 4th and to the 4th and 2nd Armies were laid down very clearly.

¹ Not on Map.

The intention of destroying the Russian right wing had failed, but the Japanese generals were by Attempt to no means inclined to let their foe cut off the escape without injury. Already, as Russian Eastern Group we have seen, the bold and active leader of the 1st Army had determined to try and cut off Stakelberg's Corps while entangled in the mountains, and this decision the Commander-in-Chief upheld.

It will be interesting now to turn to the Russian dispositions.

By nightfall of the 12th the right of the Russian army was in its prepared position from Linshengpu, through Kuchiatzu and Lamutun, to Changlingtzu. Three army corps stood in these lines, which are over ten miles long. To the right, at Sanchiatzu, stood Dembovski's strong detachment of the V. Siberian Corps.

About five miles due south of the left of these lines stood the advanced troops of the I. European Corps on the hills of Mengchiafen. The Shuangtushan, the Lotashan and the hills south and south-east of Yensansai were still held by Mau with detachments of the X. and I. Corps and by the IV. Siberian Corps, while the left of this line was covered by Mischenko and the 4th E. S. Rifle Regiment.

About four miles eastwards from the left of the

IV. Siberian Corps stood the II. Siberian Corps, occupying a position covering Pienniulupu from the west. The I. and III. Siberian Corps were still in touch with the Japanese on the passes, while Rennenkampf's detachment was at Weiningying. From Weiningying to Pienniulupu is a distance of about twenty miles over exceptionally bad mountain tracks.

Even on the night of the 12th Kuropatkin had by no means despaired of gaining the upper hand. Stakelberg's reports had not led him to expect the complete failure of his left, and it was not till the morning of the 13th that he at last realised that Stakelberg had ceased to attack. Kuropatkin then sent orders to the eastern force to retreat, but before this Rennenkampf had fallen back on Sanchiatzu.

Stakelberg, however, retained the I. Siberian and III. Siberian Corps in front of the Japanese position, and in fact a feeble attempt to attack was initiated against the Tumentzuling.

Early in the morning the flank guard on the Chaohsienling, consisting of two battalions, 3rd E. S. Rifle Regiment, and the 20th E. S. Rifle Regiment, which it will be remembered had been sent there on the 11th, was attacked by the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, under Matsunaga, after a long night march. This night march was one of the feats of the battle. After fighting all the 11th,

Progress of
the Japanese
Attack on
the Right of
the Eastern
Group

delivering a desperate attack on the night, 11th-12th, advancing and fighting all the 12th, the brigade marched all the night, 12th-13th, in pouring rain, through a trackless country, with bad maps, and arrived at the foot of the pass they were ordered to assail just before dawn. The brigade deployed for attack in the dark and advanced with the gloomy cliffs towering up to right and left lit up by the blinding flashes of the lightning, while the crash of the thunder drowned the rattle of the musketry. Up the steep, slippery slopes, here rocky, there covered with short grass with little foothold, the men scrambled, but it was soon evident that without artillery support the attack must fail, so the men were ordered to halt. Towards 7 A.M. a battery came into action, and about 8 A.M. the infantry advanced again, but could not make much ground. The general then decided to abandon the effort.

Meanwhile the 3rd Guard Regiment of Watanabe's Brigade of the Guard had moved from Pachiatzu where it had halted on the 12th, with orders to capture the Huakoulingshan and the Yenlungshan. The remainder of the Guard Division advanced towards the Chienshan, and the hills east of Tumentzu. One battalion occupied the Maerhshan, but the two battalions which attacked the Chienshan were very severely checked, and the left made no progress.

In fact, the reserve had to be put in to check a counter-attack.

It was at this juncture that Matsunaga saw troops coming from east against his left between himself and Watanabe. The gap was filled with the two cavalry regiments, Guard and 2nd. Stakelberg was not prepared to allow his retreat to be easily endangered. After a prolonged exchange of communications, what remained of the II. Siberian Corps after reinforcing the IV. Corps and placing troops at the Chaohsienling—that is to say, about thirteen

Russian battalions and 32 guns—was ordered Counter-stroke to deploy for attack in the direction succeeds, but is abandoned of Huakou. The 3rd Guard Regiment held out stoutly, but by 6 P.M. had been driven off the hills, and Alexiev, the commander of the corps, stood at last in a position to turn the line of passes and break the Japanese front. But it was not to be. Orders for retreat had been issued, and must be obeyed.

The Eastern Group was already in retreat. Stakelberg's orders were explicit. The II. Siberian Retreat of the Corps was to go to Taichiamiaotzu¹ Eastern Group with a rearguard at Tsaichiatun; the I. Siberian Corps was to take up a position from Kuantsi¹ to Feitsunpu,¹ with a covering detachment at Kangtajasen, the III. Siberian Corps

¹ Not on Map.

had to establish itself between Penmiaoling¹ and Pachiatzu,¹ with rearguards on the passes. The cover of night was to be utilised for the retreat, which was punctually carried out.

To see clearly the danger which threatened the 1st Army on this day we must turn to the action on the left of the Guard.

The forward movement of the Guard, minus one regiment, failed all along the line, although Action of the Guard and 2nd Division pushed forward with great gallantry and heavy losses. In fact, the occupation by the 4th E. S. Rifle Regiment of a position threatening to interpose between the right and left columns of the main body of the division endangered the whole line of the Guard. An attempt by the reserve to take this position failed.

After desperate fighting the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division captured the Lotashan, but the Shuangtzushan was held all day against the 11th Kobi Brigade.

At dark the IV. Corps and Mau's detachment retreated in similar fashion to Stakelberg's troops.

The I. Corps fell back during the day to a position west of Peikou, consequently the 10th 4th Army Division and 10th Kobi Brigade made considerable advance, though they did not interfere

¹ Not on Map.

with the retirement of the I. European Corps, which was clearly visible.

The 2nd Army closed up towards the Russian positions, but although an artillery battle raged all

Movement of the Main Body, engaged. In consequence of the 6th Division, to entry into action of the I. European the Right of the Corps, which was now felt for the first 2nd Army

time, the bulk of the 6th Division was transferred from the centre to the right of the 2nd Army. A detachment, consisting of a regiment and three batteries, under Koizumi, connected the 3rd and 4th Divisions.

The Japanese Cavalry Brigade moved closer in to the army, as did Dembovski's detachment on the Russian side.

In consequence of the dangerous position in which the attack of the II. Corps had placed the centre

5th Division despatched to the Right of the Guards of the 1st Army, at 3 P.M. Oyama sent his reserve, the 5th Division, less the Yamada detachment, to the right.

It was accompanied by a regiment of heavy artillery. Before this reinforcement had reached the scene of action the danger had passed.

A very welcome reinforcement of fresh troops which had come up from Korea reached Penhsihu

in the shape of the three battalions, 5th Kobi Brigade, which joined Inouye at Penhsihu.

Thus the evening of the 13th October found the troops of the Russian Eastern and Centre Groups in full retreat. The I. European Corps had fallen back from the hills north-west of Mengchiafen to the hills west of Peikou. The successful counter-attack of the II. Siberians had come too late. The success this movement obtained shows that had it been delivered on the 11th, or even on the 12th, or even early on the 13th, the battle might, even at the eleventh hour, have been restored. It is not too much to say that it was principally due to Stakelberg's reluctance to use his reserve that the efforts of his gallant troops had met with repulse.

There can be hardly any doubt that had this corps attacked earlier the advance of the 1st Army must have been checked, and its line must have been broken. The II. Siberians were a veteran corps, and their attacks did not meet with the bloody reverse that was inflicted on the equally gallant but ill-directed efforts of the VI. Siberians.

But though the Russians had failed, still the Japanese had not attained complete success. The big battalions were telling. The failure to bring up the 7th and 8th Divisions to the seat of active operations was telling against Japan.

CHAPTER XX

Map XIII. and Map G

14TH OCTOBER

Russian Position in the Morning—Kuropatkin gives Orders to collect a Reserve—Oyama's Orders—The 1st Army and 5th Division reach the Line of the Sha—I. European Corps routed—4th Army reaches the Line of the Sha—The 3rd Division breaks into the Line of the X. Corps—A Counter-attack by the VI. Corps—The Situation

DAWN of the 14th October found the long columns of Russian Position the Eastern and Centre Groups struggling over the tracks and roads muddy and difficult after the rain.

Kuropatkin had considered that the positions selected by Stakelberg were too far advanced. He therefore ordered him to come in closer to the centre, and he also directed him to make up a force of twenty-five battalions and send them to Huangshan to form a reserve to the army. After some correspondence the order was complied with, and the Eastern Group was distributed with the III. Siberian Corps near the Kaotailing, the I. Corps, less a division, north of Pienniulupu, and the II. Corps, now reduced to hardly more than a brigade, was

placed a little farther north, with an advanced post on the Titishan south of the river.

The IV. Corps had crossed the river at Fengchipu, and was moving to Erhtaokou. Mau had followed the IV. Corps, and, crossing farther west, went on to Huangshan. Mischenko, with the 4th E. S. Rifle Regiment, covered the retreat of the Centre Group with much skill.

The I. European Corps, four of whose regiments had been carried back across the Sha in the retreat of the IV. Corps, and Mau's detachment, occupied the line west of Peikou. The X., XVII. and VI. Corps were in the same position as on the night of the 18th. Dembovski was also in the same position.

Oyama's orders for the day merely reiterated his intention to clear the southern bank of the Sha river. The 5th Division was to continue its advance. The 10th Division, with two Kobi brigades, was to attack the position of the I. European Corps, and the main body of the 6th Division, which, as we have seen, had by a skilful manœuvre been brought to the right of the 2nd Army, was to assist this attack. The Yamada detachment was concentrated to form a General Reserve, together with the 3rd Kobi Brigade.

In pursuance of these orders, the 12th Division,

with the three battalions, 5th Kobi Brigade, attached, Advance of the advanced from their line along the 1st Army and passes and moved towards Pienniulupu, 5th Division reaching Hsiaoshihchiaotzu.

The Umezawa Brigade also concentrated, and began to move up behind the 1st Army. In Army Reserve were Yamada's detachment and the 3rd Kobi Brigade.

Matsunaga's and Watanabe's detachments, and the 5th Division, less the Yamada detachment, advanced to the line of the Sha. The advanced troops of the I. and II. Corps retired across the river, after some resistance, principally on the Titishan.

The advance of the remainder of the 1st Army, now consisting of the Guards, less one regiment, and the 2nd Division, less one brigade, was delayed by Mischenko's skilful dispositions.

Finally, under cover of a thunderstorm in the evening, Mischenko slipped away across the Sha, and by nightfall the outposts of the 1st Army looked down across the narrow valley which for so many weary months was to separate the two armies.

Mischenko's retreat had become necessary, owing to the retreat of the I. European Corps, which also took place under cover of the storm The 1st European Corps which saved it from a terrible disaster. The I. European Corps was, in fact, in a very

dangerous situation, due to the complete withdrawal of the whole Centre Group except Mischenko's weak rearguard. The corps was reduced to 6/68/12. It was holding a position south and west of Putsaao. This position is some 6500 yards long, a very extensive line for twelve weak battalions. Furthermore, the position was convex towards the south, and the salient thus formed made a vulnerable point.

Against this position were now advancing the 10th Division, the 10th and 11th Kobi Brigades, and the 6th Division, less the Koizumi detachment, and a regiment of field artillery, amounting to about 3/90/30, a fully threefold superiority of infantry and some superiority in guns.

Meiendorf's batteries, badly concealed, were smothered by the fire of 72 guns deployed near Mengchiafen and 18 guns deployed to the westwards. But the infantry attack was not well timed. The 11th Brigade of the 6th Division attacked alone, and was checked, while the advance of the 10th Division was not spirited. Towards 10 A.M. a regiment of the corps was withdrawn to join the main reserve, leaving only three regiments of the 37th Division in the position.

As the X. Corps on the right of the I. was in great danger by reason of a success of the 3rd Japanese Division, the 37th Division was ordered to attack westwards. This it was in no condition to do.

Discipline appears to have been slack, for many of the superior officers were absent from their regiments. Signs of demoralisation began to show themselves. A regiment on the right fell back. The 11th Brigade promptly occupied their position. The 10th Division and attached Kobi brigades advanced. To fill the gap on the right, part of the left regiment was brought across, but this only laid bare the left to an attack by a portion of the 2nd Division of the 1st Army. The advance of the 4th Army was fortunately not vigorous, and it was two hours more before the position was occupied. The I. Corps was now in full retreat. The artillery was brought forward at full speed to fire into the retreating masses. The retreat soon degenerated into a rout which was not stayed until the Sha had been crossed.

The 4th Army was now established on the south bank of the Sha. The 11th Brigade, 6th Division, withdrew west of Changlingtzu, where it covered the right of the 3rd Division, which had been very severely engaged all day.

The 2nd Army had commenced its attack on the Sha river line early in the morning. The ^{The} 3rd Division moved against the left of ^{2nd Army} the X. Corps, the Koizumi detachment against the right of the X. and left of the XVII., and the 4th Division on the west of the Sha river.

Just north of Houtai is a knoll, and this knoll, rising a little above the dead level plain, was made the objective of the attack of the 3rd Division. By one of those curious misunderstandings which are possible even in the best regulated army, this vital point had been abandoned.

The division found itself unopposed.

Leaving a regiment to protect the right, the rest of the division took the defences westwards in flank and reverse, broke into Kanchialutzu, charged a Russian artillery battalion of 24 guns, which only had time to fire a few rounds, and burst into Shahopu at 7.20 A.M. at the heels of the fleeing enemy.

Defeat of the X. Corps and Capture of Shahopu

Across the river the fugitives were being rallied, when, to complete their misfortunes, the Russians lost the gallant Ryabinkin, whose skill had held the lines of the X. Corps intact up to this fatal day. Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Division, had not a single company left in local or divisional reserve. The only hope was the six battalions, X. Corps, which had been with the XVII. and were now on their way back. Three only of these battalions arrived, but, fortunately, just in time, for the survivors on the north bank broke and fled just as the support arrived.

The left of the X. Corps had either to attack

or fall back. It selected the latter. Fortunately this was stopped in time, for Kuropatkin, who was watching the fight from One Tree or Novgorod hill, was working hard to collect reserves, and a force of some ten battalions went forward to support the left of the X. Corps by an attack in the direction of Houtai. Some ground was gained, but all attempts 3rd Division either to recapture Shahopu or the checked Houtai knoll failed. The 3rd Division, however, bent into a horseshoe shape by the advance of its centre, was in a very critical position all day. Relief came in the evening with the thunderstorm.

To all appeals for help by the 3rd Division Oku had replied that it must hold out alone, and this it did. At night the whole of the X. Corps fell back across the river, and the battalions of the 22nd Division, I. European Corps, which had formed the bulk of the force that had so gallantly attacked on the left of the X., fell back to the Novgorod hill.

While the 3rd Division had been thus engaged the Koizumi detachment of the 6th Division had Koizumi attacked the left of the X. and the attacks right of the XVII. Corps at Lamutun and Linshengpu respectively.

The detachment had counted on the support of the 4th Division, but this was not forthcoming on

account of a counter-attack delivered against it by the VI. Siberians. Koizumi had to act alone. Both villages must be assailed simultaneously and at once to assist the divisions on the right and left.

Making skilful use of the cover afforded by the ground by 2 P.M. the Japanese approached Ling-shenpu to within 400 yards. The firing both of guns and rifles was very heavy, the Japanese ammunition being nearly expended. About 4.30 P.M. the village was captured, after severe bayonet fighting. A determined counter-attack, delivered some time after the capture, was repulsed.

Lamutun held out against every effort. The attacks on that village were not supported by artillery in the afternoon because ammunition was exhausted.

The 4th Division, as we have said, was obliged to meet the long-deferred counter-attack of the VI. Siberians.

This was not supported by any effort on the part of Dembovski or Grekov. The XVII. Corps was so occupied with its effort to collect reserves and to hold Lingshengpu that it could not support the attack of the VI. Corps.

The VI. Siberian Corps and on the open level plain must have attacks

The attack was made in two columns, presented an imposing spectacle.

The left brigade deployed in stately lines,

dressed and told off as for a ceremonial parade, all within full view of the waiting Japanese. The gallantry displayed by these exponents of the linear formations of the time of Frederick the Great can be estimated from the fact that of the 3600 rifles of the Yukhnov Regiment nearly 2000 lay dead or wounded on the field of battle. The right brigade, in slightly more supple formation, made some little progress. But it could not be expected that men trained in such methods could hope to deal with the Japanese veterans. The advance was stopped and the corps fell back to its old line, retaining Shouchialintzu. Yet its advance had had some effect. The 4th Division was thrown on the defensive and the XVII. Corps was not seriously attacked except at Lingshenpu.

Marshal Oyama's orders had now been carried out and the left bank of the Sha river cleared.

The Situation Only at Lamutun and at the Putilov and Novgorod hills did the Russians maintain a footing on the southern bank.

The situation was briefly as follows :—

The whole Japanese army except the three battalions, 5th Kobi Brigade, had been engaged in very heavy fighting since 11th October. Some of the troops had been continuously engaged since the 9th. There was no General Reserve left, if we except the

Yamada detachment and part of the 3rd Kobi Brigade. The Army Reserve had long ago been absorbed into the firing line. Brigade reserves, even regimental reserves, were practically non-existent. The losses had been terribly severe. The 1st Army had lost nearly 8000 men, the 4th Army had lost 2400, while the 3rd, 10th and 11th Kobi Brigades had lost 1700. The 2nd Army had lost 5600, to which the 3rd Division had on the 14th October contributed 305 killed and 1200 wounded. On the other hand the 8th Division was rapidly arriving at Liaoyang, and would be available in about a week.

Oyama had accomplished his object. He had driven the Russian army back to the line of the Sha river and had occupied its southern bank. Four of its corps had been heavily defeated and the other four had been repulsed and forced to fall back.

It was not possible for the Japanese to realise the full measure of the difficulties of the Russians, nor could Oyama know that nearly the whole of Kuropatkin's troops had been engaged. However, he could judge his enemy by himself. He himself would never have allowed an enemy to force him back without employing his last man and his last gun, so he might fairly give Kuropatkin credit for the same good intention.

On the Russian side the situation was as follows :—

The right wing had had each in turn of its three corps heavily defeated, and the line through Lamutun and Linshengpu had been broken at the latter village. The I. Corps had, like the VI., failed in its counter-stroke, and one of its divisions had been heavily defeated by the 4th Army. The IV. Siberian Corps was in a state of partial demoralisation, but it would be able to show a front north of the river at Fengchipu.

The left wing was falling back, and was now clear of the Japanese pursuit. Twenty-two battalions from the left wing were marching towards the centre to form a new reserve.

Finally, the ten battalions of Dembovski, the Cavalry Division of Grekov and the Kossagovski detachment in the Liao valley were all available, and had not been engaged.

In many ways it would seem that the Russians were in a not wholly unfavourable position. Dembovski and Grekov, striking in on the left of the Japanese army, supported by the repulsed, but as yet undemoralised, VI. Siberian Corps, ought to have been able to shatter the extreme left of the Japanese line and force Oyama to remain on the defensive. The new central reserve would restore the battle in the centre, and though it might no longer be possible to wrest victory out of the turmoil and confusion of the battle yet a success on the extreme

right would to some extent counterbalance the repulse elsewhere.

While Kuropatkin was collecting a central reserve from the eastern wing Oyama was also at work collecting reserves.

The 3rd Kobi Brigade was ordered to form an Army Reserve while the 10th Kobi Brigade became a reserve for the 4th Army. The 5th Division was ordered to rejoin the 4th Army, and the Umezawa Brigade was concentrated near Mengchiapu as a reserve for the 1st Army. The 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, was ordered to rejoin its division. Oyama, although determined not to cross to the north of the Sha riyer, was determined that west of the Linshengpu salient and south of the river at Lamutun and Putilov and Novgorod hills he would drive back the enemy to gain room for the 2nd Army.

CHAPTER XXI

Map XIII. and Map G

15TH, 16TH AND 17TH OCTOBER

Situation of the 1st and 4th Armies and the Russian Eastern and Centre Groups—Action of the 2nd Army—Capture of Putilov Hill—Russian Counter-attack in Linshengpu—Capture of Lamutun by the Japanese—General Situation of the Russians on the Evening of the 15th—Loss of One Tree or Novgorod Hill by the Russians—Night Attack on the two Hills—End of the Battle—Losses

THE 15th and 16th October was spent by the 1st and 4th Armies in completing their advance to the line of the Sha.

By the evening of 16th October the situation reached was as follows :—

**Situation of
1st and 4th
Armies and
the Russian
Eastern and
Centre Groups**

The 12th Division, with the 5th Kobi Brigade, the 29th Kobi Regiment, and the 1st Guard Kobi Regiment, held a position south of Pienniulupu, while the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was away to the right.

Only two actions of importance took place on this wing. The Cavalry Brigade, following up the retreating III. Siberian Corps, struck its outposts south of

the Wangfuling pass. Its arrival caused Stakelberg to cancel an order previously given to the III. Corps to send two regiments and two batteries to form an Eastern Group Reserve.

On the 16th the II. Siberian Corps pushed a regiment south of the river to the Waitoushan and occupied it, driving off a battalion left there by the 5th Division. The hill remained in Russian hands till the 27th October, when it was recaptured after an exceptionally gallant fight on the part of the Russian infantry quite unsupported by artillery.

The Guard Division occupied a position facing Fengchipu, with its left prolonged by one brigade of the 2nd Division. As reserve for the 1st Army the Umezawa Brigade and one brigade, 2nd Division, stood near Mengchiafen.

On the other side of the river the IV. Siberian Corps faced the Guard, the I. and II. Siberian Corps faced the 12th Division, and the III. Siberian Corps, with Samsonov's Cavalry away to the westwards, watched the left, faced only by the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. Still farther away to the west was General Rennenkampf.

The corps of the Eastern Group were, however, by no means complete, for Stakelberg had sent twenty-two battalions to join the new Army Reserve at Fuchiatur. These battalions were taken principally from the I. and II. Siberian Corps.

Prolonging the left of the 1st Army stood the 10th Division south of Putsaoa.

Dawn of the 15th, though it had brought respite to the 1st and 4th Armies, brought none for the The Action of 2nd Army. The survivors of the the 2nd Army gallant captors of Shahopu had lain all night drenched to the skin, without food and short of ammunition, awaiting the counter-attack which if it did not come in the night would certainly come in the morning. However, the day wore away and no attack came.

The first thing to be done to enable the division to hold its ground was to capture the Novgorod and Putilov hills. Two battalions were transferred from the left, and the 4th Army gave the assistance of the Yamada detachment of the 5th Division, which came up about 4.30 P.M. The advance of the Yamada detachment freed the 11th Brigade of the 6th Division, which moved across to join its own division.

*Capture of the Putilov Hill
relieves the 3rd Division*

In the evening the 10th Kobi Brigade arrived on the right of the 3rd Division. The Russians had held the hills in force all day, but withdrew in the evening.

About 7.30 P.M., in the dusk of the evening, a regiment of the 3rd Division, unwilling to lose for the division the honour of capturing the hills, assaulted

and captured the Putilov hill. Novgorod hill, or, as it was then called, "One Tree Hill" or the "Hill with the Tree," still remained in Russian hands. No Russian attack on Shahopu was actually delivered.

Orders had been issued by Koizumi for an attack on Lamutun at 6 A.M., but at that hour Linshengpu Counter-attack was assailed by three battalions, XVII. on Linshengpu Corps, supported by the fire of 32 guns. Attack after attack was delivered with extreme gallantry, but the three Japanese battalions held their own, though a fourth Russian battalion came up in the evening. The splendid courage with which these attacks were made, costing the Russians no less than 550 men, shows that the gallant soldiers of the XVII. Corps were not slow to recover their moral after their severe defeat and subsequent retreat on the 13th.

Though the Japanese in Linshengpu could not assist, about 7.30 A.M. an attack was launched from

Capture of Shako station against Lamutun. Owing Lamutun by to a series of lamentable mistakes, the the Japanese Russian troops on the right and left of the village gave way. The Japanese were not slow to take advantage of the opening, and, dashing forward, seized the village and poured a hail of bullets in to the fleeing Russian infantry, who only escaped with the loss of 500 men.

Further advance was probably not possible, but in any case six Russian batteries turned their fire on the direction from which such advance could take place, expending nearly 8000 rounds in forty minutes. Against such a hurricane of shell it is impossible that any further Japanese advance was contemplated.

The series of lamentable errors which induced the gallant Colonel Martinov to abandon Lamutun was undoubtedly due in great part to the confusion existing in the XVII. Corps, where odd battalions of different regiments, different brigades and different divisions had become inextricably mixed up.

For example, the attack on Linshengpu was made by two battalions, 12th Regiment, two companies, 140th Regiment, two companies, 137th Regiment, and later one battalion, 139th Regiment. East of Linshengpu were one battalion, 9th Regiment, remnants of the 137th Regiment, part of the 140th Regiment, part of the 138th Regiment, two battalions, 124th Regiment, two battalions, 25th Regiment.

West of the XVII. Corps the VI. Siberian Corps did nothing. Its advanced guards even fell back.

Favourable Situation of the Russians Dembovski, with his portion of the V. Siberian Corps, advanced, and withdrew in pursuance of the letter of Kuropatkin's instructions.

But events were beginning to take a turn more

favourable to the Russians. The composite corps from the Eastern Group had now arrived, twenty-two battalions of veterans under Gerngross.

Besides these, four regiments of the I. European and two of the IV. Siberians were drawn up to the General Reserve. Mau had rejoined his own corps, the X., which had entrenched and strengthened its lines astride the main road. Some peculiar correspondence between Sluchevski and the Commander-in-Chief which took place during the day throws light on the bad system of intercommunication in the Russian army. Portions of the I. European Corps, under General Novikov, had, as we have seen, been holding the Putilov and Novgorod hills. At night they still held the latter. The XVII. Corps had failed to re-take Linshengpu, but otherwise retained its position.

With Dembovski's twelve fresh battalions and the forty-six battalions behind the X. Corps, Kuropatkin disposed of a force of between 25,000 and 30,000 bayonets available for the offensive.

He therefore decided to attack on the 16th, but when he found out that Linshengpu and Shahopu were still in Japanese hands, and that Lamutun and

16th October—
Capture of
One Tree
Hill by the
Japanese

the Putilov hills were now lost, he was obliged to limit his offensive to an attempt to capture these points.

Early in the morning of the 16th the Yamada detachment captured One Tree hill.

This loss made Kuropatkin's position even more difficult.

Gerngros, with his composite East Siberian Corps, was ordered to recapture the hills. It was afternoon before his guns, some 56 in number, came into action, and he decided to deliver his attack at night. His dispositions were made with care and deliberation.

Putilov, with three regiments, was to attack the Putilov hill. Novikov, with three regiments, I. European Corps, One Tree or Novgorod hill, and the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was to envelop the enemy's right.

Yamada, with five battalions and two batteries, was obliged to face the coming storm alone. The 4th Army could spare not a man or gun; the 3rd Division was at the last extremity already. The 5th Division, which ought to have been to hand, had been moved to the Mandarin Road for fear of a Russian counter-stroke on the left.

The 10th and 40th Kobi Regiments were in reserve, but were not on the hills.

At 5 P.M. the storm of shell burst on the devoted detachment clearly preparatory to a night attack. Yamada had already decided to fall back. Unfortunately for the Japanese, a premature advance by the advanced companies of Novikov's attack led to a

general assault on One Tree hill before the defenders had withdrawn. The first desperate assault by the raw troops of the I. Corps failed, but help was to hand. The veteran 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, sweeping round through Shakutun and Liuchiangtun, fell upon the right of the Japanese. One battalion rushed the trenches, while another dashed in upon the regimental transport, bayoneting every man. Confusion, however, arose in the Russian lines, as is inevitable in the dark. The troops of the I. Corps did not attack again, and fired into the 36th Regiment, which fell back a little. Finally about four companies of the Japanese regiment remained in possession of the hill. Before morning they fell back, leaving the hill in possession of the Russians.

Away to the right Putilov had heard the battle raging on the left. It was some time before the hour arranged for the attack, but he moved at once, and soon the grey battalions of his East Siberians of the 19th and 20th Rifle Regiments were advancing in long lines against the hill which was to bear Putilov's name. Two battalions of the 19th Regiment led the way, with one battalion in support and the 20th Regiment in reserve.

The river was crossed without a shot, and the first small rise was scaled. Then from the line of trenches about 400 yards in front burst forth a tornado of flame and shot, which showed that the Japanese were

ready and waiting. But the riflemen of the II. Siberian Corps had only seen the backs of their enemies since they marched out of the bivouacs on the 4th October. Their only fight had been the successful movement against Watanabe on the 14th. The men were not to be denied. Without a shot, the charging lines dashed in with the bayonet. The 20th Kobi Regiment and one battalion, 18th Regiment, were annihilated. Detachments of the 39th Regiment and 40th Kobi Regiment shared the general ruin, and the hill was won.

But for the failure of the central column the veterans of the East Siberian Corps would have completely destroyed the Yamada detachment and the Kobi regiments which held the two hills.

The story of this gallant night attack made by men who had retreated day after day, and had never been allowed to attack as they wished to do, shows that had men like Putilov and Zapolski been their leaders the troops would have gone anywhere. It was not the Russian soldiers who failed, it was their leaders.

As the great counter-stroke was to wait until the Putilov and Novgorod hills were recaptured the The XVII. and XVII. Corps contented itself on the VI. Siberian 16th with a bombardment, under cover Corps of which some remnants of the counter-attack of the 15th who had held on in the outskirts of Linshengpu were able to escape.

An attempt by the Japanese to outflank the defenders of the northern edge of Shahopu failed.

On the right the advance of the VI. Siberian Corps fizzled out. During the day its advanced guard succeeded in moving about a mile south, but there the movement ended. There was no opposition except from patrols.

Dembovski's ten battalions and 32 guns were held at bay all day by two cavalry regiments and one and Dembovski a half battalions of infantry. Towards and Grekov 4 P.M. Dembovski also broke off the fight, but not until the weak Japanese force had inflicted severe loss on his rearguard.

Grekov's Cavalry Division had done nothing. In concert with Stakhovich he had done yeoman service on the Russian right on the 10th and 11th. Since then his squadrons had been easily held in check by Akiyama's weak brigade.

This ended the battle. Certain "rectifications of The End of the boundary," so to speak, took place the Battle in the course of the next week or two. For example, Shahopu was abandoned by the Japanese.

To all practical purposes, however, the armies retained the positions they were in on 17th October.

Here they "went to ground," each side preparing itself for the next great struggle. The Japanese lines consisted, as a rule, of a deep trench with head

cover, the earth from the trench being used to form a breastwork round the villages. Between the villages
The Final Situation deep shelter trenches of low command were placed. The front was covered with abattis and wire entanglements. The troops of each section of defence lived in bomb-proof shelters.

On the Russian side more elaborate works were made. Deep-covered approaches led to the fire trenches, which were covered by elaborate obstacles, mines, trous de loup, etc. Redoubts of strong profile were constructed in many places. Not content with one line of defence, the Russians constructed several, each equally elaborately prepared.

The official estimate of losses is as follows :—

Russians	41,500, including 700 prisoners
Japanese	39,769

The Russians lost 45 guns, and the Japanese 14.

Thus the losses were nearly equal, and when the large proportion of the Russian army that was never seriously engaged is considered the percentages of loss per unit may be taken as nearly equal too.

It must be remembered that the most severe of the Russian losses took place during their attacks—for example, the terrible losses of certain regiments of the VI. Siberian Corps and of some of the regiments of the III. Siberian Corps and of Rennen-kampf's detachment.

CONCLUSION

Strategical Situation in the Theatre of War—Strategical Situation in the Theatre of Operations—Kuropatkin does not use his Advantage, but prepares for an Offensive-defensive Battle—Strategical Situation in the Theatre of Operations after Liaoyang—Analogy between Strategy in October 1904 and May 1863—Moral Factors—Topography—Night Operations—Summary of the Strategical Lessons of the Campaign—Offensive *versus* Offensive-defensive—Duration of Modern Battles—Duration and Losses of Battles in Manchuria compared with those of 1864 and 1870—Extent to which Duration of Battles affects Troops—Will long Battles be the Rule?—Frontal Attacks possible—Russian Numerical Preponderance the Cause of Long Battles—Tactical Lessons of the Campaign—Reserves—Night Operations—Ammunition Expenditure—Formation in Attack—Tactics of Defence—Conclusion

THE period from 22nd August to 17th October was undoubtedly the decisive phase of the Russo-Strategical Japanese War. Before the Russians ~~Situation in the~~ could recover from their disastrous ~~Theatre of War~~ repulse on the banks of the Shili and the Sha rivers, winter was upon the land. The rigours of a Manchurian winter, while not precluding active operations altogether, yet certainly render impossible the conduct of operations in which very large bodies of troops are engaged, for the men must remain out in the open whatever

may be the weather conditions at the time. Consequently the repulse of the Russians at the battle of the Shaho left the Japanese free to continue the siege of Port Arthur at their leisure. By the end of the year that fortress had fallen, and with it all hope that the Russians would gain control of the sea. Moreover the divisions of the 3rd Army were set free to join the main army, an accession of strength which, though it did not and could not equal in numbers the immense reinforcements which poured across Siberia during the winter to reinforce the Russians, nevertheless counterbalanced their numerical preponderance to some extent. The most then which Russia could hope for, when the campaign was resumed in the spring, was to defeat the Japanese army and to conclude an honourable peace following a victory in the open field.

As we have seen, the strategical situation in the theatre of war during these eventful weeks was dominated by Port Arthur. It is strictly true that the Japanese army was covering the siege operations, and the Russian army endeavouring to destroy the covering force in order to relieve the fortress.

Strategical Situation in the Theatre of Operations

But though such was the general strategical situation, yet in the actual theatre of operations between the Hun river in the north and a line

joining Anshanchan to Langtushan on the south, subsidiary strategical factors are to be noted.

On 22nd August the Japanese lay in two distinct masses while the Russians, concentrated at Liaoyang,

Russians hold the "Interior Lines" held what is technically known as the "interior lines." It is clear that this situation gives a general a great advantage.

He can detach a small portion of his force to delay and hamper the operations of one fraction, while with his main strength he falls upon and destroys the other fraction, of his enemy's army. It is, however, essential that the portion of the force detailed to delay and hamper the enemy shall be able to hold its own, until the main body has not only had time to destroy the other fraction of the enemy, but also to return. It is therefore a nice matter of timing to know when or where to strike.

The concentric advance of the Japanese armies was inevitable from the geographical and political necessities. It had been necessary Japanese obliged to adopt first to seize Korea and the army "Exterior Lines" which carried out this operation naturally advanced based on Korea. It had been necessary to isolate and cut off Port Arthur. The army which covered the siege operations naturally advanced up the railway. A 4th Army had landed and advanced between the other two, but by the end

of July it had concentrated with the 2nd Army. The Japanese advance was therefore a concentric advance of two army masses. In this case, as will be the case in most wars, political exigencies dictated the plan of campaign. When Kuropatkin decided to

Result of Kuropatkin's Decision to await at Liaoyang the advance of the Japanese from south and south-east, he fully apprehended the fact that the Attack Japanese concentric advance led naturally to an envelopment of his left flank. Furthermore, the situation of Kuroki's army in the valley of the Lan river seemed to threaten an advance *via* Pienniulupu against the Russian line of communication to Mukden. Very strong forces were therefore placed to guard and watch this flank. The Japanese, too, were cautious of this flank during the long pause from 31st July to 22nd August, for the Taitzu river offered a screen for an approach against the Japanese right. It was for this reason that Umezawa's Brigade was retained behind the right of the 1st Army and during the battle of Liaoyang was pushed up towards Pienniulupu. On the western side of the battlefield both sides were influenced in an opposite sense. On this side the Japanese had to fear an attack against their communications, and the Russians had to fear a manœuvre of a large force to envelop their right. The fact that the Japanese, possessing command of the sea, could utilise the Liao

river and Taitzu river as a line of operations for an army based on Niuchuang made this flank specially dangerous for the Russians ; while the fact that both armies were utilising the railway, which ran up to their western flanks, as a line of communication, led to the fact that reinforcements would come up on this side of the battlefield. Undoubtedly the left flank of the Japanese was their strategically dangerous flank. On the other hand, it seems that the Russian left was, always supposing that the Liao valley was not used by the Japanese, their strategically dangerous flank, for their lines of communication could be most easily reached from the east.

After the battle of the Liaoyang, as the Japanese were unable to follow up their victory gained against superior numbers, the strategical situation on the theatre of operations was entirely changed. The three Japanese armies were now, in the strictest sense, concentrated. The divergence of their lines of communication was slight and comparatively unimportant, except as an administrative measure. We therefore arrive at a situation when two armies of roughly equal strength are facing one another astride their lines of communication. Such a condition has recurred in past history very frequently indeed. As an example we may cite

Change in the
Strategical
Situation after
Liaoyang

the situation of Lee and Hooker in the spring of 1863.

There was no very great advantage to be gained, from a purely strategic point of view, by operating against the Japanese western rather than their eastern flank, though it is true that the Japanese left was still strategically weaker than their right because the railway was their main line of supply and could more easily be reached from the west.

It may be interesting to note the analogy between Kuropatkin's action in October 1904 and Hooker's

**Analogy
between the
Operations in
October 1904
and in May
1863** in May 1862. Hooker endeavoured to turn Lee's left, and in fact succeeded, but he had not given the commander of his "holding" attack a sufficiently free hand. Consequently, hampered by lack of sufficiently clear orders, and by indifferent arrangements for inter-communication, Sedgwick failed to hold Lee's army and was himself "held" by a weaker force. Meanwhile Lee concentrated against Hooker's main force and defeated it. Kuropatkin detached a strong force to turn Oyama's right and sent a weaker force forward to "hold" his enemy's front. Hampered by rigid orders, and by indifferent arrangements for inter-communication, the turning movement failed of its object and was itself "held" by inferior numbers. In each case we find the leaders of the independent

wing acting with a marked lack of resolution, yet both were notoriously good and capable corps commanders. It is not given to every general to find a subordinate such as Stonewall Jackson proved himself at Chancellorsville, or Lannes proved himself at Auerstadt, nor is it given to every general to have the strength of mind to leave his subordinate alone after assigning to him the task which he is to carry out.

So far as that inestimable military quality, moral, is concerned, there would seem to have been but little difference on either side. It has **Moral Factors** been the fashion to extol in terms of exaggerated praise the heroism of the Japanese. It cannot possibly be denied that the Russians showed fully equal courage and tenacity. Indeed when it is remembered that the Japanese were animated by a sincere and eager desire for the war, while the Russian soldiers certainly did not have their hearts in the work, it speaks volumes for the excellence of the discipline of the average Russian regiment that the men fought so well. This is only another example, if proof be needed, of the fact that discipline is of far more importance to the moral of an army than enthusiasm and patriotism, valuable though these qualities are.

The topography of the theatre of operations has been referred to in the course of the book. That it

did not more profoundly influence the strategy of the campaign is due to the circumstance that the Russian cavalry was singularly useless.

Topography, its Effect on the Strategy The topographical features of the western part of the battlefield, the great level plain of the Liao river, are an ideal terrain for cavalry. This plain appears to have been well suited to the combined action of fire and shock tactics. One would have expected that 50 squadrons would have covered the movements of the Russian right, enveloped the Japanese left, and carried confusion and destruction along the Japanese line of communication. In one direction the topography of the country did greatly affect the strategy. The absence of roads made manœuvre slow and laborious. The rates at which considerable bodies of troops can be moved on a normal European theatre of war form no criterion whatever on which to base the rate at which troops could be manœuvred in Manchuria. Marches which on an ordinary terrain would take but a few hours were extended in such a country to days. This circumstance affected the strategy of both combatants, and must have influenced in no small degree the decisions of the generals to take the simplest and most direct method of straightforward advance.

There is no doubt that in the future strategy will be influenced by the necessity to make movements

under cover of darkness. From a purely strategic point of view, night marches made with a view to **Night Operations affect Strategy** concentrating secretly, or of enveloping a flank, or approaching a position without the movement being discovered by hostile aircraft, will no doubt be common. The night also will be used when large armies are employed in order to allow of a road being utilised during the whole twenty-four hours. The other night operation which will affect strategy in contradistinction to tactics is the withdrawal of troops from a position under cover of dark. The movement of the I. and III. Siberian and the X. Corps, under cover of dark, from south of Liaoyang to the Taitzu is a case in point.

Strategic Pursuits Pursuits, whether in a tactical or strategic sense, did not take place during the phase under present consideration. That the Japanese were fully alive to their value is clear. Kuroki's determined effort on 2nd September to break through to Yentai, and his attempt, which was supported by the General Reserve, to cut off the Eastern Group on 13th October, shows this fact quite clearly. The Russians, however, were never a beaten army, they were merely repulsed. They were also much stronger than their enemy in cavalry and guns. It is not at all proved by the results of this campaign that pursuit will be impossible in the future. If

fresh cavalry are available to support the advance of the artillery, pursuits should be perfectly feasible operations.

Such pursuits will probably normally take the form of flank pursuits in which an endeavour will be made to forestall the retreating army, and demoralise it by obliging the retreating columns to fall away from the proper line of supply.

During the battle of the Shaho both combatants were much hampered by lack of proper maps.

Maps Reconnaissance reports are and always will be a poor substitute, particularly when operating in a country in which names of places are so difficult to obtain from the inhabitants.

Strategic reconnaissance by the cavalry was eschewed by both sides, who depended **Strategic Reconnaissance** almost entirely on the reports of spies and secret service agents.

Summarised, we may say that in the domain of strategy the lessons of the war are negative or else

Summary of the Strategical Lessons of the Campaign bear out and prove once again old and established theories. Defensive strategy failed, but it may well be argued that this was in no small degree due to the bad tactical methods of the Russians.

The Russians, superior in numbers, immeasurably superior in cavalry, with a far superior gun, stood to fight in battlefields of their own choosing, and were

defeated. Yet we cannot point to any strategical blunder and say that was the cause of the defeat, as we can point to Hooker's detaching his cavalry to raid and so denuding himself of the mounted arm for the battle of Chancellorsville. There we can place our finger on the spot. Jackson's famous march must have been discovered had Pleasanton's squadrons covered the south and east of Hooker's army.

Throughout the campaign the ace of trumps, the last reserve, was in Kuropatkin's hand, and he never was able to play it.

This leads naturally to the eternal question of the respective advantages of attack and defence.

In the course of this book an endeavour has been made to show that the Russian system of utilising reserves was thoroughly bad. To this, and to a natural lack of decisiveness of character, is due in no small degree the failure of Kuropatkin to employ his reserve. But is not the attitude adopted in some measure responsible for this failure ?

The duration of modern battles has been increased by the long range and accuracy of fire of modern weapons. This is all to the advantage of a defensive attitude. The question of the extent to which the example of the Manchurian campaign in this respect can be accepted as typical of modern war has been much debated.

Offensive
Strategy
versus
Offensive-
defensive

Duration of
Battle

At first, when the long duration of the battles was noted, the theorists began to assume not only that this state of things was normal but that it was likely to become even more accentuated in the future. At the present time the pendulum is swinging back, and theorists are trying to prove that modern battles will be short and sharp.

As a matter of fact, a careful analysis of the two battles under consideration will show that the duration of the actions of particular armies was not so long as is generally thought.

It has became customary to include in the battle of Liaoyang several quite distinct sets of operations.

Duration and Losses in Battles The actions on the east and south fronts on 26th 27th and 28th August, certainly in Manchuria compared with those of other campaigns were not part of the battle properly so-called. The battle of the 30th and 31st August was fought south of Liaoyang, and might more strictly be called the battle of the Tarsu Brook, or the battle of Shoushanpu-Mengchiafen ; while the battles of the 2nd September might more properly be styled the battles of Liaoyang and Hsikuantun. It is not usual to group in one name the two totally distinct battles of Jena and Auerstadt, nor those of Quatre Bras and Ligny ; nor does anyone think of including the two latter battles with that of Waterloo ; yet in point of fact there was not much more connection between the

battles of the 16th and 18th June 1815 than between those south of the Taitzu on 31st August and 2nd September.

The two battles of 2nd September, the one round Liaoyang and the other round Hsikuantun and among the kaoliang fields to the north, were as distinct from one another as the battles of Waterloo and Wavre.

The battle of the Shaho, on the other hand, forms one connected whole. From the time when Umezawa, throwing two battalions into Penhsihu, placed the rest of his brigade along the line of passes, to the time when Putilov made his night attack on the Novgorod and Putilov hills, one central conception connects the operation of both armies. But the actual duration of fighting in any particular part of the field was not so long as some writers seem to have concluded. The fighting on the east, along the line of passes, really only lasted thirty-six hours, for the actions of the 10th October were advanced guard actions, and the fighting on the 13th October was an action under cover of which the Russian main bodies withdrew. The Guard and 2nd Division commenced their action in the early morning of the 11th October, and fought hard all through the 11th and 12th, but the IV. Siberian Corps had had enough by that time and withdrew on the night, 12th-13th. The two Japanese divisions had, however, severe fighting on the 13th. The 4th Army did very little fighting on

the 11th October, had a hard fight on the night 11th-12th, and thereafter, as the table of losses shows, did very little fighting at all. The 2nd Army, on the other hand, had a stiff fight on the 11th and 12th October, and very heavy fighting on the 13th and 14th, the 3rd Division being obliged to keep up this bloody business right through to the 17th.

The following tabular statement shows, in the case of certain divisions, the periods of severity of fighting:—

BATTLE OF LIAOYANG

	26th	27th	28th	29th	30th	31st	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Guard	961	25	93	2	926	19	—	—	1	—
2nd Division	676	31	104	11	15	7	287	823	21	1
3rd Division	6	12	98	1	198	3090	—	4	873	2
6th Division	8	18	94	2	1378	1794	54	7	324	16
10th Division	63	1	5	26	1587	79	19	40	1413	—

BATTLE OF SHAHO

	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th
Guard Kobi Brigade	168	15	275	375	36	5	—	1	2
12th Division	11	26	862	556	110	11	11	11	8
Guards	2	1	452	492	721	20	—	1	3
2nd Division	10	7	1802	679	811	87	—	—	—
10th Division	10	1	88	1385	32	16	2	1	10
3rd Division	6	29	714	726	57	1505	80	310	341
11th Kobi Brigade	—	—	—	389	211	448	5	—	5

The above table may be compared with one showing the losses of certain German corps between the action at Wissembourg on 4th August and the battle of Sedan on 1st September. Occasionally a man was wounded or killed in outpost or advanced guard work between the dates of the engagements mentioned, but these have not been included. Quite a considerable percentage of these losses were "missing." Of the missing but few were prisoners; the larger number were deserters and were not seen again.

TABLE SHOWING LOSSES OF CERTAIN CORPS AT THE ENGAGEMENTS FROM WISSEMBOURG TO SEDAN

	4th August Wissembourg	6th August Worth and Spicheren	14th August Colombey	16th August Vionville- Mars La Four	18th August Gravelotte	29th August Noyart	30th August Beaumont	1st September Sedan
V. Corps	868	5636	—	—	—	—	—	1020
XI. Corps	320	3144	—	—	—	—	—	1556
I. Bav. Corps	—	783	—	—	—	—	—	2108
VII. Corps	—	2329	2004	—	—	—	—	—
X. Corps	—	—	—	5147	105	536	142	449
III. Corps	—	1995	—	6951	52	—	—	—
XII. Corps	—	—	—	—	2119	363	101	1427

The average strength of a German corps was 8 squadrons, 84 guns and 25 battalions. The battalions were fully up to war strength, but the losses by desertion and hard marching were fairly numerous.

Probably the average number of bayonets fit for duty did not exceed 23,000.

The table of losses may also be compared with those of the losses of the army of the Potomac during the battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania. Unfortunately the writer has not access at the moment to the detailed records of the losses of the campaign. These are contained in a "Medical and Surgical History of the War," an official document of the U.S.A. War Department.

A close study of this book will reveal the fact that the losses of the Russo-Japanese War, serious though they were, were no more serious than those endured by the opposing armies in Northern Virginia in 1864.

TABLE SHOWING APPROXIMATE LOSSES OF THE
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN MAY 1864

	5th and 6th	7th	8th and 9th	10th	11th and 12th	13th to 17th	18th and 19th
II. Corps, Hancock	4200	—	200	2080	2500	650	1200
V. Corps, Warren	4100	—	1750	820	1200	50	100
VI. Corps, Sedgwick	4200	—	180	1100	1000	50	100

In addition, about 5000 were missing.

The majority of the missing were deserters.

The average strength of a corps amounted to 24,000 infantry. The VI. Corps, Sedgwick, was somewhat weaker than the other two. Hancock's Corps, the II., was the strongest of the three.

The series of engagements was continued, and culminated in the bloody battle of Cold Harbor, when on 1st and 3rd June the three corps above mentioned lost some 6000 to 7000 men. Between 5th May and 14th June the army of the Potomac consisting of Sheridan's Cavalry (about 12,000 sabres), and the II., V., VI., IX. and XVIII. Corps, lost from all causes 58,000 men. Of these nearly 45,000 were killed and wounded, out of a total strength of about 160,000 to 175,000 men.

Now it will be observed that except the period, 11th, 12th and 13th October 1904 in the case of the Guard and 2nd Division, and 12th, 13th and 14th October in the case of the 11th Kobi Brigade, no periods of heavy fighting exceed two days. In most cases these two days were periods of thirty-six hours' continuous fighting. This is not more severe than the fighting in Virginia. In some respects the most remarkable series in these tables is the series showing the loss of the 3rd Division at Liaoyang. In the night attack of the 30th-31st, and during the 31st, the 3rd Division lost 3090 men. The strength of the infantry of the division cannot have exceeded 12,000, and probably was nearer 10,000 rifles fit for duty. Yet two days after this appalling loss the division submitted to a further loss of 873 in the attack on the Liaoyang defences. It is in the highest degree improbable that the division would have submitted

to such a loss within two days of its repulse from the position of the I. Siberian Corps had it been called upon to attack the same line again. The retreat of the Russians must have raised the moral of the attacker in a most remarkable degree.

However, although, as it has been shown, continuous periods of heavy fighting did not as a rule last over more than thirty-six hours, yet it is true that such long periods of continuous struggle have not often been seen in previous wars.

To what extent then, it may be asked, is this state of affairs likely to be the rule, and how do troops **Extent to which Duration of Modern Battles affects Troops** endure such strain ? The last part of the question may be taken first. The strain of fighting is in many ways less serious than the strain of marching. Long and rapid movements of large bodies of troops, particularly if manœuvring in a more or less concentrated formation—that is to say, away from their baggage and trains, so as to be ready for instant action—is almost more wasteful of men than a great engagement. Troops which can endure the fatigues of the march can endure the fatigues of the combat.

Heavy losses inflicted in a few moments are more destructive at the moment to moral than the same losses spread over a length of time. At the same time, the long-drawn-out strain of such continuous nerve-tension must undoubtedly seriously affect

attacking troops and make the prompt following up of victory a more difficult task than ever.

The question whether or not long, protracted
Will Long struggles will be the rule of modern
Battles be the war remains to be answered.
Rule?

It would seem that this will depend entirely on the circumstances of each case.

Where the terrain is suitable for the attack to mass secretly a large body of men opposite some point of the enemy's line it is more than probable, particularly in the case of very large conscript armies, that the generals will accept big losses and drive the attack home *coute que coute*.

In the long run it is cheaper to win a decisive victory with heavy loss than an indecisive victory with somewhat smaller loss.

The war has certainly not demonstrated that frontal attacks are a sheer impossibility, as has so often been asserted. Where very large Frontal At- attacks possible modern armies are concerned attacks must be frontal, and that part of the enemy's front will be selected for the main attack, before which a large force can be concentrated quickly and secretly, and the attack of the infantry be covered and supported by the artillery and cavalry. No weak screen will be allowed to check such an attack. The fire of hundreds of Q.F. guns will breach the line, and against the breach will be sent a mass of

infantry to break the line. Through the break in the line will pour the cavalry divisions, to complete the victory and hamper the reserves from coming up to stop the breach by an offensive return, or to restore the battle by a counter-stroke. In the Manchurian campaign the extremely deliberate action of the Russians led to "positions" of great strength being occupied and strongly entrenched. The Russian attacker was outnumbered by the Numerical defender, who also possessed superior Preponderance conducted to artillery and superior cavalry. Had Long Battles the situation been changed, and had Oyama possessed an equality in guns and infantry, there is no reason to suppose that the battles would have lasted so long as they did.

The battle of the Shaho really commenced on 11th October. On the night, 11th-12th, the 10th Division, assisted by almost the whole Army Reserve, broke the Russian centre. Had Oyama disposed of two or three more divisions—a force which was available in Japan and would have made his numbers approximately equal to those of Kuropatkin—next day he would have followed up the success of the 10th Division by driving his reserve through to the Sha river at Fengchipu. This would have resulted in the precipitate retreat of the Russian army, and probably in the entire destruction of one of their wings. Now the battle of the Shaho was typical

in many respects of what a modern battle will be, for both sides advanced towards one another with the idea of attacking and defeating the opponent wherever an opportunity offered.

It would seem that in the future, when the principal weapon of strategic reconnaissance will be aerial craft, that the cavalry divisions will be employed to assist the violent attack suggested as being likely, and above all to confirm the success gained. It has been remarked in the course of this book that the Russians invariably succeeded in withdrawing under cover of night when they so desired. This power, the power of breaking off the fight, results from the long ranges at which modern battles are fought. This will result in inducing an earlier use of the General Reserve, for when troops have fought their way forward to close ranges, the labour and time expended is largely wasted if the defender quietly retreats a mile or so to a second position in rear. Consequently commanders will be anxious to get in their blow as soon as possible in order to confirm their success.

Finally, in considering the probability that the General Reserve will be used early in the engagement in order to break the enemy's front, we must not forget that the modern Q.F. gun is a valuable auxiliary to the attack. A great force of guns

will be deployed secretly, and, if proper intercommunication with the infantry can be maintained,

**Artillery Im-
provements of** their fire will be switched from point to point to break down all opposition.

**Advantage to
the Attack** To sum up, we may say that though

modern battles are much longer than those of former wars, yet there is nothing to show that battles will become longer. Indeed there

Summary are indications that the opposite may be the case. Modern nations cannot afford to wage protracted wars, and will be prepared to risk the inevitable heavy loss entailed by

breaking into a hostile front speedily. Modern Q.F. artillery confer a great accession of strength to the attack. Aircraft will discover the position of reserves, and this will be another inducement to use them early in the battle. Aircraft will set free the cavalry to assist the main battle, and these may be trusted to confirm a success if the hostile front is once broken. Finally, fighting at long ranges leaves the enemy power to escape at night.

From these considerations it would seem that the offensive-defensive attitude will not be assumed from choice to-day more than previously. The side which feels strong enough to attack will do so. The weaker will remain on the defensive. If both sides are resolute to advance, that side which breaks into the enemy's line the first will probably win.

In the realm of Grand Tactics—that is to say, the conduct of the operations of large units—the series of actions dealt with in this book offer examples of almost every variety, except the action of large bodies of cavalry, and of pursuits.

We have examples of retreat under cover of rear-guards, such as the retreat of the Russian army during the 26th, 27th and 28th of August. And this example of how such a retreat should be conducted is exemplified in the largest possible scale, for the Russian retreat was covered by no less than six separate rearguards.

We have examples of the deployment for attack under cover of the advanced guards, such as the deployments of the 2nd Army on 30th August and of the Russian attempt to carry out the same operation under cover of a strategic advanced guard, formed of the XVII. Corps, on 2nd September.

We have an example of manoeuvring using an entrenched camp as a pivot. Such was the skilful movement of Kuropatkin on 1st and 2nd September.

We have an example of advancing pivoted on a defensive wing. Such was Oyama's action from 10th October to 12th October. We have examples of endeavouring to break the enemy's centre; such as the attempt of the 4th Army to break in down

the valley of the Tassu Brook on 30th August, and the storm of the Sankuaishihshan on 11th October. We have examples of extending the front so as to envelop the hostile flank ; such was the action of the 2nd Army at both battles. We have examples of holding attacks by one wing and decisive attack by the other wing ; such was the central idea of Kuropatkin's plan of action on the Shaho. We have examples of turning the enemy's flank by a force detached to manœuvre round that flank. Such were the attempt of Kuroki to outflank the Russian left north of the Taitzu, and of Stakelberg to outflank the Japanese right east of the Coal Mines.

We have an example of the danger of operating on both sides of an obstacle. We have examples of fighting in mountains, in open plains, and in crops so dense as to resemble dense bush. We have examples of night operations of all kinds, and on the largest scale. It would be difficult to find any series of operations more replete with instruction in tactics.

It may be as well to mention some of the points wherein this campaign was exceptional. In the first place we note that the Japanese who took the major share of the attackers' rôle on each occasion were inferior in numbers in all arms. Consequently it was quite impossible for Oyama to retain in his own control any considerable reserve. He could only make his will felt by his initial orders.

This placed a very severe strain on his army, and necessitated extreme simplicity in the operations. Oyama was further handicapped by his weakness in cavalry and the obligation to protect his flank with some of his infantry. The Japanese weakness not only forbade the retention of a large General Reserve, but also made the retention of reserves by the several army commanders an utter impossibility.

The Japanese were obliged to depend for their success entirely on the vigour of their attack and never on the bringing up to the decisive point of a fresh force, retained for the purpose of carrying home the attack, and of confirming a victory. Thus we find, on 13th October, that the attempt to cut off the retreat of the Eastern Group was made by Matsunaga's Brigade of the 3rd Division and the main body of the 5th Division, both of which forces had been engaged in the front line. The main body of the 6th Division fought in the centre of the 2nd Army, and was then withdrawn from the front in order to reinforce the 4th Army on 13th October. On the Russian side the reserves retained by the several commanders were, in the aggregate, very large. Reference to this fact has been made previously. It is of interest to note the difficulty which Kuropatkin had in utilising his own General Reserve. At Liaoyang he commenced the action with about one and a half corps in reserve, and the V. Siberian Corps

rapidly coming to hand. Yet for his offensive movement he was obliged to use the troops who had held the "advanced position." He used his reserve during 30th and 31st August to reinforce his defensive line, and during 1st and 2nd September to hold the pivot on which he manœuvred.

At the Shaho he retained three corps in reserve, but one was soon swallowed up to act as a connecting group between the two wings, a second was obliged to put more than half its strength into the defensive line, and the consequence was that only the VI. Siberian Corps and Dembovski's flank guard were available for a counter-stroke. Finally, he brought across to the centre about a corps from the wing which he had used as a main attack and tried to restore the battle in the centre.

It was no doubt to some extent a consequence of the paucity of the reserves held by the Japanese Night Operations commanders that night attacks were so common. No reinforcements were available to push the firing lines along; the close support by artillery was often difficult on account of their inferiority in that arm, and so the leaders had recourse to night attacks. Some of these had a brilliant success; the large majority had only a partial success, or else failed. Even the success of the attack of the 10th Division and 10th Kobi Brigade on the Sankuaishihshan on 11th-12th October was

in one sense disastrous, for the division was thrown into such confusion that it was thirty-six hours before it moved again. The night attack by the 2nd and 12th Divisions on 26th August was of but little service, resulting only in driving in the pickets into their supports. The attacks of the 3rd and 6th Divisions on 30th-31st August, and of the I. and III. Siberian Corps on 11th-12th October were also generally unsuccessful. It must be noted, however, that at two points on this occasion the I. Siberians got in, but were subsequently driven back because they had not made their position secure and brought up reserves.

On the other hand, the attacks of the 15th Brigade on Manjuyama on 1st September, of the same brigade on the Sanchengtzushan on 11th-12th October, the successful recapture of Yentaoniulu by the Russians on the same night, and Putilov's brilliant re-capture of the Putilov and Novgorod hills on 15th-16th October show how useful such attacks can be.

It is impossible to lay down rules on this matter. Night operations will be, as we have mentioned, more frequent than ever in the sphere of strategy, and no doubt also in the sphere of tactics.

A point to which attention must be drawn is the ever-increasing importance of the service of ammunition supply. During the battle of the Shaho the

2nd Army expended ammunition at the rate of 130 rounds per rifle and 300 rounds per gun. In many units the actual expenditure must have amounted **Ammunition Expenditure** to enormous figures. Yet the Japanese rarely opened fire at a range greater than 1000 yards. Even this range was considered to be too great for effective shooting. On many occasions guns were obliged to fire slowly because of a shortage in the ammunition supply, notably on 31st August during the attack of the 3rd and 6th Division on the line held by the I. Siberian Corps.

The attack formation was not very fundamentally changed by the Japanese from the normal attack **Formation** formation adopted by them at the commencement of the war.

During the two battles under consideration the normal attack formation was as follows :—The frontage allotted to a battalion was about 330 yards, or about three rifles per yard. The first line, which was preceded by a few scouts, was formed of a line of men at about one pace interval, with the remainder of the leading two companies in support. The rest of the battalion advanced in line of company columns about 400 behind the first line and deployed into a two-deep shoulder-to-shoulder line as soon as it came under fire.

After the battle of the Shaho, and to some extent

during the battle, the formations became looser. The battalions were no longer at full strength, and the front allotted was frequently more than the 330 yards previously given. A "normal" formation adopted after the battle of the Shaho is described in "Reports of British Officers," vol. ii., pages 178 and 504. A battalion attacking would form a firing line of two or three companies. Each company would deploy two or three sections as a firing line so that the whole front allotted to the battalion was covered by a line of men at from two to six paces' interval. The remainder of the leading companies formed the supports deployed in a single line at two to six paces' interval and 150 yards' distance from the firing line itself.

The remaining company or companies formed a local reserve echeloned on or behind the exposed flank. This local reserve retained a close formation as long as possible, but finally extended in column of sections at 150 yards' distance with two to six paces between men,¹ when the men could no longer be kept under cover of the ground. Advances of the firing line were made by short rushes of each section alternately.

The requisite number of rifles per yard of front to be attacked was thus gained by increasing the

¹ A Japanese company consists of three sections (Shotai) of 75 men each.

depth of the formation and decreasing the numbers in the firing line.

Occasion has been taken to point out the objections to the Russian method of occupying a defensive position. A long, continuous line of men was formed by bringing up reserves to any point threatened and deploying them across the country, often with but little reference to the way in which they could use their rifles. Their prepared position shows similarly an almost continuous front. The modern rifle is of small value unless it be made to give its full effect. This effect may best be gained on the defence by occupying a series of "localities or portions of the front." Intervals may be left between these points, and this will economise men who are available for counter-attack. It may be pointed out that those portions of the attacking force which penetrate into the intervals between the defended "localities or portions of the front" run a peculiarly serious risk of heavy loss from the unexpected and sudden counter-attack of the local reserves. The portions of the attacking firing lines which endeavour to outflank the "localities or portions of front" held by the defence will, it may be noted, offer their flanks to the counter-attacks of the local reserves.

Thus the 10th Division, penetrating down the valley of the Tassu Brook, was counter-attacked and

forced back. The 3rd Division, which broke into the Russian line at Shahopu was struck in flank by the advance of a portion of the I. European Corps from behind the Novgorod hill. We may note too the disaster which befell Meade's division at the battle of Fredericksburg when it penetrated the front of Jackson's Corps and was struck in front and flank by the reserves. In the fighting in Northern Virginia it is quite noticeable that attacking troops who penetrated—as was always possible in such close country—between portions of the defender's line were struck in flank by the local reserves and heavily defeated.

It would seem then that with the modern weapons not only need not a continuous line be held, but it is positively advantageous not to do so.

Some guns of the defence must be posted to sweep all patches of dead ground. The attacking lines cling to such patches as jumping off places for night attacks.

When standing to meet an attack or counter-attack the Japanese frequently held their fire till the enemy was fairly close. This action appears to be well worth imitation.

But when everything has been said and written about any campaign there is always one truth which stands out prominent. Scharnhorst put it thus: "In war it is not so much a question of what is done as

that the action taken be carried through with vigour and determination." Our Field Service Regulation put this old truth thus: "A firmer determination in all ranks to conquer at any cost is the chief factor of success. Half-hearted measures never attain success in war, and lack of determination is the most fruitful source of defeat."

APPENDIX I
UNITS OF JAPANESE ARMY
AND THEIR COMMANDERS

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF - Field-Marshal Oyama

CHIEF OF THE STAFF - Lieut.-General Kodama

1st ARMY. General Kuroki

GUARD DIVISION. Hasegawa (at the Shaho Asada)

Brigades. Watanabe

Asada (at the Shaho Izaki)

2nd DIVISION. Nishi (at the Shaho Nishijima)

3rd Brigade. Matsunaga

15th " Okasaki

12th DIVISION. Inouye

12th Brigade. Shimamura

23rd " Kigoshi

Guard Kobi Brigade. Umezawa

2nd ARMY. General Oku

3rd DIVISION. Oshima

5th Brigade. Yamaguchi

17th " Kodama

4th DIVISION. Ogawa (at the Shaho Tsukamoto)

7th Brigade. Nishijima (at the Shaho Sanaga)

19th " Ando

6th DIVISION. Okubo

11th Brigade. Iida
24th ,,, Koizumi

4th ARMY. General Nodzu

5th DIVISION. Ueda

9th Brigade. Yamada
21st ,,, Tsukamoto

10th DIVISION. Kawamura

8th Brigade.	Otami
20th ,,,	Marui
1st Cavalry Brigade	Akiyama
2nd ,,,	Prince Kanin
3rd Kobi	Okubo
10th ,,,	Moji
11th ,,,	Oki

APPENDIX II
UNITS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY
AND THEIR COMMANDERS

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL FORCES
Admiral Alexiev

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE MAIN ARMY
General Kuropatkin

CHIEF OF STAFF
Lieutenant-General Sakharov

1st SIBERIAN CORPS. Stakelberg

1st E.S.R. Division. Gerngross
9th E.S.R. Division. Koudratovich

2nd SIBERIAN CORPS. Zasulich

3rd SIBERIAN CORPS. Ivanov

3rd E.S.R. Division. Kashtalinski
6th E.S.R. Division. Danilov

4th SIBERIAN CORPS. Zarubaiev

2nd Siberian Infantry Division. Levestam
3rd Siberian Infantry Division. Kossovich

5th SIBERIAN CORPS. Dembovski

54th Infantry Division. Orlov
71st Infantry Division. Ekk

6th SIBERIAN CORPS. Sobolev

1st EUROPEAN CORPS. Meiendorf

10th EUROPEAN CORPS. Sluchevski

9th Infantry Division. Gershelmann

31st Infantry Division. Vasiliev (at the Shaho Mau)

17th EUROPEAN CORPS: Bilderling

3rd Infantry Division. Yanjul

35th Infantry Division. Dobrjinski

GREKOV'S COSSACK BRIGADE, 14 squadrons

(at the Shaho this was 22 squadrons)

MISCHENKO'S COSSACK BRIGADE, 21 squadrons

(at the Shaho, 11 squadrons)

SAMSONOV'S COSSACK BRIGADE, 18 squadrons

(at the Shaho, 15 squadrons)

GREKOV'S COSSACK BRIGADE, 14 squadrons

(at the Shaho, 23 squadrons)

LJUBAVIN'S COSSACK BRIGADE, 12 squadrons

OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF FLANK DETACHMENTS

Kossagovski, Peterev, Madritov

OTHER OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THE COURSE OF THE BOOK


Krause and Zikov, commanding 1st and 2nd Brigades,
9th E.S.R. Division (I. Corps)

Putilov, commanding 2nd Brigade, 5th E.S.R. Division
(II. Corps)

Mardanov and Stolitza, commanding 1st and 2nd Brigades,
3rd E.S.R. Division (III. Corps)

Shileiko and Rebuider, commanding 1st and 2nd Brigades,
3rd Siberian Infantry Division (IV. Corps)

Riabinkin, commanding 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division
(X. Corps)





United Service Institution of India
Library

Acc. No. m 8067

Class No. 355-452 Book No. SED

Author Sedgwick, F.R.

Title The Campaign in Manchuria

Date of Issue

Date of Return

Date of Issue

Date of Return



United Service Institution of India
Library

- * Books drawn by a member can be retained for one month and renewed once, provided no other member requires them.
- * New books must be returned within two weeks.
- * Not more than two books may be on loan at the same time.
- * Members are prohibited from transferring books to other members.
- * Members will be required to pay full price with penalty of any book lost or damaged by them.
- * Reference and Rare books are not allowed to be taken out of the Library.
- * Books are liable to be recalled when in special request.